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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Robert Allan Vogel for the Master 
of Arts in Speech Communication presented May 19, 1986. 
Title: Richard Whately's Theory of Argument and Its Influence 
on the Homiletic Theory and Practice of John Albert 
Broadus. 
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
In his Treatise On the Preparation and Delivery of 
Sermons, the Southern Baptist preacher and educator of the 
latter nineteenth century, John A. Broadus, acknowledged the 
influence of classical and contemporary theorists upon his 
work. Among those named, particularly with regard to notions 
of argument, was Richard Whately, the Anglican Archbishop and 
rhetorical theorist of the early nineteenth century. The 
research task involved in this thesis was to determine whether 
2 
and to what extent Whately's theory of argument was employed in 
Broadus's homiletic theory and practice. 
The writer gathered his data using methods of documentary 
research. Most of the sources were available at local 
libraries. Others, however, were obtained from the Univer-
sities of Kansas, Iowa, and Michigan. Materials by and con-
cerning Broadus were obtained from various Baptist historical 
agencies. 
Both primary and secondary sources were consulted. The 
study of the respective theories of argument and the analysis 
of Broadus's discourses were done using primary sources. 
Secondary sources provided much helpful background and 
evaluation. 
The writer examined Whately's theory of argument, as 
presented in his Elements of Rhetoric, in detail. He did the 
same with Broadus's theory as presented in his Treatise. The 
two theories were then compared. It was assumed that Broadus 
was influenced by Whately when either a direct reference to 
Whately was made or when there existed a similarity of ideas 
which could not be attributed to a common source. Differences 
between the theories of the two men were also noted. 
From the ideas discovered in the study of Whately's 
theory, a paradigm for rhetorical analysis was constructed. 
The model for the paradigm was take·n from Lawrence W. Rosen-
f ield's essay, "The Anatomy of Critical Discourse." The ele-
ments of argument included in the paradigm were presumption and 
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burden of proof, arguments from testimony, analogy, and pro-
gressive approach, and refutation. These were chosen because, 
in the opinion of experts, Whately either created or signifi-
cantly developed them. 
The paradigm was used as a standard of analysis for three 
of Broadus's discourses, namely, "The Duty of Baptists to Teach 
Their Distinctive Views," "Should Women Speak in the Mixed 
Public Assemblies?" and "Immersion Essential to Christian 
Baptism." 
The analysis of Broadus's theory and practice, done by 
this writer, confirms the notion that Whately's ideas influ-
enced Broadus significantly. Broadus's concepts of argument 
from testimony, analogy, and progressive approach and his prin-
ciples of refutation bear the unmistakable influence of the 
Archbishop. Concerning the important matters of presumption 
and burden of proof, Broadus pointedly disagreed with Whately 
in theory. In one of the discourses analyzed, however, the 
writer concluded that Broadus followed Whately's notions of 
burden of proof rather than his own. 
The writer concluded that Broadus's use of Whately's 
ideas demonstrated their usefulness in the task of preaching. 
The findings of this study confirm the opinions of others who 
hold Whately's theory in high regard. 
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The study of argument as a rhetorical process is 
nothing new. Aristotle and others of his day recognized 
and described the process as it was employed in the estab-
lishing of propositions in various speaking contexts. 
The study of rhetorical process in preaching is 
nothing new, either. St. Augustine in his treatise On 
Christian Doctrine, Book IV, established the propriety of 
applying classical rhetorical concepts to the practice of 
preaching. Therefore, it is to be expected that argument 
theory, though in the minds of some a secular notion, 
could be applied to preaching. 
Various homileticians have discussed the application 
of argument theory in preaching. Among these were Richard 
Whately, an Anglican archbishop of the early nineteenth 
century, and John Broadus, a Southern Baptist educator and 
preacher of the latter nineteenth century. This thesis 
involves the joining of the work of these two men and 




The Significance of Broadus and Whately 
Background Concerning John Broadus 
One of the most significant men in the history of 
Baptists in America is John Albert Broadus, scholar, edu-
cator, and pulpit orator. During his lifetime {1827-
1895), Broadus made significant contributions to the work 
of Baptists in the south. Some of these accomplishments 
are presented below. 
His participation in the founding and developing of 
the Southern Baptist Seminary was his primary life's work. 
Although he taught in several disciplines at the Seminary 
with scholarly credibility, he is probably most widely 
known as a teacher of preaching. Broadus has left his 
mark both as a theorist and practitioner of homiletics 
upon the students he taught as a professor at the Semin-
ary, and in succeeding generations through his Treatise on 
. 
the Preparation and Delivery of Sermons. Concerning the 
excellence of his homiletic theory and practice, Professor 
W. C. Wilkinson of the University of Chicago wrote: 
Every characteristic I have now pointed out as 
found with Doctor Broadus in the teacher of 
preaching is found also with him, and more rather 
than less, in the preacher. His practice well 
comports with his theory--comments and commends 
it. To the thoughtful student of both the theory 
and practice of the man, it becomes evident that 
in Doctor Broadus's case the practice preceded the 
theory. But it becomes equally evident that also 
the theory following reacted, as it should do, 
confirming the practice •••• 1 
E. Y. Mullins, who was one of Broadus's successors as 
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president of Southern Baptist Seminary noted the extent of 
Broadus's influence when he wrote: 
It may be said without exaggeration that Dr. John 
A. Broadus, the first teacher of Homiletics in the 
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, did more 
than any other man of his generation in the South 
to create pulpit ideals for the Baptist ministry. 
Indeed, his influence was felt in all parts of the 
country and the world. • 2 
Broadus was a popular preacher and speaker. A sur-
vey of his engagement book reveals that he was in great 
demand among the churches of both the south and the 
north--no small matter in the years surrounding the Civil 
War. His reputation as a scholar of preaching was such 
that he was invited to deliver the 1888-89 Lyman Beecher 
Lectures on Preaching at Yale, the only Southern Baptist 
ever accorded the honor.3 
1An Eminent Professor of Homiletics, "Criticisms of 
Some of the Ablest Representative Preachers of the Day: 
Rev. John A. Broadus, D.D.," Homiletic Review XVI 
(August, 1888). In Life and Letters of John A. Broadus, 
p. 367, the "eminent professor" is identified as W. c. 
Wilkinson, who served at the University of Chicago. 
2 E. Y. Mullins, "The Seminary and Preaching," The 
Baptist Argus, VI (May 1, 1902), p. 5, cited by James--
Roland Barron, "The Contributions of John A. Broadus to 
Southern Baptists" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
Southern Baptist Seminary, 1972), p. 180. 
3vernon L. Stanfield, Favorite Sermons of John A. 
Broadus (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1959), 
p. 5. 
4 
Besides teaching at the seminary and preaching in 
the churches, Broadus frequently addressed meetings of 
local Southern Baptist associations as well as those of 
the Southern Baptist Convention at large. His speaking 
gave him national prominence and significant influence 
during the first fifty years of the Convention's 
existence. 
These accomplishments make Broadus a man worthy of 
study for students of preaching in general and students of 
evangelical Baptist preaching in particular. 
The Influence of Richard Whately on Broadus 
One of the major aspects of Broadus's homiletic 
theory involved the use of argument in preaching. The 
importance of this subject to Broadus is expressed in the 
preface to his Treatise, where he wrote: 
The subject of Argument is thought by some to be 
out of place in a treatise on Homiletics or on 
Rhetoric in general. But preaching and all public 
speaking ought to be largely composed of argument, 
for even the most ignorant people constantly prac-
tice it themselves, and always feel its force when 
properly presented; and yet in many pulpits the 
place of argument is mainly filled by mere asser-
tion and exhortation, and the arguments employed 
are often carelessly stated, or even gravely 
erroneous.4 
4John A. Broadus, A Treatise on the Preparation and 
Delivery of Sermons, Fourteenth ed. (New York: A. C. 
Armstrong, 1889), p. x. 
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No doubt, the importance of good argument (as well as 
other elements of homiletic theory) was impressed upon 
Broadus by other theorists whom he read. In his Treatise 
he freely admits the influence of others on his work. 
Among those he mentioned are Aristotle, Cicero, Quintil-
lian, Alexandre Vinet, James w. Alexander, w. G. T. Shedd, 
and James M. Hoppin.s 
In his section on argument, he asserted that Richard 
Whately, the Anglican Archbishop whose Elements of Rhe-
toric was published in 1828, had the greatest influence. 
Broadus expressed his interest in Whately's theory of 
argument most specifically in his discussion of homiletic 
1 i terature. He wrote, "Whately' s Rhetoric is believed to 
be the best treatise for practical use that has appeared. 
Especially valuable are the portions on Argument and on 
Style. 11 6 This opinion is again affirmed in a footnote 
5 Ibid., p. x. Vinet, a French homileticican, wrote 
Homilet~ or the Theory of Preaching. The work was 
published after his death in 1847. It was translated into 
English by Thomas H. Skinner, Professor of Sacred Rhetoric 
and Pastoral Theology at Union Theological Seminary, New 
York, in 1854. Alexander taught homiletics at Princeton 
Theological Seminary. His book, Thoughts on Preaching, 
was published posthumously in 1860. Shedd, a professor at 
Union Theological Seminary in New York, wrote Homiletics 
and Pastoral Theology in 1867. Hoppin filled the Chair of 
Homiletics in the Divinity School of Yale University when, 
in 1869, his Off ice and Work of the Christian Ministry was 
published. For further information, see E. c. Dargan, The 
Art of Preaching in the Light of Its History (New York:~­
George H. Doran Company, 1922), pp. 184, 220-222. 
6Ibid., p. 32. 
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{appearing early in his chapter on argument) in which he 
said, "In this chapter much use is made of Whately, whose 
discussion on Arguments is the most valuable part of his 
work on Rhetoric, and unequalled by other treatises."7 
Broadus's opinion of the excellence of Whately's 
work is widely shared. One whO---highly praised Whately's 
work was Sir Richard c. Jebb, the English classical scho-
lar of the nineteenth century. Comparing Whately to Blair 
and Campbell, Jebb wrote, " .undoubtedly the best 
modern book on the subject is Richard Whately's Elements 
of Rhetoric.a Orville Pence quoted twelve different 
writers who testified to the excellence of Whately's ideas 
set forth in his Elements of Rhetoric and its companion, 
his Elements of Logic.9 Golden, et al., more contemporary 
writers, note the significance of the Elements of Rhetoric 
"as a historical document and as a moulder of contemporary 
argumentation theory. 11 10 Ehninger made the following 
7 Ibid., p. 162. 
8Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. "Rhetoric," 
by R. C. Jebb. 
9orville Pence, "The Concept and Function of Logical 
Proof in the Rhetorical System of Richard Whately" (Ph. D. 
dissertation, University of Iowa, 1946), pp. 13-15. 
lOJames L. Golden, Goodwin F. Berquist, and William 
E. Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought, 2nd ed. 
(Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1978), p. 136. 
statement regarding Whately's work: 
Because Whately's decisions on some of the major 
questions in rhetoric have proved sound and fruit-
ful through many years of practice, the Elements, 
while not to be numbered among the great creative 
works on the subject, is certainly to be ranked 
among the most influential. For the same reason, 
though now a century and a third old, it has much 
to say to the student of rhetoric yet today.11 
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The value of Whately's work to Broadus was no doubt 
enhanced by their mutual interest in the application of 
the theory of argumentation to preaching. Being a clergy-
man, Whately oriented his theory specifically toward reli-
gious discourse. Golden states that Whately's extreme 
devotion to Christianity so shaped his system of argumen-
tation that his approach could well be called an ecclesi-
astical rhetoric.12 
Although Broadus respected Whately's theory, he did 
not merely copy it. While admitting that he freely 
employed Whately's work, he developed the subject of argu-
ment "with very large additions, and with the attempt to 
correct some important errors"l3 in Whately's work. 
llRichard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed. Douglas 
Ehninger (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1963), p. xxx. 
12rbid., p. 137. Ehninger, in the introduction to 
his critical edition of Whately's Elements of Rhetoric 
makes a similar statement. 
13Broadus, p. ix. 
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Purpose and Rationale 
The purpose of this study is to trace the influence 
of Richard Whately's theory of argument on John Broadus's 
theory and practice of preaching. Such a study is desir-
able because both of these men are widely recognized for 
their influence on the rhetoric of preaching. The extent 
of their influence and reasons for their fame have been 
briefly cited above. 
Sublevels of purpose and rationale are related to 
specific directions the study is taking. One goal of the 
study is to expound and compare the theories of argument 
of both men. The exposition provides a brief but useful 
synopsis of two similar theories of argument. The discus-
sion of Whately's influence and Broadus's criticisms of 
Whately's theory provide a comparative evaluation of both 
theories. The description and evaluation of models of 
argumentation. should be useful in the ongoing development 
of rhetorical theory. 
Another goal of the study is to describe and eval-
uate the practical application of Whately's theory by 
applying procedures of rhetorical criticism to a select 
few of Broadus's discourses. Three have been chosen for 
this kind of analysis: "Duty of Baptists to Teach Their 
Distinctive Views," "Immersion Essential to Christian 
Baptism," and "Should Women Speak in Mixed Public 
9 
Assemblies?" These particular addresses were chosen 
according to criteria which are stated subsequently in 
this chapter. 
Review of the Literature 
Works Concerning Whately 
The work of prime importance for analyzing Whately's 
theory in this study is his own Elements of Rhetoric. 
Part I, sections 1-3, contains his statement concerning 
argument. Helpful commentary is included in the Douglas 
Ehninger edition of this work (1963.) 
Numerous works have been written about Whately's 
theory. Maxfield Parrish discussed that theory, as 
influenced particularly by Coplestone and Aristotle, in 
"Whately and His Rhetoric" (Quarterly Journal of Speech, 
February, 1929.) Parrish's doctoral dissertation (Cornell 
University, 1929) also concerned Whately, but treated his 
Oxford background, his college reading, the various edi-
tions of his works, and his sources rather than his 
notions regarding logical proof .14 Ehninger's article, 
"Campbell, Blair, and Whately Revisited" (Southern Speech 
Journal, Spring, 1963) traces the influence of classical 
models upon Whately. (This article is a refinement of an 
14pence, p. 4 • 
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article by Ehninger in the Southern Speech Journal, 
October, 1955.) Pomeroy's article, "Whately's 'Historic 
Doubts': Argument and Origin" (Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, February, 1963) includes some useful personal 
background on Whately, although most of the article does 
not deal with his rhetoric. James Golden's The Rhetoric 
of Blair, Campbell, and Whately (1968) includes an edited 
version of the Elements of Rhetoric. Golden's collabora-
tion with Berquist and Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western 
Thought (1976) includes a synopsis and brief analysis of 
Whately's notions of presumption and burden of proof. 
Some other works concentrate on the narrower aspects 
of argument in Whately. A definitive examination and 
evaluation of logical proof in Whately's rhetoric, parti-
cularly as compared with Aristotle's Rhetoric, was under-
taken by Orville Pence in his dissertation entitled, "The 
Concept and Function of Logical Proof in the Rhetorical 
System of Richard Whately" (unpublished dissertation, 
University of Iowa, 1946). Pence in a subsequent journal 
article ("The Concept and Function of Logical Proof in _the 
Rhetorical System of Richard Whately," Quarterly Journal 
of Speech, March, 1953) analyzed the Archbishop's view of 
conviction. Anderson and Hayes (Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, June, 1967) summarize Whately's idea of burden of 
proof and demonstrate how he applied it in one of his 
speeches. Leathers (Southern Speech Journal, Winter, 
11 
1969), comparing Whately to John Stuart Mill, asserted 
that Whately was anti-empirical in his approach to proof. 
Works Concerning Broadus 
The primary source for examining Broadus's theory is 
his own Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery of Ser-
mons. Of specific interest is Part I, Chapter VI, 
entitled "Argument." This book originally appeared in 
1870, which was early in Broadus's career. Through subse-
quent years, he made several notations of revisions which 
he wished to incorporate in a new edition of the book. 
Broadus died before he could publish a revision, but 
within two years of his death his associate at Southern 
Baptist Seminary, E. C. Dargan, prepared a revision based 
primarily upon Dr. Broadus's notes and incorporating his 
verbal ideas.15 A comparison of the two volumes on the 
subject of argument discloses changes in organization, but 
none in substance. 
Among the literature concerning Broadus's life and 
work are The Seminary Magazine, Broadus Memorial Edition 
(April, 1895), C. L. Cocke's "An Address on the Character 
of John Albert Broadus, before the Baptist General Assoc-
15John A. Broadus, A Treatise on the Preparation and 
Delivery of Sermons, rev. E. C. Dargan (New York: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1898), pp. vi, vii. 
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iation of Virginia" (November 17, 1895), and A. T. 
Robertson's Life and Letters of John Albert Broadus 
(1901). Among more recent works is James Roland Barron's 
dissertation, "The Contributions of John A. Broadus to 
Southern Baptists" (Southern Baptist s"eminary, 1972.) 
Barron described Broadus's accomplishments during his 
career and thus provides useful personal background con-
cerning the man. 
Probably the major work on Broadus's homiletical 
theory has been "A Study of the Rhetorical Theories of 
John A. Broadus" by Paul Huber (unpublished doctoral dis-
sertation, University of Michigan, 1956). Huber's work 
summarized Broadus's theory and identified the influence 
of writers Broadus quoted in his treatise. In the four-
teen pages devoted to his theory of argument, Whately's 
influence, among others, is discussed. Jerry Paxton Ashby 
("John Albert Broadus: The Theory and the Practice of His 
Preaching," New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, 
1968) determined to compare Broadus's theory with his 
practice. Using the Weatherspoon revision of Broadus's 
treatise as a basis, he studied 250 of Broadus's manu-
scripts to determine the extent to which Broadus applied 
various aspects of his theory. The work advanced Huber's 
study by considering the sermons of Broadus, but the 
analysis of so many speeches resulted in superficial 
treatment. The statistical nature of the report was 
accompanied by only minimal analysis of sermon content. 
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For purposes of the present study, Broadus's ser-
mons, addresses, and writings are also relevant litera-
ture. Broadus himself published his favorites in Sermons 
and Addresses (1886). v. L. Stanfield edited a collection 
of twenty-four sermons entitled Favorite Sermons of John 
A. Broadus (1959). Several addresses and written dis-
courses were published in pamphlet form. Among these are 
"Denominational Sermon: The Duty of Baptists to Teach 
Their Distinctive Views" (1881), "The Study of the Bible 
by Books, its Advantages" (1881), "Three Questions as to 
the Bible" (1883), "Should Women Speak in Mixed Public 
Assemblies?" (1890),16 "Immersion Essential to Christian 
Baptism" (1892), and "Christianity Essentially Missionary" 
(1893). 
Methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to trace the influence 
of Whately's theory of argument on the theory and practice 
of Broadus. The methods selected, therefore, had to 
enable the achievement of two goals. First, they had to 
expose the theories of the two men, covering their 
16He said that they should not. 
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similarities and differences. Second, they had to provide 
a vehicle for rhetorical criticism of Broadus's sermons 
and addresses. 
The achievement of the first objective was essential 
to the accomplishment of the second. The first procedure 
produced a model for argumentation, which became the stan-
dard for the criticism of Broadus's practice. 
Of first priority was the description of Whately's 
theory of argument as set forth in his work, Elements of 
Rhetoric. Elaboration from secondary sources named in the 
literature review enhanced this description. The theory 
has been summarized to identify the major elements of 
argument and their relationships to one another. 
The second procedure was to describe Broadus's 
theory, drawn from his chapter on argument in his treatise 
and elaborated through research in secondary sources. 
Significant in this description was the comparison of 
Broadus's ideas concerning argument with those of Whately. 
It has been assumed that Broadus was influenced by Whately 
when either a direct reference to Whately is made or when 
there exists a similarity of ideas which cannot be attri-
buted to a common source. Differences between Whately and 
Broadus have also been noted. 
This procedure accomplished two objectives. First, 
it provided a summary model of argument, which could be 
used as Broadus's own standard for rhetorical analysis of 
his sermons and addresses. Second, it traced the influ-
ence of Whately on Broadus's theory. 
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Having described the theories of both men, the 
writer then turned to the second goal, using methods of 
rhetorical analysis to assess whether and how Broadus 
applied his theory of argument. Specifically, three 
addresses and written discourses, selected for diversity 
of occasion and purpose yet all dealing with controversial 
subjects, were analyzed. 
The criteria used for selecting the addresses and 
discourses were as follows. First, the addresses chosen 
had to be available. Although this criterion is obvious, 
it is not as insignificant as it might appear. Because 
Broadus generally preached extemporaneously rather than 
from a manuscript, only a relatively small number of his 
sermons and addresses were ever available in print. 
Furthermore, it is likely that with the passing of time 
many of the records have been lost. Although the number 
of available sermons, addresses, and discourses is some-
what limited, there is a sufficient number for purposes of 
analysis. 
Second, the addresses were chosen for either their 
controversial content or their persuasive intent. It is 
self-evident that one would argue to establish a viewpoint 
that is disputed. The titles, introductory comments, 
16 
and central propositions of twol7 of the three chosen 
clearly indicate divided opinion concerning their topics. 
It is also self-evident that argument is naturally a part 
of persuasion. In onel8 of the three it is evident that 
Broadus desired to move his audience to adopt a course of 
action, which required some argument to persuade. It is, 
therefore, reasonable to expect that Broadus would employ 
his theory and skills of argument to establish his view-
point regarding each of the subjects at hand. 
Implied by the second criterion is the third, 
namely, that the development of those discourses chosen 
must involve at least some argument. Argumentation would 
naturally be expected by the nature of the propositions 
involved, but if Broadus had not met the natural expecta-
tion, little analysis essential to this study could be 
done. 
The fourth criterion was that the address could be 
one originally either spoken or written. This is not to 
deny the significant differences between oral and written 
discourse. Rather, it is to suggest that these differ-· 
ences, such as style, are irrelevant to the interest in 
argument involved in this study. Whether written or 
17 11 rmmersion Essential to Christian Baptism" and 
"Should Women Speak in Mixed Public Assemblies?" 
18"The Duty of Baptists to Teach Their Distinctive 
Views" 
17 
spoken, the arguments presented were directed toward an 
identifiable audience, were relative to a stated proposi-
tion, and involved a clear purpose, either expressed or 
implied. 
The rhetorical analysis followed the eclectic model 
of Lawrence w. Rosenfield, set forth in his essay, "The 
Anatomy of Critical Discourse."19 According to Rosen-
field, in critical discourse verdicts (i.e., judgments or 
evaluations) are pronounced, and reasons justifying the 
verdicts are offered.20 Because such is the nature of 
critical discourse, it is like forensic reasoning, in 
which observations are juxtaposed with normative standards 
in some fashion.21 In short, Rosenfield proposes that one 
evaluates what he's criticizing by comparing the criti-
cized entity to a standard. 
Rosenfield further suggests procedures for relating 
the norm and the observation. One means he describes is a 
"model modality." In this approach the critic begins by 
generating a paradigm (an "exemplar of a kind") which will 
19Lawrence Rosenfield, "The Anatomy of Critical Dis-
course," in Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A.Twentieth 
Century Perspective, second ed., revised, eds. Bernard L. 
Brock and Robert L. Scott (Detroit: Wayne State Univer-
sity Press, 1980), pp. 148-74. 
20Ibid., pp. 153-55. 
21Ibid., pp. 156ff. 
be his basis for comparison.22 From the comparison 
follows 
a kind of diagnosis; if the model conforms 
to the critic's rhetorical theory (as we must 
assume it does if it is to be regarded as a para-
digm), then disparity between the norm-discourse 
and the actual one should provide some insight 
into both the aesthetic excellence and the rhe-
torical we~knesses evident in the discourse being 
inspected. 3 
18 
The analysis can, in turn, become a critique of the stan-
dard as well. The critic may search for reasons to 
account for deviation from the model in the criticized 
entity. The explanation for the extent and character of 
deviation constitutes the invention of critical reasons.24 
The application of Rosenfield's procedure, then, 
begins with the construction of a model. The model, or 
paradigm used in this study was that of Whately. The 
rhetorical analysis of Broadus's addresses required juxta-
posing them against Whately's paradigm. The analysis 
describes the phenomenon, evaluating how well Broadus's 
practice conforms to Whately's theory. In turn, explana-
tions for deviation have been suggested in order to judge 
the paradigm itself. 
Background information for each address or discourse 
was examined when possible. It was expected that the 
22Ibid., p. 170. 
23Ibid. 
24rbid., p. 171. 
occasion of each and the audience's opinions concerning 
the subject would determine the argument employed. 
Plan of Organization 
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first 
introduces the subject, presenting its purpose and 
rationale, reviewing the pertinent literature, and des-
cribing the methodology employed in the study. 
19 
Chapter Two provides personal background of Richard 
Whately and selectively develops his theory of argument. 
Chapter Three includes background information con-
cerning John Broadus, and selectively presents his theory 
of argument. Through comparison, the influence of 
Whately's theory is traced. 
Chapter Four consists of the rhetorical analysis of 
three addresses or written discourses based upon a model 
derived from Whately's theory of argument as presented in 
the second chapter. Description and evaluation are 
included. 
Chapter Five includes a summary analysis of the fin-
dings of the study. Conclusions are drawn respecting the 
extent to which Broadus followed Whately's model, and how 
he may have veered from it. Judgments are offered con-
cerning the value of the paradigm itself. Also included 
are suggestions for further study. 
As Broadus pointed out, even the most ignorant of 
men practice argument, and feel its force when it is 
properly done.25 However, in pulpits and other public 
20 
forums argument is regularly abused. It is the author's 
hope that this thesis will strengthen the abilities of its 
readers to argue a point in an excellent manner, not only 
for the sake of contemporary rhetoric, but also for the 
sake of truth. 
25Broadus, 14th ed., p. ix. 
CHAPTER II 
RICHARD WHATELY'S THEORY OF ARGUMENT 
As stated in the previous chapter, the inquiry of 
this thesis concerns the influence of Richard Whately's 
theory of argument on the homiletic theory and practice of 
John Broadus. It is, therefore, logical to begin the 
investigation with a description of Richard Whately's 
theory of argument. In this chapter, the writer will 
provide a brief sketch of Archbishop Whately's life, an 
overview of his theory, an exposition of selected elements 
of argument he set forth in his Elements of Rhetoric, and 
an assessment of his contributions to the study of 
rhetoric. 
Background of Richard Whately 
Richard Whately was born in London, England on 
February 1, 1787, the son of Joseph Whately, prebendary of 
Bristol.l As a child confined to the indoors due to 
delicate health, he developed an interest in books early 
in life. His reading even as a child piqued his interest 
in mathematics, ethics, and politics. These disciplines 
1New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967 ed., s.v. "Whately, 
Richard." 
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proved to be foundational to his later interests in logic, 
the Church, and political economy.2 
In 1805, Whately was admitted to Oriel College, 
Oxford. He completed his B. A. degree in 1808, was 
elected Fellow of Oriel, and earned his M. A. in 1812. 
Soon after his degree was conferred, he was ordained an 
Anglican clergyman. In 1825, after spending four years in 
a pastorate at Halesworth in Suffolk, Whately became prin-
cipal of St. Alban Hall, Oxford.3 In 1829, he was 
appointed Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, a 
position which suited his "lucid, practical intellect."4 
In 1831, Whately resigned his position at Oxford to 
accept the call to become Archbishop of St. Patrick's 
Cathedral in Dublin. He served in this position until 
1853.5 From this office, he became involved in the poli-
2James L. Golden and Ed ward P. J. Corbett, The Rhe-
toric of Blair, Campbell, and Whately (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), p. 273. 
3 Ibid. 
4Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. "Whately, 
Richard." However, Parrish notes that his interest in. 
political economy was largely underdeveloped due to his 
greater concern for theological matters. Wayland Maxfield 
Parrish, "Whately and His Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal 
of Speech 15 (February 1929): 68. 
5Kenneth s. Latourette, Christianity in a Revolu-
tionary Age, vol. 1: The Nineteenth Century in Europe 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1959), p. 
397. 
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tical, social, and religious ferment of his day. Although 
he supported Catholic emancipation and reforms intended to 
help the Irish poor, he was not popular in Dublin,6 for he 
was an Englishman and a Protestant.7 
In his later years, Whately's health failed. For 
this reason he spent most of his time in his study. After 
an extended illness, he died on October 1, 1863, and was 
buried in St. Patrick's Cathedral.8 
Whately the Controversialist 
His years as a student and tutor at Oxford were 
extremely important in shaping the ideas and personal 
traits for which Whately would become known. His tutor at 
the· University was Ed ward Coples tone. Coples tone, who 
himself wrote satirical and argumentative works, sharpened 
Whately's taste for controversy.9 Whately's emerging 
interest in theological issues, coupled with his flair for 
controversy, is evident in his satiric pamphlet, "Historic 
Doubts Relative to Napoleon Bonaparte," written in 1819. 
6Golden and Corbett, p. 274. 
7F. R. Webber, A History of Preaching in Britain and 
America, 3 vols. (Milwaukee: Northwestern Publishing 
House, 1952-57), 1:533. 
8Golden and Corbett, p. 275. 
9parrish, p. 59. 
Although he regularly disclaimed controversial intent, 
this particular tract was quite provocative.10 
The purpose of the pamphlet was to show that the 
24 
conclusions of sceptical criticism, as advocated by Hume, 
were based upon fallacies. Hume had argued that the 
miracles recorded in the Bible cannot be accepted on the 
basis of human testimony. Heavily employing the reductio 
ad absurdum argument, and using Hume's critical proce-
dures, Whately argued that the existence of Napoleon Bona-
parte could not be admitted as a "well-authenticated 
fact."11 In other words, applying "the same methods used 
to cast doubt on Biblical miracles would also leave open 
to question the existence of Napoleon Bonaparte."12 
Whately and the Noetic School 
Whately's penchant for controversy extended not only 
to the sceptics of his day. The Archbishop regularly 
found himself at odds with churchmen as well. During his 
years at Oxford, Whately witnessed the birth and growth of 
the Tractarian movement. In the early years he was a 
lORalph s. Pomeroy, "Whately's 'Historic Doubts:' 
Argument and Origin," Quarterly Journal of Speech 49 
(February, 1963): 62. 
llibid., p. 62. 
12Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "Whately, 
Richard." 
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close friend of most of the Tractarians. In time however, 
because he could not comprehend the beliefs of the Trac-
tarians and the Low Church party, he came to hold those 
groups in comtempt. Their doctrines, he believed, were 
tinged with superstition.13 While at Oriel, therefore, 
Whately was among those who formed the so-called "Noetic" 
School. Being less inclined toward a mystical view of 
religion than the Tractariansl4 were, the Noetics called 
everything into question. This inquisitive environment 
prompted the development of natural independence and 
originality of thinking which would later be expressed in 
his works on logic and rhetoric.15 
To both the High Churchmen and the Evangelicals, his 
view of Christianity seemed to be little better than 
13Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. "Whately, 
Richard." 
14 The inclination of the Tractarians was toward many 
of the religious practices of the Roman Catholic Church. 
Among these were the historic episcopacy and apostolic 
succession, emphasis upon the Eucharist, and many pre-
Reformation practices of the Anglican Church. These 
included such things as auricular confession, the use of 
vestments, incense, candles, the eastward position of the 
altar, and intoned services. Whately's opposition to the 
movement culminated in a break with his friends when Tract 
XC, which would have made possible for Anglicans the 
Catholic practices of the invocation of Saints, belief in 
purgatory, and the use of images. For further discussion 
of the movement, see Latourette, pp. 264-270. 
15parrish, pp. 62, 63. 
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rationalism.16 However, in fundamental matters, he was 
considered to be orthodox and conservative.17 Concerning 
his theological attitude, Golden and Corbett wrote: 
Although he was a close friend of most of the 
Tractarians in the early days of the Oxford Move-
ment, he gradually drifted away from them ideo-
logically and finally broke with them over the 
affair of the famous Tract XC •••• Part of his 
disaffection with the whole Oxford Movement was 
due to his congenital antipathy for metaphysical 
and theological speculations. The principle that 
governed the stand he took in all religious con-
troversies was Chillingworth's premise that "the 
Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of 
Protestants." And it was this allegiance to the 
Scriptures that accounts for the emphasis ~e puts 
on testimony in his Elements of Rhetoric. 1 
A similar perspective on his theological method and the 
genuineness of his religion is expressed below. He may be 
said to have continued the typical Christianity of the 
18th century--that of the theologians who went out to 
fight the Rationalists with their own weapons. It was to 
Whately essentially a belief in certain matters of fact, 
to be accepte~ or rejected after an examination of "evi-
dences." Hence his endeavor always is to convince the 
logical faculty, and his Christianity inevitably appears 
as a thing of the intellect rather than of the heart.19 
16Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. "Whately, Richard." 
17parrish, p. 66. 
18Golden and Corbett, p. 274. 
19Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. "Whately, Richard." 
Perhaps some of the conflict in which he was 
involved can be attributed to a trait of his character. 
Despite his liberal orientation, Whately was rather 
intolerant of those with whom he disagreed in religious 
matters.20 This intolerance, coupled with his incisive 
skills of argument, alienated many. 
Whately was a great talker, much addicted in 
early life to argument, in which he used others as 
instruments on which to hammer out his own views • 
• • • He had a keen wit, whose sharp edge often 
inflicted wounds never deliberately intended by 
the speaker •••• With a remarkably fair and 
lucid mind, his sympathies were narrow, and by his 
blunt outspokenniss on points of difference he 
alienated many.2 
Whately's Strengths and Weaknesses 
Regularly, Whately is described as an intelligent 
man, and his accomplishments, especially the works on 
logic and rhetoric, receive high praise.22 It may be, 
27 
therefore, surprising to some that, despite his excellent 
grasp of argumentation and delivery in pulpit discourse, 
he was not the popular preacher that Hugh Blair had been.23 
20Golden and Corbett, p. 275. 
21Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. "Whately, Richard." 
22Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. "Rhetoric," 
by R. C. Jebb. 
23Blair is considered by some to have been the most 
popular Scottish preacher of the latter eighteenth cen-
His sermons were dry, systematic, and unimpassioned. 24 
Despite the acuity of his intellect, apparently he 
was not as wide a reader as some other theorists were. 
John Stuart Mill said of Whately: 
•••• of all persons in modern times, entitled 
to the name of philosophers, the two, probably, 
whose reading was the scantiest, in proportion to 
their intellectual capacity, were Archbishop 
Whately and Dr. Brown. But though indolent 
readers they were both of them active and fertile 
thinkers.2 5 
Mill's opinion not withstanding, Whately did read. His 
favorite authors, and those who influenced him most 
signf icantly, were Aristotle, Thucydides, Bacon, Bishop 
Butler, Warburton, and Adam Smith. His writings contain 




According to Lowndes Bibilographical Manual, Whately 
had ninety-seven published works.27 His writings covered a 
tury. His sermons even today are considered to be models 
of literary excellence, being concise, clear, and beau~ 
tiful. F. R. Webber, vol. 2, p. 205. 
24Golden and Corbett, p. 274. 
25John Stuart Mill, quoted by Parrish, p. 79. 
26parrish, p. 76. 
27 rbid., p. 78. 
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broad range of topics from theology to economics to the 
political and social issues of his day. He is best known, 
however, for his works on logic and rhetoric. 
After his return to Oxford in 1825, Whately wrote 
rather lengthy articles on logic and rhetoric for Cole-
ridge's Encyclopaedia Metropolitana. These articles 
formed the basis for his best-known writings, Elements of 
Logic which appeared in 1826 and Elements of Rhetoric 
which appeared in 1828.28 Each successive edition of the 
Rhetoric was enlarged and revised, so that by its seventh 
edition, published in 1846, Parts I and II were more tha~M 
two and one half times as large as the original article 
had been.29 Both of these works achieved considerable 
popularity, but the better known of the two is the 
Elements of Rhetoric. 
An Overview of the Elements of Rhetoric 
As indicated above, Whately's most famous and 
influential work is his Elements of Rhetoric.30 If one 
wishes to understand his theory of argument in discourse 
in particular, the study of Whately's Rhetoric is essen-
28Golden and Corbett, p. 273. 
29Ibid., p. 274. 
30Ibid., p. 273. 
30 
tial.31 Its particular significance for this thesis is in 
the fact that it is this work which Broadus credited for 
several of his ideas concerning argument. Therefore, a 
consideration of the Rhetoric is required for this study. 
Certain elements will be explained below. First, however, 
some general observations are in order. 
Influences Upon Whately's Elements of Rhetoric 
The primary influence upon Whately's theory was the 
classicist, Aristotle. He also reacted clearly to the 
theory of his own day, however. That theory included the 
belletristic notions of Hugh Blair, the elocutionary move-
ment of John Mason, Thomas Sheridan, et al., and the 
"psychological-epistemological" rhetoric of George Camp-
bell. Ehninger described Whately's negative and positive 
reaction: 
The belletristic, with its tendency to make 
rhetoric a criticism of written discourse, he 
rejected out of hand, strongly declaring the pro-
per function of rhetoric to be the supervision of 
oral composition and in general observing the 
traditional distinction between the offices of 
rhetoric and poetry. The elocutionary, with its 
proclivity toward the prescriptive or "mechani-
cal," he chastened and corrected. Calling elocu-
31 It should be noted that the term "theory" is used 
loosely in regard to Whately's work. As Ehninger points 
out, the Elements is not intended as a theoretical inquiry 
into the nature of communication. Rather it serves a 
pedagogical purpose for the instruction of the unprac-
ticed. See Douglas Ehninger, Introduction to Elements of 
Rhetoric, by Richard Whately (Carbondale: Southern Illi-
nois University Press, 1963), p. xv. 
tionism back from the excesses into which it had 
fallen, he settled it firmly upon a foundation of 
unqualified "naturalism," with the tones and man-
ners of earnest conversation as its guiding ideal. 
The psychological-epistemological trend Whately 
not only endorsed but, as his major contribution, 
carried to its logical completion. For while in 
denying rhetoric an investigatory method of its 
own Campbell and Priestly had made it exclusively 
a managerial science, these writers had left 
unformulated the principles and methods of "man-
agement" as they apply in the crucial area of 
invention. 
Accepting the challenge thus posed, Whately 
developed an inventional system aimed at systema-
tizing the selection and application of cogent 
"reasons," just as the ancients had systematized 
the process of choosing an appropriate argumenta-
tive position and discerning the proofs inherent 
in it.32 
31 
Whately, then, extended Campbell's ideas concerning 
logical theory to the discipline of rhetoric. Because, 
however, he believed that Campbell misunderstood logic he 
turned often to Aristotle for source materials for both 
logic and rhetoric.33 
The Scope of Rhetoric 
In Whately's view, rhetoric included both written 
and oral argumentative discourse.34 Ehninger noted, how-
32Ehninger, Introduction, p. xxviii. 
33orville L. Pence, "The Concept and Function of 
Logical Proof in the Rhetorical System of Richard 
Whately," Speech Monographs, March, 1953, p. 23. In fur-
ther citations, this source is called "monograph." 
34orville L. Pence, "The Concept and Function of 
Logical Proof in the Rhetorical System of Richard Whately" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1946), p. 366. In 
further citations, this source is called "dissertation." 
32 
ever, that while his system provides for written and oral 
discourse, the latter is the more prominent. 
A second characteristic of the Elements, hardly 
less important than its theological orientation, 
is its persistent focus upon the problems and 
methods of oral argumentation •••• The Elements, 
therefore, is not simply to be described as a 
rhetoric of argumentation. More correctly, it is 
a rhetoric of oral argumentation--a rhetoric con-
cerned with argument as it occurs either in the 
formal speaker-audience situation or in the give 
and take of face-to-face dispute.35 
Important in Whately's work is the view that argu-
ment is the primary element of rhetoric.36 Although the 
archbishop discussed style and delivery in his work, the 
section on argument receives the greatest emphasis. This 
is undoubtedly the case because Whately viewed the finding 
and arranging or arguments as the only exclusive province 
of rhetoric. 
The finding of suitable ARGUMENTS to prove a given 
point, and the skilful arrangement of them, may be 
considered as the immediate and proper province of 
Rhetoric, and of that alone •••• The art of 
inventing, and arranging Arguments is, as has been 
said, the only province that Rhetoric can claim 
entirely and exclusively.37 
Ehninger noted the general consensus that Whately's empha-
sis is upon argument. 
35Ehninger, Introduction, pp. xii, xv. 
36pence, dissertation, p. 366. 
37Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, 
Introduction by Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale: 
Illinois University Press, 1963), pp. 39, 40. 
with an 
Southern 
In spirit as in doctrine he holds so consistently 
to his announced purpose of treating rhetoric as 
"Argumentative Composition" that even today his 
work is almost universally--indeed, almost aut~~a­
tically--thought of as a treatise on argument. 
So pronounced was his view that rhetoric embraces exclu-
33 
sively the whole of oral and written argument that Whately 
is regarded as "the first English rhetorician to treat 
argument as a separate discipline."39 
In believing that the scope of rhetoric is limited 
primarily to argument, Whately's views coincide with those 
of the modern authorities Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perel-
man. 40 Thus, as Golden asserted, Whately's work" ••• is 
significant both as a historical document and as a moulder 
of contemporary argumentation theory."41 
38Ehninger, Introduction, p. xiv. 
39pence, monograph, p. 37. 
40James L. Golden, Goodwin F. Berquist, and William 
E. Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought, 2nd ed. 
(Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1978), p. 136; 
cf. Dearin, p. 262-264. It should also be observed that 
Perelman embraced Whately's notions of presumption and 
burden of proof, writing, "Only change requires justifica-
tion, presumption playing in favor of what exists, just as 
the burden of proof falls upon him who wants to change an 
established state of affairs. Perelman, Justice (New 
York, 1967), p. 104. Quoted by Ray D. Dearin, "The Philo-
sophical Basis of Chaim Pereleman's Theory of Rhetoric," 
in Philosophers on Rhetoric, ed. Donald G. Douglas 
(Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1973), p. 262. 
41Ibid., p. 136. 
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The Relationship of Logic and Rhetoric 
Whately's view of the prominence of argument in 
rhetoric follows from his acceptance of the Aristotelian 
notion that rhetoric is an offshoot of logic.42 Rhetoric 
in Whately's view is the art of reasoned discourse, in 
which "conclusions are inferred from premises according to 
the laws of logic."43 In rhetoric, the task is to find or 
invent and arrange suitable arguments to prove a point. 
In logic, the task is to judge the validity of the argu-
ments.44 As Pence observed: 
The function of logic in Whately's rhetoric was 
(1) to provide the speaker with a means of evalua-
ting his own thinking to avoid self-deception, and 
(2) to establish the probability that those ends 
recommended by the speaker might be reasonably 
anticipated through the means he proposed. 45 
Logic further serves rhetoric both as a means of 
ascertaining the truth of rhetorical propositions through 
investigation and as a means of establishing the truth to 
the satisfaction of another. In the ascertainment of 
truth, logic judges whether or not the rhetorical conclu-
42Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. "Rhetoric." See also 
Ehninger's Introduction, p. xii. 
43Ehninger, Introduction, p. xiii. 
44whately, p. 40. 
45Pence, dissertation, p. 366. 
sion reached properly follows the premises given. In 
other words, it protects one from fallacious argument.46 
In considering the interrelationship of logic and 
rhetoric, one must not blur the distinctions which 
35 
Whately observed between the two. As Ehninger points out: 
Conceiving of logic as the methodology of proof, 
he consistently treats rhetoric as the application 
of that methodology in actual attempts to influ-
ence, so that while logic is the process of estab-
lishing truth by reasoning, rhetoric becomes the 
process of conveying truth to others by 
reasoning.47 
The Purpose or Object of Rhetoric 
Rhetoric, in Whately's view, functions both to 
instruct and to convince. Both of these functions are 
subsumed under his term "Conviction," used in its widest 
sense. Defining these terms, Whately wrote: 
• under that term [Conviction] are compre-
hended, first, what is strictly called Instruc-
tion; and, secondly, Conviction in the narrower 
sense; i.e. the Conviction of those who are 
either or-a-contrary opinion to the one main-
tained, or who are in doubt whether to admit or 
deny it. By instruction, on the other hand, is 
commonly meant the conviction of those who have 
neither formed an opinion on the subject, nor are 
deliberating whether to adopt or reject the propo-
sition in question, but are merely desirous of 
46Pence, monograph, p. 24. Pence gathered these 
notions from his study of Whately's Elements of Logic. 
47 Ehninger, Introduction, p. xiv; emphasis mine. 
ascertaining what is the truth in respect of the 
case before them.48 
The methods to be used to instruct or to convince 
are generally the same, although some differences can be 
noted. 
The distinction between these two objects gives 
rise in some points to corresponding differences 
in the mode of procedure •••• these differences 
however are not sufficient to require that Rhe-
toric should on that account be divided into two 
distinct branches; since, generally speaking, 
though not universally, the same rules will be 
serviceable for attaining each of these objects. 49 
The Ecclesiastical Character of 
Whately's Rhetoric 
As a further consideration of overview, it must be 
recognized that the Elements is an ecclesiastical rhe-
toric .SO The theological illustrations he used, partic-
ularly in his treatment of presumption and burden of 
proof, reflect the fact that Whately was a Christian 
minister, extremely devoted to his Christianity.51 
Following the example of St. Augustine, Whately 
borrowed from the secular to benefit the sacred. Taking 
from law the notions of presumption and burden of proof, 
36 
the Archbishop gave the Christian apologist argumentative 
48whately, p. 36. 
49rbid., p. 37. 
SOEhninger, Introduction, p. xix. 
SlGolden, Berquist, and Coleman, p. 137. 
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tools to employ in theological controversy. His elements 
of progressive approach and testimony are particularly 
useful as arguments for propagating doctrine.52 
Ehninger concisely stated the ecclesiastical useful-
ness of the work, noting also that the work has limited 
value for forensic and deliberative purposes. 
Throughout the Elements forensic address is 
scanted, while legislative address is not only 
ignored but in spirit derogated by Whately's 
class-conscious interpretation of the speaker-
audience relationship. From his pages, therefore, 
rhetoric emerges neither as a method for probing 
judgments nor as an instrument for arriving at 
collective choices and decisions. While within 
limits its services to exegesis are recognized 
(36-37), its chief business is the justification 
and propagation of a priori truth; its more par-
ticular purposes are (1) to arm the pulpit orator 
for his task of conveying to an unlettered congre-
gation the indisputable doctrines of the Christian 
faith, and (2) to arm the Christian controver-
sialist who is called upon to defend the evidences 
of religion against the onslaughts of the 
sceptic.53 
Particulars of Whately's Theory 
Having discussed Whately's personal background, and 
having given general description and comments concerning 
Whately's ideas, the writer turns to the specific elements 
52Ehninger, Introduction, p. x, q.v. for other eccle-
siastical applications of rhetorical elements. As Golden 
and Corbett (p. 274) point out, Whately's views of the 
utility of testimony in ecclesiastical discourse are based 
in his belief in the authority of the Bible. 
53Ehninger, Introduction, p. xi. 
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of his rhetoric. A comprehensive review of Whately's 
theory is beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, 
others such as Orville Pence have ably discussed the 
whole. This writer, therefore, will review only those 
elements which were original with Whately or those common 
notions which he developed in a significant way. 
Arguments from Sign 
Two of the major forms of argument from sign which 
Whately discussed were argument from testimony and pro-
gressive approach. Both of these subjects will be 
addressed in turn. 
Testimony 
One kind of sign argument which Whately identified 
is argument from testimony. He considered it to be a sign 
not from which a cause could be inferred, but one from 
which one co~ld infer a condition. In this he was unlike 
Aristotle, who considered testimony to be an existent 
rather than an inferred proof.54 Whately justified his 
difference from Aristotle by describing testimony in terms 
of premise, conclusion, and condition. 
Of these last, [i.e., signs which infer a 
condition which is not a cause] one species is the 
Argument from Testimony: the premiss [sic] being 
the existence of the Testimony; the Conclusion, 
54Pence, dissertation, p. 138. 
the truth of what is attested; which is con-
sidered as a "Condition" of the Testimony having 
been given: since it is evident.that so far only 
a s th i s i s a 11 owed , ( i.e • , so fa r on 1 y a s i t i s 
allowed, that the Testimony would not have been 
given, had it not been true,) can this Argument 
have any force.SS 
39 
Testimony, then, is a sign argument because it rea-
sons from consequence (the testimony) to a condition (that 
which is testified to).S6 If, for example, an individual 
testified that a particular person robbed a store (this 
testimony being a consequence), one would conclude that 
that person robbed the store (that which was alleged in 
the testimony constituting the prior condition). 
The force of such argument is, of course, varied. 
Testimony does not conclusively prove anything, since it 
can be falsified. Its own intrinsic character as well as 
the kinds of conclusions it can support must be considered 
in weighing its force.S7 However, the relative force of 
such arguments can be determined along lines Whately 
proposed. 
Testimony may concern matters of fact or matters of 
opinion, a great distinction to Whately. The difference 
between the two is this: 
SS h W ately, p. S8. 
56pence, dissertation, p. 139. 
57 Whately, p. S8. 
•••• by a "Matter of Fact" is meant, something 
which might, conceivably, be submitted to the 
senses; and about which it is supposed there 
could be no disagreement among persons who should 
be present, and to whose senses it should be 
submitted: and by a "Matter (or question) of 
Opinion" is understood, anything respecting which 
an exercise of judgment would be called for on the 
part of those who should have certain objects 
before them, and who might conceivably disagree in 
their judgment thereupon.SS 
A question of fact must only conceivably be pre-
40 
sented to the senses. For a matter to be a fact does not 
require that it has been presented to the senses. 
Whately's example explains this notion weli, although his 
moral certainty that no one would ever bear testimony 
concerning the absence of inhabitants of the moon is today 
rather humorous. 
Whether there is a lake in the centre of New 
Holland,--whether there is land at the South 
Pole--whether the Moon in inhabited,--would 
generally be admitted to be questions of fact; 
although no one has been able to bear testimony 
concerning them; and, in the last case~ we are 
morally certain that no one ever will.s 
Often there will be difference of opinion concerning 
things which are themselves matters of fact.60 For exam-
ple, that a witness testified that he saw a particular 
individual commit a robbery is a fact. Whether or not 
that witness is a credible source is a matter of opinion. 
ssrbid., pp. ss, 59. 
59rbid., p. 59. 
60rbid. 
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Conversely, there may be questions of fact relative 
to opinions. For example, that some economic theorists 
believe that lower taxes will stimulate the national eco-
nomy is a well-known fact. 
To determine the worth of testimony in a specific 
case, certain characteristics must be considered. Concer-
ning questions of fact, the honesty of the witness, his 
accuracy, and his means of gaining information are signi-
ficant. When an opinion is involved, it is the ability of 
the witness to form a judgment, or his expertise concer-
ning the subject at hand, that matters.61 
The intellectual character of a witness must be 
considered in both kinds of cases, and a degree of suspi-
cion must surround any testimony of fact or opinion if the 
testimony is on the same side as the witness's prejudice. 
On the other hand, if the testimony runs directly counter 
to the witness's prejudice, it may be regarded as a 
stronger testimony.62 
Another factor which will tend to strengthen the 
force of testimony, assuming other points are equal, is a 
large number of witnesses. A common mistake in this 
regard, however, is to think that all witnesses bearing 
apparently concurrent testimony are actually attesting to 
6l1bid., pp. 60, 61. 
621bid., p. 62. 
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the same thing.63 One person may be attesting to that 
which he has seen, while one hundred others bear the same 
testimony based upon hearsay. 
These last may indeed have very good ground for 
their belief: for no one would say that a man who 
is not versed in Astronomy is not justified in 
believing the Earth's motion; or that the many 
millions of persons who have never seen the sea, 
are credulous in believing, on testimony, its 
existence: but still it is to be remembered that 
they are not, in reality, bearing witness to the 
same thing as the others. 64 
Concurrent testimony, however, in cases where the 
conclusions have been independently derived bears great 
weight. Such testimony is even more compelling if there 
is rivalry or hostility among the witnesses. The reason 
is that if the conclusions are reached separately and if 
there are rivalries among the witnesses there is far less 
likelihood of collaboration in a falsehood.65 
Concurrence on similar conditions, though leading 
not to one but rather to similar conclusions, may be 
significant in establishing a generalization and increa-
sing the probability that a single testimony is accurate. 
Whately's illustration clarifies his point. 
63 Ibid. 
641bid.' p. 63. 
651bid., p. 66. 
Before the reality of aerolites (meteoric stones) 
was established as it now is, we should have been 
justified in not giving at once full credit to 
some report, resting on ordinary evidence, of an 
occurrence so antecedently improbable as that of a 
stone's falling from the sky. But if twenty dis-
tinct accounts had reached us, from various parts 
of the globe, of a like phenomenon, though no two 
of the accounts related to the same individual 
stone, still, we should have judged his a decisive 
concurrence; ••• because each testimony, though 
given to an individual case, has a tendency 
towards the general conclusion in which all 
concur; •••• 66 
Testimony is also more credible when it is unde-
signed. The reason, said Whately, is that in such cases 
the suspicion of fabrication is precluded. His example 
involves the account of Xerxes's cutting of a canal 
through the isthmus of Athos. Herodotus's account was 
ridiculed by Juvenal. But the fact is strongly attested 
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by Thucydides, who made an incidental reference to a place 
"near which some remains of the canal might be seen."67 
Whately attributed great force to the testimony of 
adversaries, that is, to "all who would be unwilling to 
admit the conclusion to which their testimony tends."68 
Testimony of this type is often incidentally implied due 
to the reluctance of the witness to bear it.69 
66rbid., p. 7 5. 
67rbid., p. 6 3. 
68rbid., p. 64. 
69rbid o I P• 65 ° 
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In his unwillingness to confirm the truth of a 
proposition he opposes, an adversary may resort to various 
forms of evasion. Whately asserts that such tactics serve 
only to confirm the opposed proposition. 
Misrepresentation, again, of argument,--attempts 
to suppress evidence, or to silence a speaker by 
clamour,--reviling and personality, and false 
charges--all these are presumptions of the same 
kind; that the cause against which they are 
brought, is,--in the opinion of adversaries at 
least,--unassailable on the side of truth.70 
Another matter to consider in evaluating the force 
of testimony is the probability of that which is asserted. 
Whately believed that if that which is proposed is 
unlikely to occur, testimony to its occurrence may be more 
credible, since it is less likely to have been feigned or 
fancied.71 A witness gains credibility, further, if he 
does not appear to believe or understand something he is 
reporting, if it is something the evaluator of the testi-
mony accepts as true, since one is unlikely to fabricate a 
statement which he himself cannot comprehend.7 2 
Whately noted that it is generally believed that 
testimony on oath is more reliable than unsworn witness. 
He asserted, however, that this is only true of "certain 
intermediate characters between the truly respectable and 
70rbid., p. 68. 
7lrbid. 
72rbid., p. 69. 
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the worthless."73 An oath bears significance for the 
"intermediate" because the worthless sort will sense no 
constraint against lying, whether he has sworn an oath or 
not. The truly respectable, on the other hand, "considers 
himself as, virtually, on his Oath, whenever he makes a 
deliberate solemn assertion • • •• "7 4 
In his concluding remarks concerning testimony, 
Whately made the following statement concerning the signi-
f icance which can be attached to arguments of this type. 
It might seem superfluous to remark that none but 
very general rules, such as the above, can be 
profitably laid down; and that to attempt to 
supersede the discretion to be exercised in each 
individual case, by fixing precisely what degree 
of weight is to be allowed to the testimony of 
such and such persons, would be, at least, useless 
and trifling, and, if introduced in practice, a 
most mischievous hindrance of a right decision.75 
Progressive Approach 
Another aspect of argument from sign which Whately 
discussed was that of progressive approach. This notion 
somewhat parallels his idea of concurrent testimony.76 The 
notion is that 
several Testimonies or other Signs, singly 
perhaps of little weight, produce jointly, and by 
73 b'd ..!._2_., p. 72 • 
74 b'd !_2_., p. 7 3. 
75 b'd ..!._2_. , p. 7 2 • 
76Pence, dissertation, p. 155. 
their coincidence, a degree of probability far 
exceeding the sum of their several forces, taken 
-- 77 separately: •••• 
The effectiveness of a series of arguments, according to 
this idea then, "stems from the order in which they are 
46 
presented and from their progressive tendency to establish 
a certain conclusion. 11 78 The procedure is to remove 
objections encountered in a gradual approach to an inevi-
table conclusion.79 
Arguments from Example 
Having examined two forms of argument from sign, the 
writer turns to Whately's category of argument from exam-
ple. In this category, Whately included, among others, 
induction, experience, and analogy. The nature of these 
arguments is to infer a conclusion about one or more 
individuals of that class. Whately described it as 
fol lows: 
we consider one or more, known, individual 
objects or instances, of a certain Class, as a 
fair sample, in respect of some point or other, of 
that Class; and consequently draw an inference 
77whately, p. 82. 
78rbid. 
79Pence, dissertation, p. 155. 
from them respecting either the whole Class, or 
other, less known, individuals of it.80 
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Whately recognized both the inference from the par-
ticular to the general, and from the particular to another 
particular. The former is obviously inductive; the latter 
he identified as such because the generalization is 
implicit • 
• • • • [in that] which is the most usually called 
the Argument from Example, we generally omit, for 
the sake of brevity, the intermediate step, and 
pass at once, in the expression of the Argument, 
from the known to the unknown, individual. This 
ellipsis however does not, as some seem to sup-
pose, make any essential difference in the mode of 
Reasoning; the reference to a common Class being 
always, in such a case, understood, though not 
expressed;. 81 
With this general overview of Whately's approach to 
argument from example in mind, the writer turns to one 
specific type of such argument, namely, argument by 
analogy. 
Analogy 
Whate~y, influenced by Campbel1,82 defined an analogy 
 "in which the instance adduced is somewhat 
more remote from that to which it is applied."83 In the 
80 Whately, p. 86. 
8l1bid. 
82Pence, dissertation, p. 57. 
83whately, p. 90. 
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case of example (in the Aristotelian sense of reasoning 
from particular to particular), one draws an inference 
concerning another individual of like kind. In the case 
of analogy, the second individual resembles the first to a 
lesser degree. For instance, if one noticed that a parti-
cular drug would poison a man, he might reason from ana-
logy that that drug would also poison a dog. The argument 
is from analogy in that the dog resembles a man to a 
lesser degree than another man does. By comparison, an 
argument from example could only conclude that the drug 
would poison another man.84 
Whately further defined analogy as a "resemblance of 
ratios," to use Aristotle's terms.BS The likeness of two 
individuals compared in an Analogy is not in their 
essence, but in their relation to some other thing or 
things. Their commonality consists in a relation.86 He 
illustrated his point as follows: 
• • • the fact that from birth different persons 
have different bodily constitutions, in respect of 
complexion, stature, strength, shape, liability to 
particular disorders, etc. which constitutions, 
however, are capable of being, to a certain 
degree, modified by regimen, medicine, etc. 
affords an Analogy by which we may form a presump-
tion, that the like takes place in respect of 
84rbid. 
BSrbid. 
86rbid.' p. 91. 
mental qualities also; though it is plain that 
there can be no direct resemblance either betwg7n 
body and mind, or their respective attributes. 
49 
The analogy given above is in the relation between inborn 
traits and the possibility of modifying them. In the 
first particular the traits are physical; in the second 
they are mental. In the first particular the modifying 
regimen might be an exercise program; in the second it 
would probably involve a reading program (or something 
similar). The analogy is in the relation in both cases of 
inborn traits and modifying regimens. 
Certain errors readily attend this form of rea-
soning. One common one is that of concluding that the 
compared individuals are alike because they have a common 
relation, "to resemble each other in themselves, because 
there is a resemblance in the relation they bear to cer-
tain other things •••• "88 
A related, though separate error is to extend 
the Analogy further than it was intended. Cor-
rectly, Whately cautioned against this error in 
the interpreting of Biblical parables. 
In the Parable of the unjust Steward, an Argu-
ment is drawn from Analogy, to recommend prudence 
and foresight to Christians in spiritual concerns; 
but it would be absurd to conclude that fraud was 
recommended to our imitation; •••• 89 
As Whately pointed out in reflecting upon the genius of 
87Ibid. 
88Ibid. 
89Ibid., p. 92. 
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the Parables of Jesus as analogical arguments, one may 
protect his analogies by using images very remote from the 
thing to be illustrated, except in the single point of 
intended comparison. One is also wise to use a variety of 
analogies in making the single comparison, for the thing 
to be thus illustrated certainly could bear direct resem-
blance in several points to many diverse analogies. The 
ultimate test of the validity of an Analogy is to consider 
in each case not which differences or similarities are the 
greatest, but which are the ones which do or do not affect 
the argument. 90 
Selection and Use of Arguments 
Part I, Chapter III of the Elements of Rhetoric is a 
discussion of the selection and use of various kinds of 
arguments. It is in this chapter that Whately presents 
his well-known views concerning presumption and burden of 
proof. 
Major attention is also given to arrangement of 
arguments, including those used in refuting objections. 
General notions governing the task of refutation are 
included, as are observations respecting the problem of 
excessive proof. 
90Ibi~., p. 102. 
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Other matters discussed in the chapter are matters 
of fact and opinion and the illustrative use of examples. 
Because these items receive incidental treatment by 
Whately, and are irrelevant to the larger purpose of this 
thesis, they will be omitted from this discussion. 
The Aim of an Argument 
The first rule governing the selection and use of 
arguments is to determine the aim or object of the dis-
course. The possible objects suggested by Whately are: 
••• to give satisfaction to a candid mind, and 
convey instruction to those who are ready to 
receive it, or to compel the assent, or silence 
the objections, of an opponent.91 
When the chief object is to instruct the learner, the a 
priori argument will be principally employed. When the 
object is to refute an opponent, the other class of argu-
ments will be more effective.92 
Presumption and Burden of Proof 
Pence, quoting Sandford, asserted that Whately's 
discussion of burden of proof and of presumption appears 
to be the first in the history of English rhetoric.93 Not 
9lwhately, p. 108. 
921bid., p. 109. 
93w. P. Sandford, English Theories of Public Address 
1530-1828 (doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 
1938), p. 123, cited by Orville Pence, dissertation, 
p. 175. 
on 1 y was i t the first attempt, i t was one of the most 
complete until the twentieth century.94 Although the 
notion was not unknown in the courts of law, Whately 
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pioneered its application in rhetoric. Particularly evi-
dent is his interest in ecclesiastical rhetoric, for in 
this section of the book he makes several applications to 
the Christian faith. His ideas on the subject are pro-
bably among his greatest contribution to the field of 
rhetoric at large, for, as Golden asserted, his theory is 
largely upheld by modern textbooks on argumentation and 
debate. 95 
Determining Presumption and Burden of Proof 
At the outset of a case, Whately asserted, after one 
has determined his aim, he must decide and point out to 
the hearer on which side the presumption lies and to whom 
belongs the burden of proof .96 While this might seem to be 
difficult to determine, Whately noted that "a moderate 
portion of common-sense" will usually suffice in deciding. 
94Pence, dissertation, p. 175. 
95Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, p. 137. Golden et. 
al. have prepared an excellent abstraction of Presumption 
and Burden of Proof. On pages 177 and 178 of his disser-
tation, Pence included quotations from nine different 
relatively contemporary authors, including Cairns and A. 
Craig Baird, who adopted Whately's notions in their works 
on argument and debate. 
96whately, p. 112. 
The greater problem is that the need to determine the 
issue is often overlookea.97 
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Presumption, said Whately, has been erroneously been 
understood by some as referring to a preponderance of 
probability in favor of the supposition. The Archbishop 
was careful to point out that, rather, presumption 
involves: 
••• such a pre-occupation of the ground, as 
implies that it must stand good till some suffi-
cient reason is adduced against it; in short, 
that the Burden of Proof lies on the side of him 
who would dispute it.gs 
Given this definition, a prisoner at his trial is presumed 
innocent. This does not mean that it is probable that he 
did not commit the crime, but rather that he pre-occupies 
the ground of innocence. Those who allege his guilt must 
displace him from the ground he occupies by proving his 
guilt. The burden of proof, then, lies with the one who 
opposes the side which presumption favors. 
The presence of presumption on one's side gives him 
a decided advantage. One in such a position must only 
refute the arguments brought against him to gain a vic-
tory. 99 To surrender his pre-occupation of ground is to 
97rbid., p. 113. 
98rbid., p. 112. 
99 b'd ~., p. 113. 
abandon that which is perhaps one of his strongest 
arguments.100 
Examples of Presumption 
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Whately asserted that there is a presumption in 
favor of any existing institution, and if one would pro-
pose a change in the status quo, the burden of proof lies 
with him. This does not mean one should assume that 
existing institutions are perfect; rather, it assumes 
that change is not a good in itself, and therefore he who 
demands a change must show cause for it. Furthermore, no 
one is called upon to defend an existing institution 
(although it may be advisable to do so) until some argu-
ment is adduced against it.101 
There is a presumption against the paradoxical, 
i.e., anything contrary to the prevailing opinion. To 
identify a statement as a paradox is not to imply that it 
is false or absurd. Rather, it means that it is a new 
statement challenging ground pre-occupied by a prior 
opinion. The burden of proof rests with he who would 
maintain the paradox, since men are not expected to aban-
lOOrbid., pp. 113, 114. 
lOlrbid., p. 114. 
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don their present beliefs in favor of new ones without 
reason to do so.102 
Whately illustrated presumption against a paradox 
from the history of Christianity. Before Christianity was 
established, the burden of proof rested upon those who 
affirmed it. After the faith was established, the burden 
of proof shifted to those who attack it. 
It is indeed highly expedient to bring forward 
evidences to establish the divine origin of Chris-
tianity: but it ought to be more carefully kept 
in mind than is done by most writers, that all 
this is an argument "ex abundanti," as the phrase 
is,--over and above what can fairly be called for, 
till some hypothesis should be framed, to account 
for the origin of Christianity by human means.103 
He selected a second illustration from a period of church 
history, namely the Reformation. He pointed out that the 
Reformers bore the burden of proof for the changes in 
church doctrine they proposed, but were not bound to show 
cause for maintaining the doctrines they left unaltered. 
To these latte.r doctrines they were obligated only to 
answer objections.104 
Whately also pointed out that regarding any one 
question, the presumption may lie on different sides, 
depending upon the biases of the different parties 
102rbid., p. 115. 
103rbid., p. 116. 
104rbid., pp. 116, 117. 
" 
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involved.105 For example, at a gathering of the bishops of 
the Church of England, the presumpti~n concerning a ques-
tion of infant baptism would be quite different than that 
at a gathering of Baptist clergy. 
Presumption and Deference 
Habitual presumption in favor of the decisions or 
opinions of an individual, a Body, or a book is called 
"authority." A recognition of authority is called 
"deference. 11 106 Deference, he said, must be distinguished 
from admiration, concurrence of opinion, and esteem. One 
may show deference apart from these three attitudes; 
conversely, one may display the attitudes without 
deference. 107 
and, 
Deference ought to be, and usually is, shown selec-
tively. One ought show deference to those who have a 
reasonable ground for having authority, but only in mat-
ters in which they have appropriate expertise. Whately 
illustrated the point as follows: 
One has a deference for his physician, in ques-
tions of medicine; and for his bailiff, in ques-
tions of farming; but not vice versa. And accor-
dingly, Deference may be misplaced in respect of 
the subject, as well as of the person. It is con-
ceivable that one may have a due degree of 
105rbid., p. 118. 
106rbid., pp. 118, 119. 
107rbid., pp. 119, 120. 
.. 
,, 
Deference, and an excess of it, and a deficiency 
of it, all towards thn same person, but in respect 
of different points.l 8 
It is natural, and not unreasonable, to show more 
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deference to the decisions of a group than to those of an 
individual.10 9 However, a credible individual's opinion 
should not be lightly dismissed in favor of a group opin-
ion, for group opinions are often the product of compro-
mise, concession, and exceptions rather than expertise. 
Transferring the Burden of Proof 
A presumption may be rebutted by an opposite, or 
counter presumption, thus shifting the burden of proof to 
the side which had previously enjoyed the presumption. 
Whately explained how such an exchange takes place. 
Again there is ••• a presumption, (and a fair 
one,) in respect of each question, in favour of 
the judgment of the most eminent men in the 
department if pertains to;--of eminent physicians, 
e. g., in respect of medical questions,--of theo-
logians, in theological, etc •••• 
But there is a counter-presumption, arising from 
the circumstance that men eminent in any depart-
ment are likely to regard with jealousy any one 
who professes to bring to light something unknown 
to themselves; especially if it promise to super-
sede, if established, much of what they have been 
accustomed to learn, and teach, and practise 
[sic] •••• 
There is also this additional counter-presump-
tion against the judgment of the proficients in 
108rbid., p. 121. 
109Ibid., p. 123. 
,• 
any department; that they are prone to a bias in 
favour of everything that gives the most palpable 
superiority to themselves over the uninitiated, 
••• and affords the greatest scope for the 
employment and display of their own peculiar 
acquirements.110 
In short, the preceding illustration shows that presump-
tion in favor of the learned may be challenged on the 
grounds of their vain and jealous human character. 
Presumption and Advantage 
One would naturally expect that it is always an 
advantage to have presumption in one's favor, and the 
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burden of proof upon the adversary. Surprisingly, the 
opposite is often the case.111 The reason is that if one 
enjoys the favor of presumption, he may begin to take a 
truth for granted. In so doing, he may grow apathetic 
toward inquiry concerning the subject. In such a state of 
complacency, he may be jarred by objections raised against 
his viewpoint. Unable to answer the objections because he 
has stopped thinking about the issue, he will lose the 
advantage of presumption, if not the entire argument. 
The situation described above finds an analogy in 
sports. It is often disadvantageous to be favored to win 
an athletic contest. The favorite may tend to underesti-
llOrbid., pp. 128, 129. 




mate the opposition, and therefore fail to prepare for the 
contest properly. Entering the contest with a degree of 
complacency, the team may be shocked to awareness as the 
underdog builds a lead. The so-called "momentum" of the 
contest then favors the challenger, who may hang on to win 
the contest. 
Refutation 
Refutation in Whately's schema is treated as a mat-
ter of arrangement of arguments, because he believed that 
the refutation of objections should generally be placed in 
the midst of the argument.112 The opening of the subject, 
however, led him a bit afield from arrangement, into a 
discussion of the conduct of refutation. He knew what he 
was doing, for he admitted: 
Though I am at present treating principally of the 
proper collocation of Refutation, some remarks on 
the conduct of it will not be unsuitable in this 
place.113 
Agreeing with his classical predecessors, Aristotle, 
Cicero, and Quintilian, Whately stated that there is no 
distinct class of refutatory argument. 
In the first place, it is to be observed that 
there is no distinct class of refutatory Argument; 
112rbid., p. 146. 
113rbid., p. 148 • 
since they become such merely bi the circumstances 
under which they are employed.l 4 
60 
As noted above, Whately believed that refutation of 
objections should be interspersed in the midst of argu-
ment, but that it should be done nearer the beginning than 
the end.115 Particularly if the opponent has advanced many 
strong proofs so that one's own proposition would be 
likely to be regarded as paradoxical, one should even 
begin with a refutation.116 If the previous is not the 
case, however, one should not begin with a refutation, 
because that causes him to appear to be on the defensive. 
To address an objection at the outset, if it is not neces-
sary to do so, implies a consciousness that much can be 
said against one's assertion, creating an undesirable 
sense of paradox.117 
Mention of objections should not all be deferred to 
the end of the discourse, however. 
If again all mention of Objections be deferred 
till the last, the other arguments will often be 
listened to with prejudice by those who may sup-
pose us to be overlooking what may be urged on the 
other side.118 
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Therefore, because to address all objections at the outset 
will create an impression of paradox and to save them 
until the end will diminish the hearing one will receive, 
objections normally should be addressed in the midst of 
the discourse. 
Sometimes, it is difficult to refute objections 
sufficiently until one has established through argument 
his own propositions. In such cases, Whately urged that 
at least brief notice of the objections be taken early in 
the discourse, carefully including a promise to refute 
them later.119 Such a promise, however, should not be 
used as sophistical evasion of objections difficult to 
answer. The Sophist will promise to refute the objec-
tions, but will in the presentation of his own case draw 
the listener's attention away from .the objections. Con-
veniently, he will forget to answer the objections, which 
will then not be given their due weight.120 
. 
Whately asserted that any proposition may be refuted 
by proving its opposite or by overthrowing the arguments 
by which it has been supported.121 The first of these two, 
he said, is less strictly to be considered refutation, 
119rbid. 
120rbid. 
12lrbid., p. 148. 
because it can exist apart from one's awareness of a 
proposition counter to his own. 
The former of these is less strictly and properly 
called Refutation; being only accidentally such, 
since it might have been employed equally well had 
the opposite Argument never existed; and in fact 
it will often happen that a Proposition maintained 
by one author, may be in this way refuted by 
another, who had never heard of the Arguments • 
• • • In fact, every one who argues in favour of 
any Conclusion is virtuall2 refuting, in this way, 
the opposite Conclusion.12 
Following the pattern of Aristotle and Cicero,123 
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Whately said that refutation in its strict sense involves 
a reference made and an answer given to some specific 
arguments in favour of the opposite conclusion. This 
refutation may consist in the denial of the premises 
(either the stated or implied premise in an informal 
syllogism) or in an objection against the conclusiveness 
of the reasoning.124 
Whately distinguished between direct and indirect 
arguments in refutation. The direct approach proves the 
truth of the contradictory by handling the objections from 
the opposite perspective. With the indirect method, one 
attempts to prove the absurdity or falsity of another's 
proposition using his own premises.125 This form of refuta-
1221bid. 
123Pence, dissertation, p. 208. 
124whately, p. 149. 
125Ibid., p. 150. 
tion could also be called reductio ad absurdum. Whately 
described the approach and its usefulness as follows: 
••• in Controversy, the Indirect is often adop-
ted by choice, as it affords an opportunity for 
holding up an opponent to scorn and ridicule, by 
deducing some very absurd conclusion from the 
principles he maintains, or according to the mode 
of arguing he employs. Nor indeed can a fallacy 
be so clearly exposed to the unlearned reader in 
any other way. For it is no easy matter to 
explain, to one ignorant of Logic, the grounds on 
which you object to an inconclusive argument; 
though he will be able to perceive its correspon-
dence with another, brought forward to illustrate 
it, in which an absurd conclusion mar be intro-
duced, as drawn from true premises.! 6 
Whately, with his bent toward satire, said more in favor 
of this form of refutation, citing as an illustration of 
it his attack on scepticism in "Historic Doubts." 
The dangers of this kind of "irony," as he called 
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it, are two. First, many listeners fail to differentiate 
between the form and the substance of the argument. Con-
sequently, when they hear one using ridicule with a 
serious (or in the case of an ecclesiastical application, 
a sacred) subject, they believe that he is profaning the 
subject. The second danger is that when one applies a 
good title, for example, to someone in bitter scorn, he 
may appropriate the title to himself in a serious sense, 
and thus diffuse the irony.127 For example, one may be 
126rbid., pp. 150, 151. 
127rbid., pp. 154, 155. 
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labeled as "orthodox" in scorn, the label implying that 
his views are anything but orthodox. He may ignore the 
satire intended and appropriate the label seriously, crea-
ting the impression that his adversary has conceded that 
his views are orthodox. 
Whately continued his section on refutation by 
explaining its limitations. 
It may be observed generally, that too much stress 
is often laid, especially by unpractised rea-
soners, on Refutation; ••• I mean, that they are 
apt both to expect a Refutation where none can 
fairly be expected, and to attribute to it, when 
satisfactorill made out, more than it really 
accomplishes. 28 
The first limitation is that, when the propositions 
with which one works are matters of probability, irrefut-
able arguments may be advanced against a proposition that 
is nevertheless true. He described the problem and its 
solution as follows: 
In what is called moral or probable Reasoning, 
there may be sound arguments, and valid objec-
tions, on both sides •••• The real question in 
such cases is, which event is the more probable;--
on which side the evidence preponderates •••• 
The objection perhaps may be unanswerable, and yet 
may safely be allowed, if it can be shown that 
more and weightier objections lie against every 
other supposi tion.129 
The preceding assumes that the counter-arguments are 
valid. Of course, all are not. 
128Ibid., pp. 155, 156. 
129Ibid., p. 156. 
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Secondly, men may believe that successful refutation 
of all the arguments offered in support of a conclusion 
disprove the conclusion. The conclusion, however, may be 
true. The false assumption operative in this case is that 
all the possible arguments in favor of the conclusion have 
been presented (and subsequently refuted).130 That all 
possible arguments were not advanced may be the unfor-
tunate failure of a weak advocate. In such a case, it is 
regrettable that the whole argument falls for want of a 
competent advocate.131 On the other hand, however, the 
advocate may purposefully have reserved certain arguments 
as Whately recommended subsequently. 
Because a weak argument is "positively hurtful," 
Whately urged that objections be stated with their full 
force when refuting them.132 The reason is this: 
•••• otherwise, those who hear them stated more 
strongly than by the uncandid advocate who had 
undertaken to repel them, will naturally enough 
conclude that they are unanswerable.133 
To state the objection weakly is to appear to be avoiding 
its difficulty. 
130rbid., p. 158. 
13lrbid. 
132rbid., p. 159. 




When objections raised are not only unanswerable, 
but also are decisive, Whately urged that an advocate 
confess the fact and abandon his argument. To refuse to 
retract an untenable position is unwise, for such refusal 
is likely to cast suspicion on that which is sound in the 
advocate's position.134 At stake in such a situation is the 
advocate's credibility. 
Whately also warned against elaborately refuting 
insignificant arguments. To pay great heed to an inconse-
quential argument will frequently have the effect of ele-
vating its importance. The Archbishop explained and 
illustrated his point as follows: 
Whatever is slightly noticed, and afterwards 
passed by with contempt, many readers and hearers 
will very often conclude {sometimes for no other 
reason) to be really contemptible. But if they 
are assured of this again and again with great 
earnestness, they often begin to doubt it. They 
see the respondent plying artillery and mus-
ketry,--bringing up horse and foot to the charge; 
and conceive that what is so vehemently assailed 
must possess great strength. One of his refuta-
tions might perhaps have left them perfectly con-
vinced: all of them together, leave them in 
doubt. 135 
Refutation is directed toward fallacious premises or 
reasoning processes. Therefore, a complete study of refu-
tation includes a discussion of logical fallacies. 
134rbid. 
135rbid., p. 161. 
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Whately acknowledged the need for consideration of the 
subject, but did not include such a discussion in his 
Rhetoric. Instead, he referred his readers to Book iii of 
his Elements of Logic.136 
The possibility of excess in refutation led Whately 
to warn regarding the danger of excess in proof as well. 
Others, again, perhaps comparatively strangers to 
the question, and not prejudiced, or not strongly 
prejudiced, against your conclusion, but ready to 
admit it if supported by sufficient arguments, 
will sometimes, if your arguments are very much 
beyond what is sufficient, have their suspicions 
roused by this very circumstance. "Can it be 
possible," they will say, "that a conclusion so 
very obvious as this is made to appear, should not 
have been admitted 1 ong ago?" •••• Hence they 
are apt to infer, either that the author has 
mistaken the opinions of those he imagines opposed 
to him, or else, lhat there is some subtle fallacy 
in his arguments. 37 
In situations, however, in which forcible proofs are 
desired, one may find it necessary to caution the hearers 
against thinking that a point is difficult to establish, 
simply becaus~ its importance led one to dwell upon it. 13 8 
Whately supported his point with an example and an 
analogy. 
Some ~ are apt to suppose, from the copious and 
elaborate arguments which have been urged in 
defence of the authenticity of the Christian 
136Ibid., p. 150. 
137Ibid., p. 163. 
138Ibid., p. 162. 
Scriptures, that these are books whose authen-
ticity is harder to be established than that of 
other supposed-ancient works; whereas the fact is 
very much the reverse ••• We bar· the doors care-
fully, not merely when we expect an unusually 
formidable attack, but ~hen we have an unusua 1 
treasure in the house.l 9 
Whately concluded his discussion of refutation by 
noting the difference between simply disproving an error 
and showing how it arose. While the former should be 
sufficient to dislodge an argument, he said, the latter 
will effect greater satisfaction and a more lasting 
result. 140 
Whately's Contributions to Rhetoric 
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The purpose of this chapter has not been to critique 
Whately's theory of argument, but rather to expound 
selected portions of it. It would be presumptious for 
this writer to attempt independently an assessment of the 
Archbishop's work. The opinions of a few individuals, 
qualified by their formal study of rhetoric in general and 
Whately in particular, will suffice to summarize Whately's 
contributions. 
Perhaps his most significant contribution was that 
of introducing the notions of presumption and burden of 
139rbid. 
140rbid., p. 167. 
proof, known in both Roman and English law,141 into the 
world of rhetoric. As Golden, Berquist, and Coleman 
wrote: 
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of 
Whately's pioneering analysis of presumption and 
burden of proof. What makes his discussion a 
significant landmark in the rhetoric of Western 
thought is the reminder that presumption rests not 
on the side where a "preponderance of probability" 
exists, but on that side which consists of a 
"preoccupation of the ground." (i.e. that side 
which the majority of a given audience favors at 
the outset of a speech.) And he was also on 
target in reminding his students that no meaning-
ful debate on a controversial question can proceed 
intelligently unless it is first determined where 
the presumption lies. Finally, Whately contri-
buted vitally to argumentation theory when he 
pointed out that, in most circumstances, there is 
a presumption in favor of "existing institutions," 
"innocence," "tradition," and people who command 
"deference. 11 142 
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These same authors noted a second major contribution 
made by Whately and others of his day, namely, a psycho-
logical, audience-centered rhetoric grounded in the nature 
of man.143 Much of the Archbishop's practical advice, par-
ticularly that relating to refutation, is conditioned by 
his analysis of the way an audience can be expected to 
perceive one's argument. Clearly his interest was not 
only in establishing the truth of a proposition, but also 
in making it convincing to the hearer. Pence developed 
141Pence, monograph, p. 38. 
142Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, p. 142. 
143 rbid., p. 143. 
this contribution nicely as follows: 
But his originality is best seen in his perceptive 
analyses of the techniques of refutation and in 
his intensive study of fallacies. These are 
characterized by a useful integration of the logi-
cal with the psychological elements of persuasion. 
He was most aware that an argument must be cred-
ible as well as logical. ••• His special skill 
lay in his ability to clarify obscurities in 
intricate argument--to conduct a searching explo-
ration of the open ground between the purely for-
mal logical 44rors and the psychological errors of 
perception. 1 
Pence asserted that Whately's "careful distinction 
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between arguments from example and arguments from analogy 
is unmatched in English rhetoric."145 Besides noting that 
analogies compare relationships whereas examples compare 
concrete qualities, Whately established helpful criteria 
for judging the validity of these two types of argument. 14 6 
His explanation of the nature of arguments from proba-
bility and from sign removed much of the obscurity of 
Aristotle's discussion of these elements.147 
Pence, writing in 1946, reached the following con-
clusion concerning the contemporary usefulness of 
Whately's work: 
••• Whately was not a learned logician, in a philo-
sophical sense. But few, if any, figures in the 
144Pence, monograph, p. 38. 
1451bid., p. 37. 
146Ibid., p. 38. 
1471bid. 
history of English rhetoric to his time matched 
his application of the principles of sound rea-
soning and hard common sense to argument. His 
practical application of probability as a ratio-
nale for action in human affairs, his introduction 
of burden of proof into rhetoric, his insistence 
on precision in the use of terms, and his compre-
hensive treatment of fallacies in general are 
reflected in virtually all treatises argument 
since his time.148 
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Ehninger observed that when the modern field of Speech was 
born near the turn of the twentieth century, Whately's 
ideas were embraced by the leaders in the new discipline. 
He also noted its continuing influence when he wrote in 
1963: 
••• for many years the instruction given in 
courses and textbooks in public address has been, 
and remains today, strongly Whatelian, while only 
rece.ntly have such theorists as Kenneth Burke and 
I. A. Richards begun to envision new functions and 
boundaries for rhetoric as a discipline. 
Because Whately's decisions on some of the major 
questions in rhetoric have proved sound and fruit-
ful through many years of practice, the Elements, 
while not to be numbered among the great creative 
works on the subject, is certainly to be ranked 
among the most influential. For the same reason, 
though now a century and a third old, it has ~~ch 
to say to the student of rhetoric yet today. 1 
Nearly a century earlier, John Broadus had recog-
nized the worth of Whately's theory. It is to Whately' s 
influence upon this American homiletician that the next 
chapter is addressed. 
148Pence, dissertation, pp. 380, 381. 
149Ehninger, Introduction, p. xxx. 
CHAPTER III 
JOHN BROADUS'S THEORY OF ARGUMENT 
The preceding chapter provided some personal back-
ground of Richard Whately, together with an exposition of 
his theory of argument. In this chapter, the same kind of 
information will be presented regarding John Broadus. 
First the writer will develop a brief survey of his life. 
Then an overview of his theory of argument will be pre-
sented, followed by a more particular analysis of 
Broadus's ideas and the influence of Richard Whately upon 
them. 
Background of John Broadus 
w. O. Carver, a younger contemporary of John A. 
Broadus, stated that in his opinion, "no Baptist of his 
generation surpassed Broadus in his influence among 
Southern Baptists."l Broadus wielded such influence not 
because he occupied positions of power within the denomi-
lw. o. Carver, "Recollections and Information from 
Other Sources Concerning The Southern Baptist Theological 
Seminary," unpublished typescript, p. 21, cited by James 
Roland Barron, "The Contributions of John A. Broadus to 
Southern Baptists (doctoral dissertation, Southern Baptist 
Seminary, 1972), p. 1. 
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nation, but because his scholarly learning, his compelling 
preaching, and his personal charm commanded broad popular 
respect. 
One has only to read briefly concerning the life of 
Broadus to discover how highly he was regarded, and why he 
was held in such esteem. A brief chronology of Broadus's 
life will enable the reader to understand Broadus's impact 
upon American preaching. 
A Chronology of His Life 
The Broadus family was prominent in the early his-
tory of the "Old Dominion," Virginia.2 The Broaduses 
were, for the most part, farmers. However, there were 
physicians, lawyers, many teachers, and ministers, some of 
them men of great distinction. They were profoundly reli-
gious, almost all members of country Baptist churches in 
Virginia.3 Into this family, John Albert Broadus was born 
in Culpeper C~unty on January 24, 1827.4 
John's father was Major Edmund Broadus, said to be a 
2A. T. Robertson, 
Broadus (Philadelphia: 
Society, 1901), p. 1. 
Life and Letters of John A. 
American Baptist Publication 
3w. J. McGlothlin, "John Albert Broadus," The 
Review and Expositor 27 (April, 1930): 141; cf. 
Robertson, p. 3. 
4Robert N. Barrett, "Dr. John A. Broadus," The 
Seminary Magazine 8 (April, 1895): 339. 
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man of high character, ability, and independence of judg-
ment.5 Edmund was a farmer, miller,_ teacher, major in the 
Culpeper militia, a member of the Virginia legislature for 
eighteen years, and a leader of the Whig party in the 
state.6 He was an ardent supporter of Thomas Jefferson in 
the founding of the University of Virginia in 1819.7 
John's mother was Nancy Simms, a woman of many 
excellent qualities. She was gentle and quiet in manner, 
yet firm and energetic in the management of her home. 8 
Her husband's frequent absence due to his political 
activity made it necessary for her to run the family farm, 
which she did with great efficiency. With her children, 
she was a firm but gentle disciplinarian, teaching them 
habits of neatness and order.9 
Because there were no public schools, as we know 
them, John received his preparatory schooling privately. 
He undertook his secondary school studies with his uncle, 
Albert Simms. Simms was reputedly one of the best 
teachers in the area, and as a result, young Broadus 
SMcGlothlin, p. 142. 
6rbid. 
7Ibid., p. 143. 
8Robertson, p. 17. 
9Ibid., p. 18. 
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received an excellent secondary education.10 John was an 
excellent student, particularly in Latin and mathematics. 
During his last year at his uncle's school, John assisted 
in the instruction.11 
At the age of seventeen, Broadus became a country 
school teacher. Although the experience was difficult and 
discouraging for him, due to his youth,12 he persisted in 
the endeavor, developing in the process the teaching 
skills and habits of hard and independent work which 
characterized his later life.13 Broadus's success in life, 
according to Robert Barrett, was not due to brilliant 
achievement, but to "patient, quiet, humble industry."14 
In the fall of 1846, Broadus enrolled at the Univer-
sity of Virginia in Charlottesville, where he was pro-
foundly influenced by Gessner Harrison, professor of 
Greek, w. H. McGuffey, professor of moral philosophy, and 
H. H. Courtenay, professor of mathematics.15 His irregu-
lar course of study kept him at the university two years 
longer than most students. However, Dr. w. J. McGlothlin, 
101bid., p. 25. 
llMcGlothlin, p. 145. 
12Robertson, p. 37. 
13McGlothlin, pp. 145, 147. 
14 Barrett, p. 339. 
15Robertson, p. 61. 
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a former president of Furman University and a colleague of 
Broadus at Southern Seminary, noted that by the time he 
graduated in 1850, Broadus was regarded as the leading 
student scholar there.16 
Within a year of his graduation from the University 
at the age of twenty three, Broadus was ordained to the 
ministry, married to the daughter of Gessner Harrison, 
appointed an assistant professor of Latin and Greek at his 
alma mater, and called to the pulpit of the Charlottes-
ville Baptist Church.17 In 1853 he resigned from the 
University to devote his full attention to the church, but 
in 1855 he was persuaded to return as chaplain to the 
University. He remained in this role until 1857 when once 
again he returned to his pastorate.18 While serving the 
church he also served the University indirectly, for his 
preaching attracted both students and professors, as the 
following statement by a student, George B. Taylor, 
indicates. 
Pressed as he was with double duty, his preaching 
reached high water mark, and the little Baptist 
church at Charlottesville was always crowded, the 
l6McGlothlin, p. 152. Robertson made similar com-
ments, citing the opinions of Prof. F. H. Smith and Hon. 
W. W. Henry who was a fellow student, on pp. 65 and 74 of 
Life and Letters of John Albert Broadus. 
17clyde E. Fant, Jr., and William M. Pinson, Jr., 
Twenty Centuries of Great Preaching, vol. 5: MacLaren 
to Talmadge (Waco: Word Books, Publisher, 1971), p. 43. 
18rbid. 
congregation including numbers of the students and 
often professors as well. Never can I forget how 
I would sit enwrapped in his eloquence which was 
scarcely sul~assed afterwards, however much he may 
have grown. 
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In the mid-SOs the Southern Baptist Convention began 
seriously to consider forming a seminary in the south. 
Broadus was among the five young men to whom the Conven-
tion turned for leadership in the venture.20 To him fell 
the lot of developing a plan of organization and instruc-
tion. That which he devised was heavily patterned after 
the model he had learned at the University of Virginia. 
The plan was described and assessed by McGlothlin as 
follows: 
When the committee reported at Greenville in 1857, 
they proposed a new type of theological seminary, 
based largely on the plan of the University of 
Virginia, one with emphasis upon the English 
Bible, with freedom for the student in the selec-
tion and pursuit of studies, with the highest 
scholarship for the able and prepared students and 
with something worth while for all. The plan 
proposed by the committee was adopted and while it 
has had some drawbacks, it has justified itself 
and has exercised a profound influence upon theo-
logical education throughout America. It was half 
a century and more in advance of most of ihe 
theological institutions of the country.2 
In 1859 Broadus was persuaded to give up his church 
and join the founding faculty of the Southern Baptist 
19George B. Taylor, "Virginia Baptist Ministers," 
unpublished manuscript, cited by Robertson, p. 106. 
20McGlothlin, p. 156. 
2lrbid., p. 157. 
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Seminary in Greenville, South Carolina.22 It was to the 
work of the Seminary that he devoted the remainder of his 
life. 
The Seminary's small beginning, with four faculty 
members and twenty-six students, was soon to be tested by 
the advent of the Civil War. Enrollment declined to the 
point that, in the fall of 1862, the school had too few 
students to open.23 The closure of the school was a dis-
appointment to Broadus, but it also provided for him the 
opportunity to preach in various churches and to begin 
labor on one of his finest works, his commentary on the 
Gospel of Matthew.24 
The Civil War also presented Broadus with the oppor-
tunity to serve as a chaplain in the Confederate armies. 
J. William Jones, D. D., related the following story, 
recounting how the opportunity arose. 
In the early spring of 1863 I was walking one 
day from our camp at Hamilton's Crossing, near 
Fredericksburg, Virginia, to old "Round Oak" Bap-
tist Church, some eight miles off, when, hearing 
the clatter of horses' hoofs behind me, I turned 
and saw the familiar form and face of "Stonewall" 
Jackson mounted on his famous "Little Sorrell." 
As he drew near he recognized me, asked if I was 
going to the meeting of the Chaplains' Associa-
tion, and dismounting walked with me for several 
miles, talking about the religious interests of 
his men, and the best means of reaching them. 
22Barrett, p. 340. 
23Robertson, p. 196. 
24 Ibid. 
Among other things he said that he would like to 
see some of the ablest preachers of all the deno-
minations come to the army, if not as permanent 
chaplains, at least as missionaries for a time. 
He mentioned the names of a number of leading men 
whom he would be especially glad to have come, and 
among them Dr. J. A. Broadus, saying very ear-
nestly: "Write to him by all means and beg him 
to come. Tell him for me that he never had a 
better opportunity of preaching the gospel than he 
would have right now in these camps" •••• 
When I met General Jackson a few days after the 
reception of Dr. Broadus's letter, and told him 
that he would come, the great soldier said, in his 
characteristic phrase: "That is good--very good. 
I am so glad of that. And when Dr. Broadus comes 
you must bring him to see me. I want him to 
preach at my headquarters and I wish to help him 
in his work all I can." Alas! the battle of 
Chancellorsville came on a few days afterward, and 
before the great preacher could see the great 
soldier Stonewall Jackson had "crossed over 5ge 
river to rest under the shade of the trees." 
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Following the Battle of Gettysburg, Broadus maintained an 
active preaching schedule, drawing large crowds of sol-
diers from the hospitals and camps.wherever he went.26 One 
high point of his war-time preaching occurred on Confede-
rate Fast Day, when he spoke at General Gordon's head-
quarters. An immense crowd--probably 5,000 in number--
gathered to hear Broadus preach. Several Confederate 
generals attended the meeting, among them Robert E. Lee, 
A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Early.27 
25J. William Jones, "As Evangelist in Lee's Army," 
The Seminary Magazine 8 (April, 1895): 353, 354. 
26 Ibid. 
27rbid., p. 357. 
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After the war, the Seminary reopened, but times were 
difficult in the impoverished south. Determined to see 
the institution succeed if at all possible, Broadus and 
his colleagues reopened the school on November 1, 1865, 
with seven students. Broadus had only one student in 
homiletics, and that student was blind. But so careful 
was he to prepare thoroughly to teach his single student 
that his lectures became the basis for his Treatise on the 
Preparation and Delivery of Sermons. 28 
The Seminary continued to struggle financially, 
unable to raise an adequate endowment due to the state of 
the southern economy. Broadus and his colleagues regu-
larly visited churches and individuals to solicit funds to 
stabilize the institution. Broadus had several oppor-
tunities which would have offered greater financial secu-
rity,29 but he refused them, determined to honor his 
commitment to Southern.30 
Broadus continued in his duties during the seventies 
and eighties, teaching Greek and Homiletics. During this 
28Robertson, p. 214. 
29rbid., p. 306. Brown University, Crozer 
Seminary, Richmond College, the First Church, Richmond and 
Eutaw Place, Baltimore all sought Doctor Broadus's 
services at a time when there was not enough money to pay 
the salaries of the professors. 
30rbid., pp. 281, 282. In 1877 the school was 
moved to Louisville, Kentucky where it eventually was to 
become more secure financially. 
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period his reputation as a preacher increased so that he 
was in demand in churches of many denominations, in many 
cities, and for various types of meetings.31 Bothered by 
frail health and exhaustion, he found it necessary at 
times during this period of his life to reduce his respon-
sibilities so that he could recover. One such occasion 
occurred in 1870, at which time he received the following 
note from none other than Robert E. Lee. 
LEXINGTON, VA., June 21, 1870: I am glad to learn 
that you have decided to visit Europe, and trust 
complete relaxation from duty and the objects of 
interest that will at all points attract your 
attention, may entirely restore your health, and 
that you will return renovated in strength and 
vigor, to gladden the hearts of your many 
friends.32 
In 1889, upon the death of his colleague and friend 
of over thirty years, President J. P. Boyce, Broadus was 
appointed president of Southern Baptist Seminary.33 As 
president, Broadus gathered a faculty of young men to 
assist his aging faculty and to ensure the future of the 
seminary at the turn of the century.34 He also worked 
31Ibid., p. 316. Among these speaking engagements 
were several addresses to the Southern Baptist Convention, 
the 1889 Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale, speeches at 
universities, church dedications, .etc. 
32Ibid., pp. 403, 404. 
33Fant and Pinson, p. 43. 
34Robertson, pp. 402, 420. 
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to increase the endowment35 and built buildings to house 
the institution.36 He reduced some of his teaching and 
speaking responsibilities as well so that he could devote 
significant time to writing projects he hoped to complete 
in his sunset years.37 
For the last year of his life he suffered ill 
hea 1th. He preached his 1 as t sermon in the sum mer of 
1894. That fall he taught as he was able, but it was 
obvious that his strength was failing. He died on March 
16th, 1895.38 
Characteristics of the Man 
The preceding chronology has hinted at some of 
Broadus's characteristics, because they were so manifestly 
intertwined with the events of his life. Those charac-
teristics and others will now be discussed briefly. 
One of Broadus's outstanding qualities was his plea-
santness and charm.39 This characteristic enhanced his 
stature with people throughout his life.40 It was probably 
351bid., p. 406. 
36rbid., pp. 398, 414. 
371bid., pp. 403, 404. 
38Robertson, p. 422. 
39McGlothlin, p. 159. 
40 Robertson, pp. 17, 18. 
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this quality which contributed to his persuasive power in 
the southern Baptist Convention, although he held no for-
mal denominational office.41 It also, no doubt, accounts 
for his popularity in the North, although he was a loyal 
southerner. or. w. H. Whitsitt wrote: 
He was loyal to his section. He kept his feet 
always firmly planted on Southern sod. He was the 
idol of the Confederate Veterans who have come to 
stand with sad pride in the order of his funeral. 
Yet he was as much loved in New York as in Vir-
ginia. Whatever he spoke from any platform on 
either side of the line was applauded to the echo 
on both sides of the line. Other men have endea-
vored to accomplish a feat of that sort and have 
often failed ingloriously.42 
Broadus's charm was attested to by many, but perhaps the 
most eloquent statement was made at his funeral by Rabbi 
Adolph Moses. 
He was the most charming and brilliant conversa-
tionalist I have known. He touched on no subject 
but he adorned and illumined it. Whatever the 
subject of conversation, he opened large and new 
vistas to the surprise and delight of his admiring 
friends. However trite and stale the topic, he 
lifted it to a higher plane. There was a play of 
fine humor and wit in his talk. But he never 
employed the weapon of sarcasm or irony. He never 
abused his great intellectual powers in debate • 
• • • There was such touching gentleness in his 
voice, such noble modesty in his demeanor that it 
was a pleasure to bow to his superiority. He was 
an excellent listener. He was all attention and 
41w. H. Whitsitt, "Remarks Made at the Funeral," The 
Seminary Ma~azine 8 (April, 1895): p. 413. Whitsitt ~­
called him ' ••• for thirty years the leading force in 
our Southern Baptist Convention. " 
42rbid., p. 412. 
eagerness to hear what one had to say •••• He 
greeted the most ordinary persons with gracious 
cordiality and utmost respect •••• Broadus was 
an ideal American gentleman. He was perhaps the 
most amiable and lovable Southerner of his time. 43 
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Broadus's scholarly interests have been noted above, 
in part. He was a wide reader, with interests in history, 
biography, poetry, and fiction. Concerning languages he 
was a scholar of Greek and Latin, he knew Anglo-Saxon, 
Hebrew, and Coptic well, was at home with French and 
German, and had some knowledge of Italian, Gothic, and 
Sanskrit.44 In addition to his seven books, he wrote many 
tracts, pamphlets, and magazine and journal articles for 
publications such as the Homiletic Review.45 
As a popular preacher, Broadus had few peers. Over 
the course of his life, he preached at least 2,187 ser-
mons, 1,274 of them itinerantly.46 He served as pastor 
for seven churches over the course of his career, and also 
spent several summers preaching in the churches.47 He 
preached at the Southern Baptist Convention at least 
43Rabbi Adolph Moses, "As a Conversationalist," The 
Seminary Magazine 8 (April, 1895): pp. 382, 383. 
44A. T. Robertson, "As a Teacher," The Seminary 
Magazine 8 (April, 1895): 360. 
45Ibid., pp. 364-366. 
46Jerry Paxton Ashby, "John Albert Broadus: The 
Theory and the Practice of Hi~ Preaching" (doctoral 
dissertation, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, 
1968), p. 17. 
47 Barron, p. 167. 
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eleven times between 1863 and 1891.48 His preaching was 
popular, although his substance was disarmingly simple and 
his delivery reserved by the standards of the day.4 9 
One critic, a prominent pastor in Virginia who pre-
ferred a grandiloquent delivery to Broadus's conversa-
tional style, charged him with ruining Southern Baptist 
preaching.SO Although Broadus was not without his critics, 
the majority of them commended him very highly. His 
excellence is affirmed by Dr. w. C. Wilkinson of the 
University of Chicago, a man not much given to superlative 
praise. 51 
I have named in my title a man with every 
natural endowment, every acquired accomplishment, 
except, perhaps, plenitude of physical power, to 
have become, had he been only a preacher, a 
preacher hardly second to any in the world. 
A conjectural judgment like the foregoing, it 
is, to be sure, almost always unwisely bold and 
hazardous to put forth. I simply record the 
impression which, after some familiarity acquired 
with the man himself, seen and heard both in 
public and in private, and after no little conver-
sance wi~h his productions in print, I find fixed 
and deepening in my mind concerning Dr. Broadus.52 
48Ibid., p. 177. 
49Edgar E. Folk, "As a Preacher," The Seminary 
Magazine 8 (April, 1895): 374. 
50w. o. Carver, "Recollections and Information from 
Other Sources Concerning the Southern Baptist Theological 
Seminary," cited by Barron, p. 181. 
51Edgar DeWitt Jones, The Royalty of the Pulpit 
(New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1951), p. 51. 
52w. c. Wilkinson, Modern Masters of Pulpit 
Discourse, p. 344, cited by Jones, p. 51. 
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Vernon L. Stanfield, himself a professor of preaching and 
the man who undertook the 1979 revision of Broadus's 
Treatise, wrote: 
During the last half of the nineteenth century in 
America, no Baptist preacher enjoyed greater popu-
lar fame than did John Albert Broadus. By his 
Seminary colleagues, by denominational leaders, by 
competent critics of preaching, and by apprecia-
tive congregations, he was ranked as one of the 
leading preachers of his time.53 
Other characteristics could be noted concerning 
Broadus, but perhaps the most striking of all was the 
depth of his Christian character and fervor. Perhaps the 
best attestation to Broadus's Christianity came from his 
Jewish friend, Rabbi Moses. 
Before I became familiar with Dr. Broadus I knew 
Christianity only as a creed which seemed abso-
lutely incomprehensible to me. I judged it mainly 
from the untold, unmerited misery, the agony of 
ages which Christian rulers and nations had 
entailed upon poor Israel under the impulse given 
by Christian priests and teachers. But when I 
learned to know and revere in Broadus a Christian 
[sic], my conception of Christianity and my atti-
tude toward it underwent a complete change. 
Broadus was the precious fruit by which I learned 
to judge of the truth of Christianity.54 
53vernon L. Stanfield, Favorite Sermons of John A. 
Broadus (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 
1959), p. 1. 
54Rabbi Adolph Moses, quoted by McGlothlin, p. 160. 
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An Overview of Broadus's Theory 
Broadus's Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery 
of Sermons has long been recognized as a fine textbook for 
the training of preachers. W. c. Wilkinson, whose follow-
ing statement may be considered as typical of the opinion 
of many, affirmed the excellence of the work. 
The individual opinion of the present writer is 
that, fairly judged in view of the whole round of 
its comparative merits, the volume of which I now 
speak is not only one of the best works, but by 
eminence quite the best work of its kind in exis-
tence for the use of the average English reader 
and student. There may be writers on homiletics 
who surpass Dr. Broadus in suggestive originality 
of view, there may be those who surpass him in 
profoundness of formal philosophy, there may be 
those who surpass him in elegance of exposition; 
but if I were asked to name a writer on homiletics 
who, equalling him in the union and harmony of 
these different traits, moreover equalled him in 
alert sagacity of insight, in sure sobriety of 
judgment and of taste, in breadth and comprehen-
sion of treatment, in sympathetic and penetrative 
Christian tone and spirit--and it has been my duty 
to read somewhat widely in the literature of homi-
lectics [sic]--I should be obliged to confess 
myself unable to do it.55 
Broadus's View of the Relation 
of Rhetoric and Preaching 
Historically, preaching was distinguished from the 
secular discourse of such men as Demosthenes and Cicero. 
55An Eminent Professor of Homiletics, "Criticisms on 
Some of the Ablest Representative Preachers of the Day," 
The Homiletic Review 16 {August, 1888): 100. This emi-
nent professor is identified as w. C. Wilkinson by A. T. 
Robertson in Life and Letters of John A. Broadus, 
p. 3 6 7. 
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While the secular followed a certain formal arrangement, 
the homily was considered to be a talk, or a familiar 
discourse.56 St. Augustine was probably the first to bring 
the secular and sacred together in his book, On Christian 
Doctrine, Book IV. In this fifth century work, Augustine 
pressed many Classical rhetorical notions into the service 
of preaching. Perhaps more significantly, however, he 
prepared the way for viewing preaching as a kindred art, 
if not a branch, of rhetoric.57 
Broadus believed that preaching is a kindred art of 
rhetoric insofar as the fundamental principles of both 
relate to common human nature. To the extent that this 
commonality exists, then, homiletics may be regarded as 
rhetoric applied to a particular kind of speaking. 
Preaching differs from secular discourse, according to 
Broadus, in the primary source of its materials, its 
directness and simplicity of style, and the unworldly 
motives which should influence the preacher and his pre-
sentation .58 
56John A. Broadus, Treatise on the Preparation and 
Delivery of Sermons, ed. E. C. Dargan (New York: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1898), p. 15. 
57rbid. 
58rbid., p. 16. For Broadus, the primary source of 
preaching material was the Bible. Preaching style should 
be clear to any listener, motivated by a compulsion to 
speak a message from God for the good of the hearer. 
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Because he accepted the overlap of preaching and 
rhetoric, it is not surprising that Broadus urged his 
readers to study works on rhetoric. Included in his list 
of such works are Aristotle's Rhetoric as well as the 
writings of Cicero and Quintillian. He also recommended 
the reading of several more contemporary works, among 
them Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric. Of particular 
significance for the present study is his commendation of 
Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric. Concerning 
Whately's volume he wrote: 
Nor has Whately's admirable "Rhetoric" been ren-
dered valueless by more recent discussions. Its 
treatment of Argument and Style is particularly 
good. 59 
Broadus's View Concerning the Place of 
Argument in Preaching 
The assumptions regarding the rational nature of the 
Christian faith which undergird Whately's use of argument 
in preaching comport well with Broadus's views on the 
subject. Broadus the scholar certainly knew that mere 
assertion was insufficient to convince a doubter that 
59Broadus, p. 544. In the 1870 edition of his 
Treatise, p. 32, Broadus said, "Whately's Rhetoric is 
believed to be the best treatise for practical use that 
has appeared. Especially valuable are the portions on 
Argument and on Style." In Dargan's revision, this com-
ment was revised as quoted and placed in a bibliography at 
the end of the book. At the end of his life, Broadus 
maintained that more recent discussions had not rendered 
Whately's "admirable work" valueless. 
90 
one's proposition is true. His opinion of the importance 
of the subject is evident in the extent to which he dis-
cussed it in his Treatise. In his preface, Broadus felt 
compelled to explain his extensive treatment of argument. 
He wrote: 
The subject of Argument is thought by some to be 
out of place in a treatise on Homiletics or on 
Rhetoric in general. But preaching and all public 
speaking ought to be largely composed of argument, 
for even the most ignorant of people constantly 
practice it themselves, and always feel its force 
when properly presented; and yet in many pulpits 
the place of argument is mainly filled by mere 
assertion and exhortation, and the arguments 
employed are often carelessly stated, or even 
gravely erroneous. 60 
Although he regarded argument in preaching highly, 
he realized that a good thing can be overdone. In his 
chapter on explanation, he cautioned against the overuse 
of argument. He stated that preachers often belabor argu-
ments when the need is for practical and simple 
explanations.61 
In his materials on argument, the influence of 
Whately is unmistakable. While some notions are elabo-
rated from other sources, almost every element of argument 
Broadus proposed is also found in Whately's Rhetoric. 
Broadus accounted for the influence of Whately as follows: 
The author's chief indebtedness for help has been 
to Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, and to 
60Broadus, p. xi. 
6lrbid., p. 153. 
Whately and Vinet. The two last (together with 
Ripley) had been his text-books,--and copious 
extracts are made from them on certain subjects.62 
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One of the subjects to which Broadus undoubtedly referred 
was argument, for he confessed: 
The well-known chapters of Whately have been here 
freely employed, but with very large additions, 
and with the attempt to correct some important 
errors.63 
Considering the substance of Broadus's confession, 
quoted above, an investigation should disclose many simi-
larities in their respective approaches to argument. It 
should also reveal some differences between the two men. 
It is to the relationship of the two theories that the 
writer will turn below. 
A Summary of Broadus's Materials 
Concerning Argument 
Before developing the comparison of Whately and 
Broadus, the writer will preview Broadus's chapter on 
argument. The basis of the preview and the analysis to 
follow, organizationally, will be the 1898 revision of the 
Treatise, done by Broadus's associate and successor, Dr. 
E. C. Dargan. The revision was chosen instead of the 
original because while the substance remained essentially 
62Ibid., p. xii· 
63Ibid., p. xi. 
--1 
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unaltered, the organization of thought is easier to follow 
in the later work.64 
Chapter VII of Broadus's Treatise is entitled 
"Special Materials--Argument." The chapter is divided 
into seven sections. Section One deals with the impor-
tance of argument in preaching. Section Two concerns 
questions preliminary to argument, including the matters 
of presumption and burden of proof. Sections Three and 
Four are a treatment of principal varieties and forms of 
argument. Section Five is a discussion of refutation. 
The sixth section involves the subject of arrangement, and 
the seventh includes some general suggestions governing 
argument. 
All of the elements of argument named above will not 
be reviewed here. To consider all of them would lengthen 
this study unduly. However, those elements of Broadus's 
64 This choice will not compromise the necessity of 
studying a primary source, even though it is a revision. 
By revising the book, Dargan was carrying to completion 
Broadus's own plan to revise it. Prior to his death, 
Broadus had discussed the revision with Dargan, who had 
become his associate at the Seminary in 1892. Certain 
revisions Broadus had penciled into his notes, others he 
and Dargan specifically discussed, and a few were made by 
Dargan with the consent of Broadus's family. See E. c. 
Dargan, Preface to the Revised Edition of Treatise on the 
Preparation and Delivery of Sermons {New York: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1898), p. vii. The 1870 and the 1898 texts 
have been compared and no differences bearing upon this 
study were discovered. It seems reasonable to assume that 
any changes recorded in the 1898 edition reflect changes 
in Broadus's ideas during the mature years of his career. 
theory which clearly reflect Whately's major contribu-
tions, as discussed in the second chapter, are treated 
below. 
A Comparison of the Theories of 
Whately and Broadus 
The purpose of this section is to outline and 
expound selected ideas concerning argument set forth in 
Broadus's Treatise, and to compare them to those of 
Richard Whately, whose theories were explained in the 
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previous chapter. As indicated above, the ideas discussed 
are those which reflect Whately's influence in the areas 
of the his most significant contribution to the under-
standing of rhetoric. The assumption that direct refer-
ence to Whately or the inclusion of similar ideas consti-
tutes influence was stated in the first chapter. It must 
be admitted that similar ideas might be attributed to a 
source common to both men rather than to Whately. If 
Broadus's wording is similar to Whately's, however, it is 
reasonable to assume that Whately was his source. 
It should also be noted at the outset that Broadus's 
section on argument is not nearly as complex as Whately's. 
It is therefore assumed that Broadus included what he 
considered to be the most important of Whately's elements, 
together with ideas from other theorists, as they related 
to his purpose of writing a homiletics textbook. Although 
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he borrowed ideas from others as well, Broadus relied most 
heavily upon Whately, "whose discussion on Arguments," he 
said, "is the most valuable part of his work on Rhetoric, 
and unequalled by other treatises." Besides including a 
number of Whately's principles, in some places Broadus 
also used his illustrations.GS 
It should be noted, finally, that in those elements 
which Broadus borrowed from Whately, he was in substantial 
agreement with the Archbishop. Only in the matters of 
presumption and burden of proof did Broadus take exception 
to the Englishman's views. 
Questions Preliminary to Argument 
As matters preliminary to the framing of an argu-
ment, Broadus identified three questions, all of which 
reflect the influence of Whately. These involve the 
placement of the proposition, the determination of the 
burden of proof, and the value of presumption in argument. 
For purposes of this study, the latter two subjects will 
be discussed. 
Burden of Proof 
Concerning burden of proof, Broadus both agreed and 
disagreed with Whately. Although some matters of agree-
65Broadus, p. 172. 
ment may be found, Broadus pointedly emphasized the 
areas of disagreement.66 
First, Whately said that it is important to deter-
mine at the outset where the burden of proof lies.67 
Unlike the Archbishop, Broadus said that the preacher is 
only indirectly concerned with the burden of proof. The 
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notion is more useful in legal proceedings and in debate. 
Regarding controversial sermons, however, Broadus conceded 
that placement of the burden of proof is essential. At 
such times, he said, it is wise to make formally clear to 
the hearers where the burden lies.68 
Second, Broadus accepted the Roman legal formula for 
determining the burden of proof, which he paraphrased, 
"He who alleges anything must prove his allegation; and, 
conversely, no man is required to prove the negative of 
another man's assertion."69 If, however, one asserts a 
66In what is probably a veiled reference to the 
Archbishop, Broadus said, "On this subject, certain very 
erroneous views have lately obtained currency, from a 
confusion of two different senses of an ambiguous term." 
John Broadus, Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery of 
Sermons, 14th ed. (New York: A. c. Armstrong & Son, 
1889), p. 163. Curiously, this statement is omitted in 
the Dargan revision, although Broadus's ideas on the sub-
ject remained unchanged. 
67Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed. 
Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale: University of Southern 
Illinois Press, 1963), p. 112. 
68Broadus, p. 174. 
69 Ibid. 
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negative, he is obligated to prove it, for the burden of
proof always rests with the one who alleges. Because it 
is difficult to prove a negative proposition, seldom are 
assertions made in negative form.70. Contrary to the Roman 
notion which Broadus adopted, Whately asserted that the 
burden of proof rests upon the side opposite the one 
favored by presumption.71 To Whately, then, the placement 
of the burden of proof depended upon the determination of 
presumption in each given case, a matter which will be 
discussed more fully below. To Broadus, presumption and 
burden of proof were separate matters, the former being 
irrelevant to the determination of the latter. 
Presumption 
Broadus did not consider presumption to be particu-
larly pertinent in preaching, although he advocated a 
clear understanding and fair use of the principles 
involved. 72 This fact is due in part to his views on the 
related matter of burden of proof, which he believed was 
pertinent only in controversial speaking. It is also, no 
doubt, the consequence of his views concerning the nature 
of presumption. 
70rbid., pp. 174, 175. 
7lwhately, p. 112. 
72aroadus, p. 175. 
. .. 
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Broadus distinguished three different meanings of 
the notion of presumption. These he called the common 
meaning, the legal usage, and Whately's definition.73 The 
common meaning, as he understood it, is this: 
A presumption in favor of any proposition is, in 
the most general statement, something which 
inclines us to believe it true before examining 
the proof, or independently of any formal process 
of reasoning. In other words, it is that part of 
the evidence which lies upon the surface and leads 
to the belief in advance of further investigation • 
• • • in itself, strictly and etymologically 
speaking, a presumption is that which we take 
hold of before we inter formally into investiga-
tion or argument.7 
It is evident that the strength of presumption will 
vary from person to person. One may confront a proposi-
tion with a strong presumption, while an opponent has 
little or no disposition in its favor. For example, a 
person who attends church regularly would probably con-
front a proposition asserting the existence of God with a 
strong presumption favoring the proposition. An atheist, 
on the other hand, would consider the same proposition 
with no disposition in its favor. The speaker, therefore, 
must be aware of his audience's viewpoint in each case, 
for presumption is situationa1.75 




The legal sense of presumption is an arbitrary 
determination framed in the interest of justice. Its best 
known expression is that an individual accused of a crime 
is presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty. 
As a matter of fact, the actual logical presumption is 
often the exact opposite, as demonstrated in the lawful 
arrest of a suspect. A warrant is issued on the practi-
cal, logical presumption of guilt, but the trial proceeds 
on the legal, arbitrary presumption of innocence. Broadus 
asserted that legal presumptions should not confuse the 
issue in moral reasoning where the arbitrary, benevolent 
principles of law are not in question.76 
Broadus observed that Whately defined presumption in 
a way which departs from both the common and the legal 
uses of the term. He quoted Whately's definition, which 
rejects the notion of preponderance of probability in 
favor of a proposition, considering presumption instead to 
be the preoccupation of ground.77 Actually, as he 
developed his notion of preoccupation, Whately embraced 
both the legal and common meanings which Broadus preferred 
to distinguish. The Archbishop's examples of preoccupa-
tion included presumption of innocence in courts of law, 
one aspect of the legal meaning. He also believed that 
76rbid. p. 177. 
77Ibid. Cf. Whately, p. 112. 
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presumption can be a function of audience prejudice, 
remarking that in any one question the presumption will 
often be found to lie on different sides in respect of 
different parties.78 This notion is clearly like unto the 
common meaning endorsed by Broadus. 
For Whately, presumption and burden of proof were 
inextricably linked. If a proposition is favored by pre-
sumption, the burden of proof rests with the other side. 
Broadus separated the two elements, noting that they 
depend on different principles. Broadus conceded that 
presumption in one's favor might strengthen his argument, 
but it doesn't transfer the burden of proof to the oppo-
nent as Whately asserted. Burden of proof, Broadus 
affirmed, always rests upon the one who alleges.79 
To clarify the difference of viewpoint, we may con-
sider as an example the matter of baptism. The proposi-
tion to be argued is that the church should practice 
infant baptism. Whately would say that presumption favors 
the proposition, because historically in the Church 
infants have been baptized. Broadus would deny the 
validity of presumption upon the basis of institutional 
precedent. He would say that, apart from the context of 
an audience, presumption cannot be determined. Whately 
78whately, p. 118. 
79 Broadus, pp. 177, 178. 
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would assert that the burden of proof rests upon the one 
opposing infant baptism, for the burden rests upon one who 
disputes the position favored by presumption. Broadus 
would argue that the burden of proof rests upon the one 
asserting the proposition that infants should be baptized, 
for to place the burden upon the opponent would require 
him to prove a negative, namely, that infants should not 
be baptized. If the proposition were made to an Anglican 
audience, Broadus would say presumption strengthens the 
argument, but it would not determine the placement of the 
burden of proof. 
If the proposition were that the church should bap-
tize only those who profess faith, both theorists would 
say that the burden of proof rests with the one asserting 
the proposition. Their reasons, however, are different. 
Whately would say that the burden rests upon the one 
making the assertion, because his proposition is contrary 
to the view enjoying the advantage of presumption. 
Broadus, on the other hand would place the burden on the 
same individual, reasoning that he who alleges must prove. 
If the audience were Anglican, Broadus would concede 
that presumption is against the proposition, and this fact 
should be considered in the development of argument. The 
burden of proof would rest upon the proponent, not because 
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the pedobaptist80 viewpoint preoccupies the ground, 
although it would with the given audience, but because the 
one who alleges must prove. 
If the audience were a Baptist audience, Broadus 
would probably acknowledge the benefit of presumption in 
favor of the proposition, but would still place the burden 
of proof upon the one asserting the proposition. Whately 
would face a dilemma in this situation. On one hand, his 
view that presumption favors existing institutions would 
lead him to conclude that presumption opposes the propo-
sition at hand and that the burden rests with its propo-
nent. On the other hand, his statement that audience 
prejudice may determine presumption would lead him to 
conclude that presumption favors the proposition, since 
the audience bias of Baptists is toward baptism of only 
those who profess faith. The burden of proof would then 
rest with the opponent of the proposition. 
It is evident that Broadus preferred the common 
meaning of presumption when the application was to pulpit 
rhetoric. The legal use he confined to courts of law, 
insisting upon a distinction between the law and moral 
reasoning. Whately's meaning did not distinguish legal 
and common uses. Furthermore, it included some other 
conditions, such as the favoring of existing institutions, 
80 Pedobaptism is the baptism of infants. 
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which the Archbishop believed established preoccupation of 
ground. Broadus rejected Whately's approach as unproven 
and unreasonable. 81 
Principal Varieties of Argument 
Of five principal varieties of argument presented by 
Broadus, four reflect the influence of Whately. Those 
four types are argument a priori, argument from induction, 
argument from analogy, and argument from testimony. The 
latter two will be, discussed below. 
Argument from Analogy 
The influence of Whately is evident and extensive in 
Broadus's treatment of argument from analogy. Mill and 
Campbell are each cited once, but clearly Whately was the 
predominant influence as far as this variety of argument 
is concerned.82 Except as noted, each of the ideas dis-
cussed below clearly follows Whately's theory. 
Broadus cited Whately's notion that analogy is not 
to be confused with resemblance, but rather refers to 
81Ibid., pp. 174-178. This discussion of Whately's 
line of reasoning is the basis for the inference that 
Broadus found Whately's views unreasonable. 
82rn fact, in the reference to Mill, Broadus takes 
exception to the former's notion that arguments from 
analogy are invalid because objects called analogous are 
similar in some respects but dissimilar in others. See 
Broadus, p. 193. 
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proportion.83 Noting the confusion of many concerning the 
nature of this form of argument, he wrote: 
Analogy is still too often confounded with resem-
blance, notwithstanding the earnest efforts of 
Whately and some other writers to confine the term 
to its original and proper sense.84 
He illustrated the notion of proportion, using three 
examples. One of these examples was that of the likeness 
between an egg and a seed as the 1 ink between a parent 
bird and its nestling in the one case and the old plant 
and the seedling in the other. This illustration was 
taken directly from Whately.85 
Because two objects may be analogous in one rela-
tionship, it must not be presumed that the analogy extends 
to all of their relationships. When reasoning by analogy, 
one must be careful not to extend the analogy beyond its 
proper limits. Broadus employed Whately's illustration of 
this rule as he wrote: 
Thus, bec?use a just analogy has been discerned 
between the metropolis of a country, and the heart 
of the animal body, it has been sometimes con-
tended that its increased size is a disease,--that 
it may impede some of its most important func-
tions, or even be the cause of its dissolution.86 
83Broadus, p. 192; cf. Whately, pp. 90, 91. 
84 Ibid. 
85rbid., pp. 192, 193; cf. Whately, p. 91. 
86rbid., p. 194; cf. Whately, p. 92. 
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In the example above, the diseased enlargement of the 
animal heart is improperly used to a~lege that it is 
undesirable for a city to become large, and that the fatal 
consequences of an enlarged heart will also occur in the 
case of a large city. 
One difficulty with argument from analogy is the 
frequent similarity of analogous objects. Such similarity 
often results in erroneous comparison of the resemblance 
rather than the corresponding ratios. Because of this 
difficulty, the proper points of analogy are often clearer 
when the objects do not resemble each other.87 Although 
Whately had not stated this notion explicitly, it is very 
evident in his work. Based upon this premise, he 
explained that several of Jesus' parables are very remote 
from the point to be illustrated, except in the one essen-
tial to his message.88 This remoteness prevents an inter-
preter of the parables from making unintended analogies 
from details of the story involved. 
Broadus wrote concerning the usefulness of examples 
invented to furnish argument, considering such to be argu-
ments from analogy.89 Aristotle had written of the dis-
tinction between real and invented examples, so that one 
87rbid., pp. 192, 193. 
88Whately, pp. 92, 93. 
89Broadus, p. 197. 
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might conclude that Broadus was in this case influenced 
more by the Greek than by the Englishman. This, however, 
does not appear to be the case. Whately, citing Aris-
totle, referred to real and invented examples. However, 
unlike Aristotle who believed that the real example was 
the more convincing, Whately asserted that a supposed 
case, if it is probable, will often be no less convincing 
than the rea1.90 Broadus apparently adopted Whately's 
view, for he said that merely probable cases may provide 
an analogy which will be highly convincing. With this 
idea he credited Whately in a footnote.91 
Finally, Broadus observed that real and invented 
examples, used as analogical arguments, are sometimes used 
not as proof, but rather to explain or make an argument 
interesting.92 In this he clearly followed Whately, who 
had said that this variety of argument may be used at 
times not to prove anything, but either to illustrate and 
explain one's meaning or to amuse the fancy with the 
ornament of language.93 
Broadus included a few other ideas, such as the . 
usefulness of arguments from analogy to refute objections, 
90whately, p. 103. 
91Broadus, p. 197; cf. Whately, pp. 103, 104. 
92rbid. 
93 Whately, p. 108. 
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which do not appear in Whately's text. However, the major 
elements he discussed reflect the unmistakable imprint of 
Whately. 
Argument from Testimony 
The next principal variety of argument Broadus dis-
cussed is that of argument from testimony. Departing from 
Whately, he pointed out that the words "testimony" and 
"authority" are often confused. The former, he believed, 
should be applied only in matters of fact. The latter 
should be used concerning matters of judgment or opinion. 94 
At the same time, he cited Whately's premise that men are 
inclined to confuse facts with their judgments concerning 
them.95 
As had Whately, Broadus stated that in testimony to 
matters of fact, the character and number of witnesses 
will either strengthen or weaken the argument.96 A wit-
9 4Broadus, pp. 197, 198. See also Whately, p. 61, 
where, in a footnote, the Archbishop acknowledged that 
testimony to matters of opinion usually was designated 
"authority." In his Elements of Logic he confirmed this 
as the primary sense of the term, calling it a claim to 
deference. Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (London: 
Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1864), p. 
194. However, in his discussion of argument from testi-
mony in his Rhetoric he preferred to speak of testimony 
regarding matters of fact and regarding matters of 
opinion. 
95rbid., p. 198; cf. Whately, pp. 58-61. 
96Broadus, p. 199; cf. Whately, p. 61. 
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ness's truthfulness, intelligence, and opportunity to know 
the facts are primary considerations. Whately's develop-
ment of these notions is far more thorough. It is evident 
from a footnote that Broadus expected his readers to refer 
to Whately for a more complete discussion of the subject.97 
A large number of witnesses to a common fact will 
strengthen an argument from testimony if the witnesses' 
knowledge was gained first-hand, rather than from what 
others have told them.98 Details of individual testimonies 
may differ, but will not invalidate the testimony as long 
as these details are non-contradictory. In fact, non-
contradictory discrepancies among their accounts serve to 
authenticate the independence of the witnesses and to 
strengthen their combined testimony to the substantial 
facts.99 Broadus used this notion as an argument to defend 
the authenticity of the Gospel accounts of the life of 
Christ. 
The unintentional testimony of adversaries is a 
compelling argument. Broadus barely mentions this, 
apparently assuming that his readers would consult Whately 
97Ibid., p. 202. Broadus referred his readers to 
pp. 78-104 in Whately, which corresponds to pp. 58-76 in 
the Ehninger edition. 
98Ibid., p. 199; cf. Whately, pp. 61, 62. 
99Ibid. 
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for a thorough treatment. His illustration, that the 
miracles of Jesus were acknowledged by unbelievers, makes 
the allusion to Whately unmistakable.100 
Concerning the character of things attested, Broadus 
noted that the improbable requires more testimony to gain 
credence than does the probable. In this regard, he 
discussed the miracles of Jesus as examples. Miracles are 
improbable and therefore can be expected to require more 
testimony to establish their credence. The testimony of 
Jesus, strengthened by arguments for his sterling charac-
ter, and the witness of others are offered by the Gospel 
writers as arguments affirming the actual occurrence of 
the miracles. lOl 
It has been demonstrated that Broadus closely 
followed Whately in relating testimony to matters of fact. 
His dependence upon the Archbishop is evident not only in 
the similarity of ideas, but also in the footnote men-
tioned above. However, he related authority rather than 
testimony to matters of opinion. 
Broadus made a distinction between testimony and 
authority. The early Church Fathers, for example, offered 
testimony concerning the apostolic origin of the New 
lOOibid., p. 200; cf. Whately, pp. 64-66. 
101Ibid., pp. 200, 201; cf. Whately, p. 68ff. 
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Testament documents. Their interpretations of the meaning 
of those documents, however, is a matter of authority.102 
Broadus also believed that the Bible should be con-
sidered in a discussion of testimony and authority. His 
views concerning the authority of the Bible are essential 
to understanding his approach to establishing the proof of 
a proposition. For Broadus, a Biblical affirmation was 
the supreme argument, as the following statement 
indicates: 
The Scriptures themselves are an authority indeed. 
All that they testify to be fact is thereby fully 
proven, all that they teach as true and right is 
thereby established and made obligatory. There 
are some subjects on which the Bible is our sole 
authority, such as the Trinity, justification by 
faith, the conditions of the future life, and the 
positive ordinances of Christianity; namely, bap-
tism and the Lord's supper. The Christian 
reasoner should seek fully to appreciate this 
unparalleled authority, and shquld heedfully 
observe its proper relation to all other means of 
proof .103 
Although this notion is not developed in Whately's dis-
cussion of argument from testimony, it is consistent with 
that which he said concerning the presumption and defer-
ence established in favor of the decisions or opinions of 
"an individual, a body, or a book."104 It also is consis-
tent with the Archbishop's view that the Bible alone is 
102rbid., pp. 202, 203. 
103 rbid., p. 203. 
104whately, p. 118, emphasis mine. 
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the religion of Protestants. As Golden and Corbett noted, 
it was his allegiance to the Scriptu~es that accounts for 
Whately's emphasis on testimony in his Elements of 
Rhetoric.105 
To summarize, Broadus identified five principal 
varieties of argument. His ideas were not original, but 
were conventional. Although other theorists were quoted, 
Whately was the predominant influence upon Broadus's 
ideas. Accurately summarizing this section of Broadus's 
Treatise and assessing Whately's influence, Paul Huber 
wrote: 
Broadus presents no unusual definitions in his 
development of the principal varieties of argu-
ment. Most of his material comes from his study 
and work in the area of argumentation. He does 
admit, however, that he was influenced by Whately, 
and it is evident that his views closely parallel 
those of the English Archbishop.106 
Forms of Argument 
Broadus next discussed five forms of argument. 
These included argument a fortiori, progressive 
approach, dilemma, reductio ad absurdum, and ex 
concesso. His treatment of the forms is brief, and in 
105James L. Golden and Edward P. J. Corbett, The 
Rhetoric of Blair, Campbell, and Whately (New York:~­
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), p. 274. 
106paul Huber, "A Study of the Rhetorical Theories of 
John A. Broadus" (doctoral dissertation, University of 
Michigan, 1956), p. 23. 
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each case conforms to standard definitions. The progres-
sive approach will be discussed here, since it is this 
form only which reflects Whately's influence. 
The argument from progressive approach involves 
proof based upon a progressive tendency toward substantia-
tion of the point in question. Broadus attributed this 
idea to Whately, who described it as involving the collec-
tive force of several arguments which individually con-
sidered would have little weight. By presenting a series 
of such arguments in optimum order, he said, one can 
establish a progressive tendency toward a certain 
conclusion.107 
Broadus illustrated the form with an argument regar-
ding the development of religious tolerance. He borrowed 
the example from Whately and abbreviated it as follows: 
In every age and country, as a general rule, 
tolerant principles have (however imperfectly) 
gained ground wherever scriptural knowledge has 
gained ground. And a presumption is thus afforded 
that a still further advance of the one would lead 
to a corresponding advance in the other.108 
Refutation 
Broadus recognized that often the assertion of 
counter propositions is not sufficient to prevail in 
establishing one's viewpoint. The arguments of an oppo-
107whately, p. 82. 
108Broadus, pp. 205, 206; cf. Whately, pp. 84, 85. 
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nent must be met, and objections to one's own arguments 
must be addressed. Although the preacher may not have an 
actual antagonist, he must be aware of contrary arguments 
which he must refute if he would convince his audience 
that his proposition is correct.109 So that his readers 
might be more skillful, Broadus included eight principles 
which govern refutation of arguments. These will be dis-
cussed below. 
First, Broadus noted that proving the opposite truth 
is a sufficient refutation of error.110 In this view he 
agreed with Whately, who had observed that a proposition 
may be refuted either by proving its opposite or by over-
throwing the arguments in its favor.111 
Second, in moral reasoning, one cannot always fully 
refute all arguments. This is due, in part, to the fact 
that moral reasoning deals in probablilities rather than 
in empirirical data. Furthermore, some arguments are too 
weak to refute. If one cannot see their absurdity, he 
will probably not be persuaded by the best refutation.112 
An inability to refute an argument will not neces-
sarily weaken one's own position. Broadus stated that the 
109Ibid., p. 201. 
llOibid. 
lllwhately, p. 148. 
112Broadus, pp. 208, 209. 
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reason for believing any moral truth consists in con-
sidering the arguments in favor of it, minus the objec-
tions refuted as far as possible.113 In support of this 
notion he quoted Whately, who had asserted that an 
unanswerable objection may be allowed if weightier objec-
tions can be presented against every other supposition.114 
Included also is Whately's illustration concerning evi-
dences of religion, which suggested that rather than 
answering every objection to Christianity, one should pose 
the possibility of human origin of the Christian faith and 
then determine which proposition bears the fewer 
difficulties.115 
Broadus's third principle is that when objections 
are discussed, they should be stated in full force.116 In 
other words, one should state his opponent's objection as 
accurately and strongly as possible rather than making a 
straw man of the objection. Although the straw man may be 
more easily destroyed, such refutation is hardly persua-
sive to those who understand the force of the objection. 
Although Broadus did not quote Whately as his source for 
this idea, it parallels Whately's statement very closely. 
113 Ibid., p. 209. 
114whately, p. 156. 
115aroadus, p. 209; cf. Whately, pp. 156, 157. 
116Ibid., p. 210. 
The Archbishop encouraged the statement of objections in 
full force lest the audience conclude that they are 
unanswerable. 117 
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Fourth, Broadus identified four aspects of an argu-
ment to which refutation may be directed. The four are 
named in his following statement: 
Refutation, whether of an erroneous proposition, 
or of an objection to the truth, will be accom-
plished by showing either that the terms are ambi-
guous, the premises false, thr geasoning unsound, 
or the conclusion irrelevant. 1 
Broadus developed his idea with quotations from Potter and 
Vinet, who were contemporary writers on the subject of 
homiletics. His thoughts, however, were not unlike those 
of Whately, who had noted that refutation may consist 
either in the denial of one of the premises of the argu-
ment or in objection to the conclusiveness of the 
reasoning.119 
Fifth, Broadus suggested that refutation is 
strengthened if the origin of an error can be shown. To 
illustrate the principle, he referred to infant baptism. 
His argument was that after one deals with any New Testa-
ment passages offered in support of the practice, one can 
further refute it by tracing its origin to the second or 
117whately, pp. 159, 160. 
118Broadus, p. 210. 
119whately, p. 149. 
----- l 
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third century.120 Whately also asserted that even if an 
argument has been decisively refuted on other grounds, the 
case against it will have a longer lasting effect if the 
error is traced to its origin.121 Perhaps Broadus borrowed 
the idea from Whately, but he certainly did not find his 
illustration in the Archbishop's work!l22 
Sixth, Broadus urged the use of indirect refutation, 
the principal variety of which is reductio ad absurdum. 
This argument form is used to reduce an opponent's argu-
ment to absurdity. For example, it might be proposed that 
a particular tragic story be censored from the newspaper 
because it might create emotional distress for readers. 
Following that line of reasoning, one could argue in 
refutation that no bad news should be published because 
it might promote distress. Broadus developed relatively 
extensively the notion of indirect refutation with an 
extensive and unmistakable dependence upon Whately.123 
One kind of indirect refutation is to show that an 
opponent's premise proves too much, i. e., that besides 
the conclusion drawn, it proves one that is inadmissable.124 
120Broadus, p. 211. 
121Whately, p. 167. 
122Anglicans practice infant baptism. 
123Three footnotes cite Whately. 
124Broadus, p. 212; cf. Whately, p. 151. 
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Another type is irony, with which one makes an opponent or 
an error appear to be ridiculous.125 Because some will 
complain that irony is irreverent, Broadus counseled that 
it be used sparingly in sermons.126 The third kind is the 
sophistical method which consists in counter-objections 
urged against something taken to be, although it is not, 
the only alternative. Broadus included one of Whately's 
examples, in which a man replies to the censure he 
receives regarding a vice to which he is addicted that 
there are other vices which are worse.127 
Broadus's seventh principle is that refutation 
should not be too elaborate or vehement. His reasons 
clearly reflect his dependence upon Whately for this 
notion, for he said that excessive strength of refutation 
125Broadus illustrated the notion from the Biblical 
story of the prophet Elijah who confronted the prophets of 
Baal on Mt. Carmel. After his opponents had unsuccess-
fully called upon their god, Elijah taunted them, saying, 
"Call out with a loud voice, for he is a god; either he is 
occupied or gone aside, or is on a journey, or perhaps he 
is asleep and needs to be awakened." Broadus, p. 212. 
Whately illustrated this idea by referring to his pub-
lished Historic Doubts, which with irony attacked the 
scepticism of David Hume. Whately, p. 152-155. 
1 26Broadus, p. 213. 
1 27rbid.; cf. Whately, p. 157. Specifically, 
Whately said that if he is blamed for being a sot, he 
dilates on the greater enormity of being a thief, as if it 
were necessary that he be either. 
will arouse deep-seated prejudices and may prompt one to 
cling to the refuted argument as a matter of pride.128 
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Eighth, Broadus observed that successful refutation 
gains the sympathy of the hearers, often to their detri-
ment, for they overestimate the extent of the refutation. 
The fact that all arguments offered in favor of a propo-
sition have been refuted does not necessarily prove that 
the proposition is false. It may be that the proposition 
could be supported by arguments not yet advanced.129 These 
ideas regarding the overestimation of refutation parallel 
those of Whately.130 
Finally, Broadus addressed the placement of refuta-
tion of objections. Following Ripley's Sacred 
Rhetoric, he first asserted that a point should be made 
and objections to it disposed of before the preacher 
advances his next point.131 If objections lie against the 
general sentiment of the discourse, and if they can be 
addressed briefly and independently, they should be 
refuted before proposing the argument. If refutation 
depends upon the prior advancement of argument, then it 
must be postponed until the conclusion. If one chooses 
128Ibid.; cf. Whately, pp. 162, 165. 
129Ibid., p. 214. 
130whately, pp. 155-159. 
131Broadus, p. 219. 
to delay refutation, knowing that objections are in the 
hearers' minds, he is advised to intimate at the outset 
that he will notice objections before concluding.13 2 
Regarding principles of refutation, there is evi-
dence of Whately's influence, as described above. It is 
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also evident that Broadus borrowed ideas from other theo-
rists as well. In some cases, the sources of ideas are 
difficult to identify, probably because the notions are 
so common that they are now considered to be self-
evident. 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the 
personal background of John Albert Broadus, and to 
explain his theory of argument. Of particular interest 
was the influence of Richard Whately's theory. Although 
the influence of other classical and more recent theo-
rists is evident, Broadus's confession that Whately's 
work was freely employed is confirmed in the analysis. 
Matters in which Broadus differed from Whately have 
been included in this chapter, upon the assumption that 
not only similarities, but also differences should be 
noted. Broadus followed Whately closely in the matters 
132Ibid. Concerning the choice of delay, the 
influence--or-whately is apparent, although the idea 
itself is Aristotelian. Compare the Archbishop's state-
ment in this regard on p. 147 of his Elements. 
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of argument from testimony, analogy, and progressive 
approach. He also clearly adopted the Englishman's ideas 
regarding refutation. In the very important matters of 
presumption and burden of proof, however, Broadus poin-
tedly disagreed with Whately. 
The analysis of Broadus's addresses and written 
discourses in the following chapter will undoubtedly 
disclose the influence of the Archbishop. It will also 
reveal the differences between the two theorists. 
CHAPTER IV 
A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF SELECT DISCOURSES 
OF JOHN A. BROADUS 
In the two preceding chapters the writer has 
described the theories of argument of Richard Whately and 
John A. Broadus. It has been demonstrated that the former 
individual exerted considerable influence upon the latter, 
although Broadus also incorporated ideas from other 
writers into his Treatise. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how 
and to what extent Broadus applied Whately's theories in 
three of his own addresses and written discourses. The 
addresses and discourses will be examined to discover both 
the application of Whately's ideas and the deviations from 
his theory. 
Before proceeding with analysis, a model for criti-
cal discourse will be presented. That model will serve as 
a methodological basis for the rhetorical analysis to 
follow. 
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A Model for Critical Discourse 
In an essay entitled "The Anatomy of Critical 
Discourse,"l Lawrence Rosenfield proposed a model for the 
practice of rhetorical criticism. Rosenfield contended 
that criticism is most sensibly conceived of as a special 
form of reason-giving discourse.2 More specifically, a 
critic makes evaluative assertions about the way things 
are and offers reasons to justify his assessments.3 This 
approach is likened unto a forensic argument, in which a 
claim is based upon an interpretation of a set of facts in 
light of a legal code. Applied to rhetoric, this means 
that the facts of a specific rhetorical event are inter-
preted, and the interpretation is compared to a norm. 
Judgments are based upon the degree to which the event 
conforms to or deviates from the n~rm. 4 
If one would engage in rhetorical criticism, he must 
decide what ~he relevant data will be. Rosenfield sug-
gested four variables which may be considered in this 
regard. They are the source or creator of the message 
!Lawrence Rosenfield, "The Anatomy of Critical 
Discourse," in Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A 
Twentieth Century Perspective, second ed., revised, eds. 
Bernard L. Brock and Robert L. Scott (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1980), pp. 148-174. 
2Ibid., p. 148. 
3Ibid., pp. 153, 154. 
4 Ibid., pp. 155, 156. 
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(S), the message (M), the environment, including matters 
of historical background and context _in which the message 
is received (E), and the critic, who is a unique receiver 
(C) .s A total interpretation of a communicative event 
would require analysis of all four variables. Such analy-
sis is, however, rare if not impossible for one critic.6 
Therefore, various combinations of these variables may be 
considered. For the rhetorical critic, the indispensible 
variable is the message (M). 7 
After determining what will constitute relevant 
data, the critic must formulate a basis or standard for 
comparison. Rosenfield suggested two types. One he 
called "analog modality," in which an actual speech or 
address is selected to serve as a standard of comparison 
for another. The other type he called "model modality," 
in which the critic generates his own paradigm of an ideal 
to serve as a standard of comparison.a The search for an 
explanation for the extent and character of deviation from 
the model constitutes the invention of critical reasons. 9 
In the model modality, the critic's norm is generated from 
5Ibid., p. 159. 
6 Ibid. --
7Ibid. --
8 Ibid., pp. 170, 171. 
9rbid., p. 171. 
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a theoretical base. The comparison of a discourse to the 
model serves to confirm or to qualify the theory repre-
sented by the model. Comparison also is used to assess 
the discourse.10 
This writer will use Rosenfield's approach to ana-
lyze and assess three of Broadus's discourses. Of the 
four variables which Rosenfield suggested, the source (S) 
and the message (M) will provide the relevant data. 
Rosenfield's description of the interaction of these two 
variables follows: 
The S-M focus concentrates on understanding dis-
course as an expression of its creator. Most 
often the critic attempts to trace out the crea-
tive process by which the speaker externalized and 
structured the feelings, thoughts, and experiences 
contained within himself. The relation of source 
to message has prompted two general schools of 
criticism. One (which actually concentrates on 
the S ---> M relationship) seeks to account for 
the rhetor's behavior as a function of the factors 
which influenced him: his education, the books hi 
read, the persons who inspired him, and the like. 1 
These two variables were chosen because they naturally and 
adequately accomplish the stated purpose of this study. 
The notions of argument stated in previous chapters con-
stitute the influences, particularly that of Whately, 
which determined the viewpoint of a rhetor, Broadus. It 
can be expected that his messages will reflect those 
l01bid., p. 172. 
ll1bid., p. 161. 
-1 
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influences. Analysis will disclose the form and substance 
of Broadus's approach to the argumentive materials in the 
discourses. 
Following Rosenfield's "model modality," the stan-
dard of assessment will be a paradigm based upon Whately's 
theory of argument. It is expected that both conformity 
and intentional deviation will be discovered, since in his 
Treatise, Broadus stated that he employed Whately's 
notions, but with additions and corrections.12 
A Paradigm Based Upon Whately's Theory 
Whately's theory was discussed in chapter two, and 
therefore will not be reviewed here in detail. Selected 
portions of that theory will be included in a paradigm to 
be used in analyzing and assessing Broadus's discourses. 
The criteria for choosing the selected portions are named 
and developed below. 
Criteria for the Paradigm 
First, it must be remembered that Whately's theory 
en toto was not incorporated into Broadus's Treatise. 
In other words, some ideas of Whately's were omitted. The 
reasons for omissions are not known, but possibilities 
12John A. Broadus, Treatise on the Preparation and 
Delivery of Sermons (New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1898), p. xi. 
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might be suggested. It is possible, for instance, that 
Broadus expected his readers to examine Whately's work for 
themselves, making duplication in his Treatise unneces-
sary. This possibility is strengthened by the fact that 
in his section on relevant literature he urged the reading 
of several authors, including Whately. Another possible 
reason is that to include most or all of Whatley's ideas 
would make the Treatise too long. The fact that Broadus 
treated several notions only briefly could indicate that 
he recognized the need to limit the scope of his work. It 
is also possible that he chose those ideas which he con-
sidered most important. This final possibility seems most 
likely, and does not exclude the other two as concurrent 
explanations. In any case, the criterion which will be 
inferred from the above is that only those elements of 
Whately's theory which appear in Broadus's Treatise will 
be included in the paradigm. 
Second, it must be remembered that not all of 
Whately's ideas were original. He borrowed many of his 
ideas from the classic rhetoricians. That which gave the 
ideas he borrowed distinction was his extensive develop-
ment and modification of some, and the ecclesiastical 
application he made of most, if not all. The second 
criterion, then, which an element must meet to be included 
is that it must be, in the opinion of experts, among 
Whately's original or otherwise significant contributions. 
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Third, in the very important matters of presumption 
and burden of proof, for example, Whately and Broadus did 
not agree. Broadus's discussion of the disagreement was 
developed in chapter three, in which the differences 
between the two men were carefully noted. As a criterion 
concerning matters in which the two disagreed, Whately's 
notions are included in the paradigm. Deviation from the 
standard can be expected in the discourses, however, inso-
far as such ideas are concerned. 
Fourth, Broadus adopted ideas from other sources. 
Such ideas will not be included since the fourth criterion 
is that only Whately's ideas will constitute the paradigm. 
It is likely that ideas from other theorists are reflected 
in the addresses. These ideas may be noted in passing, 
but they will not receive primary analysis or emphasis. 
Elements of the Paradigm 
Based upon the criteria stated above, the elements 
included in this paradigm must appear in Whately's 
Rhetoric, they must also appear in Broadus's Treatise 
(either confirmed or disputed), and they must be judged by 
experts to be original and/or significant contributions 
made by the Archbishop in the field of rhetoric. Based 
upon the discussion and analysis of chapters two and 
three, the following elements meet the criteria: presump-
tion, burden of proof, argument from testimony, argument 
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from analogy, and refutation. According to nature and 
function, these elements can be placed in three groupings: 
1) presumption and burden of proof, 2) forms of argument 
(including those from testimony and analogy}, and 3) refu-
ta ti on. 
It is significant that the list of elements Broadus 
included in his Treatise and those which are considered 
by expert opinion as Whately's contribution to the field 
of rhetoric are almost identical. Broadus's list was 
longer, adding some of Whately's principles governing 
order of arguments and also including two varieties of 
argument, a priori and argument from induction. Other-
wise, the two are remarkably alike. 
Because Whately's ideas were discussed in chapter 
two, they will not be repeated here. They will be briefly 
reviewed below, however, when appropriate and helpful in 
the discussion of Broadus's discourses • 
. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it should be 
observed that this paradigm does not provide an exhaustive 
model for studying argument. Many forms of argument and 
principles of argumentation are not included, even though 
they appear both in Whately's Rhetoric and in Broadus's 
Treatise. The paradigm has been designed to allow an 
examination and assessment of Whately's most significant 
contributions, as recognized and applied by Broadus. 
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It must be further observed that Broadus did not 
employ every element of the paradigm.in every discourse 
studied. Presumption and burden of proof will be examined 
in each case, but the nature of the subject matter and the 
situation involved will bear heavily upon the varieties of 
argument employed and the amount and form of refutation 
required. Explanations will be suggested to account for 
omissions, but the mere fact of such omissions must not be 
construed as a weakness in Broadus's addresses. 
An Analysis and Assessment of Three Discourses 
of John Broadus 
The three discourses to be analyzed and assessed are 
"Duty of Baptists to Teach Their Distinctive Views," 
"Should Women Speak in the Public Assemblies?" and "Immer-
sion Essential to Christian Baptism." The addresses will 
be examined in the order listed above, which corresponds 
to their chronological sequence. 
"Duties of Baptists to Teach 
Their Distinctive Beliefs" 
Background of the Address 
This particular address was delivered in 1881 at the 
fifty-seventh annual meeting of the American Baptist Pub-
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lication Society.13 It is evident, therefore, that the 
audience to which this address was originally given was 
primarily, if not exclusively, Baptist. 
In addition to the external evidence cited above, 
this conclusion is supported by internal evidence. For 
example, Broadus introduced his proposition using a first 
person, plural pronoun to refer to himself and to his 
audience. He said, "Hence, the text lays upon us the 
duty of which I have been requested to speak--the duty of 
Baptists to teach their distinctive views."14 First per-
son, plural pronouns were also regularly employed in the 
reasons offered in support of the proposition. The fol-
lowing sentences are a few of many which identify the 
Baptist character of the audience through the use of the 
first person. 
1. It is a duty we owe ourselves. We must 
teach these views in order to be consistent in 
holding them. Because of these we stand apart 
from other Christians, in separate organizations--
from Christians whom we warmly love and delight to 
work with. We have no right thus to stand apart 
unless the matters of difference have real impor-
tance; and if they are really important, we cer-
tainly ought to teach them.15 
l3Edward C. Starr, ed., A Baptist Bibliography, 25 
vols. (Chester: American Baptist Historical Society, 
1953) 3:150. 
14John A. Broadus, "The Duty of Baptists to Teach 
Their Distinctive Views" (Philadelphia: American Baptist 
Publication Society, n.d.), p. 6. 
15Ibid., pp. 11, 12. 
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It is also significant that Broadus had been 
assigned the topic for this address, as indicated in his 
statement of the proposition, quoted above. Not only was 
he speaking to an audience likely to be sympathetic with 
his views; he was also addressing a topic concerning which 
they desired to hear his opinions. 
An Overview of the Address 
The Biblical text for this address was Matthew 
28:20, in which Jesus charged his disciples, saying, 
"Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have 
commanded you." Broadus began his address with a brief 
exposition of his text, from which he inferred that "all 
things" included not only matters of personal piety, but 
also rules governing Christian societies, or churches. 
From the exposition of his text, he inferred his proposi-
tion, which was this: "Hence, the text lays upon us the 
duty of which I have been requested to speak--the duty of 
Baptists to teach their distinctive views.nl6 
Following the statement of the proposition, Broadus 
listed and described briefly the distinctive views of 
which he spoke. He named four: 1) that the Bible alone 
is a religious authority; 2) that a Christian Church 
ought to consist only of persons who make a credible 
profession of conversion; 3) that officers, government, 
16rbid., p. 6. 
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and ceremonies of a church ought to be such, and only 
such, as the New Testament directs; and 4) that churches 
ought to be independent, free from the control of other 
churches and separate from the State.17 
His first distinctive view he simply stated. The 
second he elaborated, arguing that this one precluded 
infants from church membership and implying that one whose 
life did not provide credible evidence of conversion 
should not be retained in membership.18 The third notion 
he developed relatively extensively, referring to the 
significance of the ceremonial ordinances of baptism and 
communion. He amplified the fourth distinctive, stating 
that independence does not preclude cooperation with other 
churches and that separation of church and state does not 
allow the church to violate moralities essential to public 
welfare.19 
After stating those principles which he believed to 
be the distinctive views of Baptists, he offered four 
reasons for teaching them. First, he said, it is a duty 
to ourselves, because teaching these views justifies 
separation from other religious groups and also corrects 
the excesses of some who claim to be Baptists. Second, he 
17rbid., pp. 6-10. 
18rbid., pp. 6, 7. 
19rbid., p. 10. 
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said, it is a duty to fellow Christians who need to under-
stand Baptist views. Third, it is a duty to the unbe-
lieving world in that through asserting these views the 
assaults of infidels might be met. Fourth, it is a duty 
owed to Christ, who charged his disciples to teach all 
things that he had commanded them.20 
The final section of the address was devoted to six 
suggested means and methods for performing the duty urged 
by the proposition. Those six included 1) thorough 
instruction of Baptists themselves, 2) improvement of the 
character and influence of the churches, 3) understanding 
the audience to be taught, 4) skillful treatment of con-
troverted topics, 5) cooperation with other denominations 
without sacrificing convictions, and 6) cultivation of 
unity among Baptists.21 
An Analysis and Assessment of the Arguments 
Having surveyed the contents of Broadus's address, 
the writer will now analyze and assess those contents 
according to the paradigm described above. All elements 
of the paradigm may not appear in this address, but an 
attempt will be made to deal with those which do occur. 
20rbid., pp. 11-20. 
2lrbid., pp. 20--35. 
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Presumption and Burden of Proof 
The first elements of Whately's paradigm which serve 
as a standard of analysis and assessment are the notions 
of presumption and burden of proof. As noted elsewhere, 
Whately identified presumption with preoccupation of 
ground. The burden of proof rests upon the one who chal-
lenges presumption. 
Whately noted that presumption can vary from situa-
tion to situation, depending upon the biases of the audi-
ence. This fact is significant in analyzing this address. 
It is evident from the use of first person, plural pro-
nouns that Broadus was addressing a Baptist gathering. 
Although all present may not have been predisposed to the 
propagation of Baptist views, as called for by the 
proposition, most could reasonably .be expected to accept 
the distinctive views Broadus listed and described. At 
least to a certain extent, then, he could claim pre-
sumption in his favor upon the occasion of this address. 
A second aspect of Whately's description of pre-
sumption is important in this address. The Archbishop 
spoke of authority as a matter of "habitual presumption." 
Such presumption may favor the decisions or opinions of 
"an individual, a body, or a book. 11 2 2 Broadus' s views 
2 2Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed. 
Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale: Un1vers1ty of Southern 
Illinois Press, 1963), p. 118. Emphasis mine. 
regarding the authority of the Bible, expressed not only 
in his Treatise, but also as the first distinctive view 
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of Baptists stated above, indicate that for himself and 
for other Baptists any proposition taught by the Bible has 
presumption in its favor. 
It appears that Broadus recognized presumption to be 
in his favor, for the address consists primarily of 
appeals and assertions rather than extensive arguments. 
Knowing that his audience was a Baptist audience, he did 
little to defend the distinctive views he asserted, 
although he undoubtedly knew that individuals of other 
theological persuasions would dispute his convictions. It 
is also evident from his introductory exposition of his 
text, Matthew 28:20, and the implied reference to it in 
his fourth reason, that Broadus understood the New Testa-
ment to support his proposition. For him and his audience 
the weight of habitual presumption conclusively favored 
his assertion. 
Because in this situation, presumption favored 
Broadus, Whately would argue that the burden of proof 
rested upon those who would dispute the proposition. 
Broadus would be required only to refute the objections to 
the proposition in order that it might stand. According 
to his own theory, however, Broadus would place the burden 
of proof upon himself despite the benefit of presumption, 
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for he stated that he who alleges bears the burden of 
proof. 
A review of the address indicates that Broadus 
followed his own viewpoint rather than that of Whately, in 
that he offered four reasons in support of the proposi-
tion. However, it should be noted that his reasons were 
not strongly argumentative in nature. He addressed a few 
objections raised against them, as will be demonstrated 
below, but his primary development of reasons consisted of 
little argument. For example, as a portion of the 
development of his first reason, i. e., that the teaching 
of distinctive views is a duty owed to ourselves, he gave 
an explanation, as he wrote: 
And this teaching is the only way of correcting 
excesses among ourselves. Do some of our Baptist 
brethren seem to you ultra in their denomina-
tionalism, violent, bitter? And do you expect to 
correct such a tendency by going to the opposite 
extreme? You are so pained, shocked, disgusted, 
at what you consider an unlovely treatment of 
controverted matters that you shrink from treating 
them at all. Well, the persons you have in view, 
if there be such persons, would defend and fortify 
themselves by pointing at you. They would say, "I 
am complained of as extreme and bigoted. Look at 
those people yonder, who scarcely ever make the 
slightest allusion to characteristic Baptist prin-
ciples, who are weak-kneed, afraid of offending 
Paedobaptists, or dreadfully anxious to court 
their favor by smooth silence: do you want me to 
be such a Baptist as that?" Thus one extreme 
fosters another .23 
23Broadus, "Duty ••• ," pp. 12, 13. 
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Forms of Argument 
At this point the writer will analyze forms of 
argument in Broadus's address. The paradigm allows the 
study of arguments from testimony and from analogy. To 
analyze only for these three forms is not to suggest that 
other forms of argument are not used in the address, nor 
is it to suggest that all three forms necessarily should 
be employed. Indeed, other forms of argument appear, and 
only one of these two appears in this address. 
An argument from analogy, as previously defined, is 
one in which an instance adduced is somewhat remote from 
that to which it is applied. The resemblance between the 
two instances is one of ratios. The likeness is not one 
of essence, but is rather a likeness of relationship. 
Errors arise if one assumes that likeness of relationship 
implies likeness of essence or if one presses the compari-
son further than it was intended to be pressed. The 
genius of understanding this variety of argument is in 
determining which points of comparison make the argument. 
Twice in this discourse Broadus employed the argu-
ment from analogy. In both instances he used the same 
analogy to make essentially the same point, although the 
second instance is slightly different from the first and 
is used to support a separate proposition. 
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Broadus first used this argument in the development 
of his third distinctive view, which stated, in part, that 
the only ceremonies of a church should be those which the 
New Testament requires. He named two such ceremonies, 
baptism and communion. The argument from analogy was used 
to support his contention that to be baptized is tanta-
mount to taking an oath of allegiance to Jesus Christ. He 
noted that the early Roman Christians had called baptism a 
sacramentum, which in common Latin usage was used of a 
military oath. From this common use he framed his 
analogy, as follows: 
The early Roman Christians had a good word for 
this idea if only the word could have remained 
unchanged in use: they called it a sacramentum, 
a military oath. As the Roman soldier in his oath 
bound himself to obey his general absolutely so !n 
baptism we solemnly vow devotion and obedience. 2 
The point of analogy is clearly in a relationship. 
The comparison is not between a Christian and a soldier, 
nor is it between Christ and a general. The analogy is 
that as a soldier with a sacramenturn vows absolute 
obedience to his superior officer, the Christian by the 
"sacrament" of baptism vows devotion and obedience to 
24 Ibid. , p. 8. 
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Christ.25 The analogy is in the relationship between two 
individuals as mediated by an oath. 
The second use of this form of argument is in the 
support of Broadus's fourth reason that Baptists should 
teach their distinctive views, namely, that it is a duty 
to Christ. The Professor again used the analogy of the 
Roman soldier under oath, but with an imaginative twist: 
••• what shall hinder us, what could excuse us, 
from observing them ourselves and teaching them to 
others? The Roman soldier who had taken the 
sacramentum did not then go to picking and 
choosing among the orders of his general: shall 
the baptized believer pick and choose which com-
mands of Christ he will obey and which neglect and 
which alter? 26 
The point argued in this analogy is that the Baptist 
listener was not at liberty to excuse himself from the 
duty imposed by the proposition of the discourse. As in 
the previous use of this argument, the comparison is in 
the relationship of an individual to another to whom he 
had vowed allegiance. In the first occurrence, the empha-
sis was upon that which the oath affirmed, namely 
obedience. In the second the emphasis is upon that which 
the oath precludes, namely selective obedience. Both, 
however, argue from the ratio or relationship of ideas 
2 5Because the Roman Catholic use of the term "sacra-
ment" denotes a means of mediating divine grace, Baptists, 
including Broadus use instead the word "ordinance" to 
refer to baptism. 
26Broadus, "Duty ••• ," pp.19, 20. 
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rather than from a comparison of the essence of the indi-
viduals involved. 
In this discourse, then, Broadus employed to a 
limited extent the argument forms for which Whately is 
best known. Although the argument was limited in its 
extent, it was sufficient for the occasion upon which the 
address was delivered. With an audience primarily in 
agreement with his propositions, it was not as necessary 
to establish a proposition through argument as it would 
have been with one unconvinced. His conformity to the 
paradigm should not be judged by the number of arguments 
he employed from it, nor should he be expected to use all 
three forms in the address. Rather, he should be judged 
according to the degree to which he conformed to Whately's 
notions when, in the address, the ~rgument form would be 
useful. 
The fact that only two instances of argument are 
cited above does not imply that other varieties of argu-
ment were not employed. There are several instances of 
induction, for example. The primary burden of the address 
was to urge a course of action which was probably acknow-
ledged by his audience to be at least mildly desirable. 
Therefore, he offered reasons to justify his proposition 




Whately believed that refutation is a specialized 
use of regular forms of argument. Therefore, most of his 
notions regarding the subject relate to arrangement and 
other considerations which make refutation most effective, 
rather than to forms. In the following analysis, parti-
cular principles will be noted as applicable to Broadus's 
discourse. 
Because he was addressing an audience which could be 
expected to be mostly in sympathy with his views, Broadus 
treated few objections. Had he been presenting the same 
material to a broader religious audience, it would have 
been necessary not only to support the distinctive views 
he asserted with affirmative argument, but also to refute 
the objections that individuals of other theological view-
points would raise. 
Although he presented little argument in the 
development of his distinctives, it is in regard to the 
second of these that the first instance of refutation 
occurs. Whately had urged that refutation be placed in 
the midst of argument, and this Broadus did. Immediately 
after asserting his position, he raised the opposing view-
point and then attempted to refute the opponent. 
Having asserted that Baptists require a credible 
profession of conversion as a condition of church member-
ship, he noted that such a statement precludes infants 
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from membership. Recognizing that such a conviction is 
contrary to the view of many Protestants, Broadus chose to 
address the opposing viewpoint. He said: 
The notion that infants may be church-members 
because their parents are seems to us utterly 
alien to the genius of Christianity, not only 
unsupported by the New Testament, but in conflict 
with its essential principles; and we are not 
surprised to observe that our Christian brethren 
among whom that theory obtains are unable to carry 
it out consistently--unable to decide in what 
sense the so-called "children of the church" are 
really members of the church and subject to its 
discipline. The other notion, that infants may be 
church-members because so-called "sponsors" make 
professions and promises for them, seems to us a 
mere legal fiction, devised to give some basis for 
a practice which rose on quite other grounds.27 
The preceding subjoins three refutational statements 
to the implied proposition that infants could be members 
of churches because their parents are. First, he said, 
the practice is unsupported by the New Testament and, in 
fact, conflicts with its teaching. Second, the practice 
cannot be carried out consistently. Third, the notion of 
sponsorship is groundless. 
The order of these is significant, in that Broadus 
began with his strongest argument. Given his views of the 
authority of the Bible, the conflict of infant membership 
with Bible teaching was, for him, a sufficient refutation 
of the proposition. To strengthen the case, however, he 
offered the other two arguments, an act consistent with 
27rbid., pp. 6, 7. 
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his own belief that sometimes individuals will give 
greater consideration to arguments from sources other than 
the Bible. 
The brevity of these arguments lessens their effect. 
His first argument could have been strengthened by treat-
ment of the specific theological arguments offered by the 
opponents. His second one would have been helped by 
explanation. The third one is difficult to understand, 
and appears to be an arbitrary dismissal of the opponent's 
practice. The generalized way in which these refutations 
addressed the issue may have been sufficient for an 
audience already convinced of Broadus's proposition (i.e., 
that the need for credible profession of conversion as a 
condition for church membership precludes infants). 
However, it is unlikely that a pedobaptist would be per-
suaded to change his belief based upon this refutation. 
A second instance of refutation is addressed to an 
implied objection Broadus raised after he stated the 
distinctive views of Baptists as he understood them. 
Following are his remarks from which the implication is 
inferred. 
Now, I repeat that we do not consider these exter-
nals to be intrinsically so important as the 
spiritual, or even the ethical, elements of Chris-
tianity. But they are important, because they 
express the spiritual and react upon it healthily 
or hurtfully, and because the Author of Chris-
tianity, in person or through his inspired 
apostles, appointed and commanded them. And we 
think it a matter of great importance that they 
should be practised in accordance with, and not 
contrary to, his appointment--that, in the lan-
guage of his text, his disciples should observe 
and conserve (for the word includes both ~deas) 
all things whatsoever he commanded them. 2 
The implied objection is that Baptist distinctive views 
are really inconsequential, particularly when compared 
with the spiritual or ethical elements of Christianity. 
Broadus conceded that the spiritual and ethical are of 
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greater importance. However, he countered that the exter-
nals are important, because they cannot be separated from 
the spiritual and because Jesus commanded that they be 
taught. The refutation in this case consists of argument 
to establish a counter proposition which, as Whately said, 
in effect refutes its contrary. Again, one of his primary 
appeals was to the authority of the Bible, as specifically 
expressed in his chosen text. 
Conjoined with his second reason that Baptists 
should teach their distinctive views, namely, that it is a 
duty owed to fellow Christians, is a third instance of 
refutation. Applying Whately's dictum that objections 
should be handled nearer the beginning than the end, 
Broadus immediately raised the common objection that 
denominational differences should be minimized in the 
greater interest of Protestantism. He stated the objec-
tion and his refutation as follows: 
2Brbid., pp. 10, 11. 
~ 
We are often told very earnestly that Baptists 
must make common cause with other Protestants 
against the aggressions of Romanism. It is urged, 
especially in some localities, that we ought to 
push all our denominational differences into the 
background and stand shoulder to shoulder against 
Popery. Very well; but all the time it seems to 
us that the best way to meet and withstand 
Romanism is to take Baptist ground; 9nd if, in 
making common cause against it, we abandon or 
slight our Baptist principles, have a care lest we 
do harm in both directions. Besides, ours is the 
best position, we think, for winning Romanists to 
evangelical truth •••• If well-meaning Roman 
Catholics become dissatisfied with resting every-
thing on the authority of the church and begin to 
look toward the Bible as authority, they are not 
likely, if thoughtful and earnest, to stop at any 
halfway-house, but to go forward to the position 
of those who really build on the Bible alone.29 
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Whately urged that one state an opponent's objections with 
full force, lest he appear to evade the issue. Broadus in 
this instance gave a stronger statement of the contrary 
viewpoint than he had in previous cases, in which the 
objections were implied rather than explicitly stated. In 
this matter, then, the Professor conformed to the Arch-
bi shop's theo.ry. 
The refutation offered was a conjectural counter 
proposition, namely, that the better way to withstand the 
encroachments of Roman Catholicism was to stand firmly for 
Baptist convictions. In form, this approach comports 
nicely with Whately's theory, but the substance of the 
argument in this case is not compelling. The basis of his 
proposition was that "it seems to us" to be the better 
29Ibid., pp. 13, 14. 
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alternative.30 Perhaps his testimony carried great weight 
with that audience, but several examples of success based 
upon his proposed approach would have been more convin-
cing. He explained his proposal with a hypothetical case, 
which could very easily be challenged. 
A fourth instance of refutation was also a part of 
the development of the second reason for teaching Baptist 
distinctives. In this case, Broadus had suggested that 
such teaching was a duty owed to other Christians so that 
they might consider Baptist views and adopt them if they 
were found convincing. Again with full force, he stated 
the objection that other Christians need not be prosely-
tized as follows: 
But why should we wish to make Baptists of our 
Protestant brethren? Are not many of them noble 
Christians--not a few of them among the excellent 
of the earth? If with their opinions they are so 
devout an~ useful, why wish them to adopt other 
opinions? 1 
Whately, with his penchant for satire, had suggested 
that an indirect means of refutation is to prove an absur-
dity using the opponent's own premises as the basis of 
reasoning.32 It was this element of Whately's theory that 
30Ibid., p. 13. 
31Ibid., pp. 16, 17. 
32This notion comports well with the reductio ad 
absurdum form of argument. 
Broadus applied to refute the objection at hand. He 
wrote: 
Yes, there are among them many who command our 
high admiration for their beautiful Christian 
character and life; but have a care about your 
inferences from this fact. The same is true even 
of many Roman Catholics, in the past and in the 
present; yet who doubts that the Romanist system 
as a whole is unfavorable to the production of the 
best types of piety?33 
The point of the argument is that desirable Christian 
character is not the measure of a system of doctrinal 
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belief. If it were, Roman Catholic doctrine would have to 
be deemed acceptable based upon the noble character of 
many Catholics. His audience, of course, would not con-
cede that Roman Catholic doctrine could be accepted and 
therefore could not assert that noble character can be the 
measure of belief. 
Summary 
Although in his own Treatise Broadus discounted 
the importance of presumption and burden of proof, he 
relied heavily upon presumption in his favor, as Whately 
defined the notion. His approach to his subject assumed 
that his audience was predisposed to agree with his asser-
tions. He also, as expected, employed Whately's notion of 
"habitual presumption" concerning the Bible. This is 
evident in the number of times that he used his text from 
33Broadus, "Duty ••• ," p. 17. 
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Matthew 28:20 to support his major proposition, that Bap-
tists are duty-bound to teach their distinctive views. 
Following his own dictum that if possible, the strongest 
argument should be presented last, his fourth argument was 
that this teaching was a duty owed to Christ, in keeping 
with his command recorded in the Bible. He would consider 
this to be his strongest argument based upon his view of 
the supreme and final authority of the Bible. 
Regarding the matter of burden of proof according to 
Whately, Broadus would have been required only to answer 
objections against his proposition. He did more than 
answer objections, however. Consistent with his own view 
that he who alleges must prove, he deviated from the 
paradigm and assumed the burden of proving his proposition 
that Baptists are duty-bound to teach their distinctive 
views. 
It was noted above that this discourse involves 
surprisingly little argument. Rather, it consists largely 
of affirmations, explanations, illustrations, suggested 
ways and means, and appeals. This fact was probably due 
to the predisposition of the audience in favor of 
Broadus's ideas. Because the paradigm permits the study 
of only three argument forms, only two cases of argument 
from analogy were examined. In both cases, Broadus cor-
rectly applied Whately's ideas. 
.... 
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Several instances of refutation were discovered in 
the discourse, and these regularly conformed to various 
principles which Whately had articulated for governing the 
process. The substance of the refutative arguments was 
not convincing in every case, but in form, they followed 
the paradigm. 
"Should Women Speak in Mixed 
Public Assemblies?" 
Background of the Discourse 
The subject of the second discourse to be studied is 
evident from its title. Historically, it was presented at 
a time when women's issues such as suffrage were prominent 
in society. It was probably inevitable that the question 
of the role of women in the churches would arise. 
Whereas the previous discourse was oral, this one 
was written. It was published in booklet form in 1890 by 
Baptist Book Concern.34 It was disseminated among Bap-
tists, including Dr. W. C. Wilkinson, who in a letter to 
Dr. Broadus, wrote: 
Thank you heartily for your leaflet, "Should Women 
Speak in Mixed Assemblies?" I had been wishing I 
could see it and wondering just how to get it. It 
shows you the same consummate master of persuasive 
presentation that I have always felt you to be.35 
34starr, 3:153. 
3SA. T. Robertson, Life and Letters of John Albert 
Broadus (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publ1cat1on 
Society, 1901), p. 390. 
149 
Wilkinson's statement includes at least one promient 
individual's opinion of the merits of the discourse as 
well. 
Internal evidence indicates that this discourse was 
addressed to a Baptist audience. Broadus pointed out, for 
example, that one specific objection he addressed had been 
raised by a Baptist lady. Toward the end of the document, 
he traced the origin of the practice in question among 
non-Baptist denominations. He then contrasted the doc-
trinal assumptions of these groups with Baptists, arguing 
that Baptist doctrines would support his view. In his 
final remarks, he made an appeal through a rhetorical 
question which clearly identified his audience: 
Is it too much to hope that our excellent Baptist 
ladies who have fallen in with the movement in 
some parts of the country will stop while they 
can, will exclude men from their women's meetings, 
will decline to join in temperance address~g to 
assemblies composed of both men and women? 
Internal evidence also indicates that Broadus was 
aware that all members of his intended audience did not 
agree with his proposition. In addition to the Baptist 
lady who raised an objection, referred to above, Broadus 
acknowledged the contrary opinion of other Baptists. He 
referred to one such individual as follows: 
36John A. Broadus, "Shouid Women Speak in Mixed 
Public Assemblies?" (Louisville: Baptist Book Concern, 
1890), p. 16. 
A justly honored Baptist pastor was not long ago 
reported as saying (in substance) that he did not 
want to hear so much about texts on this subject; 
the thing does good, and that was enough for him.37 
At the same time, he asserted that the great majority of 
Baptist women were distinctly opposed to the practice in 
question.38 
An Overview of the Discourse 
This discourse began with a direct reference to a 
controversial issue: the appropriateness of women 
speaking in mixed public assemblies. After commenting 
briefly upon the contemporary issue, Broadus defined the 
limits he intended to place upon his subject. First, he 
would confine his treatment to the issue raised in the 
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title rather than discussing the broader issue of women's 
rights. Second, he would be prima~ily occupied with an 
attempt to explain the passages of Scripture which appear 
to forbid women to speak in mixed public assemblies.39 His 
explanation included arguments involving the interpretive 
judgments he made. 
Following these introductory comments, Broadus cited 
two Biblical texts as translated in the Revised English 
Version. He quoted I Corinthians 14:34£, which reads: 
37rbid., p. 14. 
38rbid., p. 15. 
39rbid., p. 2. 
Let the women keep silence in the churches; for 
it is not permitted unto them to speak; but let 
them be in subjection, as also saith the law. And 
if they would learn anything, let them ask their 
own husbands at home; for it is shameful for a 
woman to speak in the church.40 
He then referred to I Timothy 2:11-15, broadly para-
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phrasing and commenting upon the preceding context, which 
addresses the subject of order in public worship. The 
verses which pertained to his discourse read as follows: 
Let a woman learn in quietness with all subjec-
tion. But I permit not a woman to teach, nor to 
have dominion over a man, but to be in quietness. 
For Adam was first formed, then Eve; and Adam was 
not beguiled, but the woman being beguiled, hath 
fallen into transgression; but she shall be saved 
through the child-bearing, if they continue in 
faith and love and sanctification with sobriety.41 
Following a few comments regarding the suitability 
of the translation from which he quoted, Broadus set forth 
his proposition that the texts in question forbid women to 
speak in mixed public assemblies. He stated his position 
as follows: 
Now it does not need to be urged that these two 
passages from the Apostle Paul do definitely and 
strongly forbid that women shall speak in mixed 
public assemblies. No one can afford to question 
that such is the mos~ obvious meaning of the 
apostle's commands. 4 
Subjoined to the proposition is a series of six 
objections, each of which Broadus refuted in turn. The 
40r Cor. 14:34, 35 (RV). 
41 1 Tim. 2: 11-15 (RV) • 
42aroadus, "Should Women Speak ••• ," p. 4. 
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objections were: 1) that "speak" in I Corinthians 14:34 
means "chatter;" 2) that "church" in the same verse 
refers to the formal public meeting; 3) that prophetesses 
mentioned I Corinthians 11:5 spoke in mixed public assem-
blies; 4) that the prohibition was culturally condi-
tioned, and not applicable beyond the immediate audience; 
5) that Broadus's proposition would permit women without 
husbands to speak; and 6) that the documents of these 
texts were corrupt. 
To conclude, he summarized his understanding of the 
texts, satisfied that he had adequately refuted the objec-
tions. He also suggested what he considered to be impli-
cations and applications of the proposition that he had 
maintained. 
The leaflet which the author examined includes an 
addendum written after the address had been published. In 
this addendum, Broadus answered three more objections 
which apparently he had not foreseen. Those are: 1) that 
the Apostle Paul was biased and contradicted the teaching 
of Jesus; 2) that women had been speaking in mixed assem-
blies with good results; and 3) that Baptists would lose 
the beneficial effects of a growing movement by forbidding 
the practice. 
The conclusion of the addendum involves an appeal to 
adopt the proposition in practice. Claiming that the 
majority of Baptist women concurred with his viewpoint, he 
called upon those who did not to consider and apply his 
message. 
An Analysis and Assessment of the Discourse 
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Again the three categories of the Whately paradigm 
will be applied as the standard of analysis and assess-
ment. The pattern of discussion, however, will differ 
somewhat from that of the first address. First presump-
tion and burden of proof will be examined. Then each 
issue named in the overview above will be analyzed. Ele-
ments of refutation will receive primary attention, 
because each issue was presented as an objection to his 
major proposition. Forms of argument, as outlined in the 
paradigm, will be discussed as they arise. 
Presumption and Burden of Proof 
Whately's notions concerning presumption and burden 
of proof have been stated elsewhere, so a complete state-
ment of his ideas is not necessary at this point. How-
ever, a review of those conceptions pertinent to the 
address at hand may be helpful. First, presumption is the 
preoccupation of ground rather than preponderance of pro-
bability in favor of a particular proposition. Second, 
presumption stands against the paradoxical, or that which 
is contrary to prevailing opinion. Therefore, the biases 
of an audience may determine upon which side of a question 
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presumption falls. Third, habitual presumption, or autho-
rity, may favor the decisions or opinions of an indivi-
dual, a body, or a book. Fourth, the burden of proof 
rests upon the one who disputes the position favored by 
presumption. Fifth, if presumption favors one's proposi-
tion, he needs only to answer objections in order to 
sustain his proposition. 
In this address, Broadus assumed that presumption 
favored his view. This is evident in two ways. First, he 
supposed that the majority of prevailing opinion among 
Baptists was opposed to the practice in question. This 
belief he stated as follows: 
It is a comfort to know that the great majority of 
Baptist women in our country as a whole are still 
distinctly opposed to this practice. Such is the 
case almost universally in New England (if I am 
correctly informed), quite generally in the Middle 
States, and with very few exceptions throughout 
the South and Southwest.43 
Because the audience he hoped to persuade was a Baptist 
audience, and the prevailing opinion and audience bias 
were in his favor, he could enjoy the "comfort" of pre-
sumption, as indicated in his statement above. 
The second element which placed presumption in his 
favor was the habitual presumption among Baptists that the 
judgments of the Bible are authoritative. That he 
employed this notion is evident in several ways. First, 
43Ibid., pp. 15, 16. 
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after introducing the question, he suggested to his audi-
ence an appropriate answer must be consistent with the 
Bible. He wrote: 
No thoughtful person would like to profess that in 
our country at the present moment he can make this 
investigation in a completely impartial and dis-
passionate manner; but it is obviously very 
desirable that writer and readers in such a case 
should earnestly strive to deal fairl1 with their 
own minds and with the truth of God.4 
Second, immediately following this statement he quoted the 
two Biblical passages from which he inferred his proposi-
tion. Third, the concluding statement of the discourse 
proper cites Biblical authority as the conclusive reason 
establishing the assertion. Following is that conclusion: 
As to crying out against the Bible for teaching 
"the subjection of women," leave that to Inger-
soll. The precise nature and proper limits of 
this subjection may not be generally understood, 
and would be an appropriate subject for earnest 
inquiry. But that the Bible does teach subjec-
tion, and that the apostle makes that his special 
reason for the prohibition before us, would seem 
to be quite beyond question.45 
According to Whately, since presumption was in 
Broadus's favor, the burden of proof rested with one who 
would challenge his assertion. Broadus, on the other 
hand, had said that the burden of proof rests with the one 
who alleges. Broadus may have believed that in this 
instance he proved his proposition. However, his only 
44 . 2 h . . Ibid., p. • Empasis mine. 
45Ibid., p. 10. 
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line of proof was to assert that the obvious sense of the 
two texts he quoted established his viewpoint. 
It is the opinion of this writer that in this dis-
course Broadus followed Whately's approach to burden of 
proof rather than his own. If he had seriously assumed 
the burden of proof, he would have been obligated to prove 
not that the Bible was to be accepted as authoritative, 
but that the "obvious" sense of his texts was the actual 
sense. Furthermore, the argumentative substance of the 
discourse, following the statement of the proposition, is 
entirely the refutation of objections. He had, therefore, 
adopted Whately's dictum: if presumption favors one's 
proposition, he needs only to refute objections to confirm 
the assertion. His own statement, following the six refu-
tations in the discourse proper, expressed his belief that 
he had refuted the objections and thus confirmed the 
proposition. He observed, "So the apostle's clear and 
consistent prohibitions stand unshaken, in their obvious 
sense. n46 
Refutation 
As stated in the overview above, Broadus refuted 
nine objections to his proposition. Six of these were in 
the discourse proper. The remaining three were presented 
in an addendum written subsequent to publication. 
46Ibid., p. 9. 
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The first objection Broadus addressed was that the 
term "speak" in I Corinthians 14:34 ~eans "to chatter."47 
The implication of this objection is that the prohibition 
applied only to disorderly speech, but would not exclude 
intelligent speaking. Broadus stated the objection with 
full force, as Whately urged, acknowledging that in clas-
sical Greek the term was sometimes used not only for 
chattering, but also to refer to animal sounds. 
To refute this argument, Broadus observed that there 
are no clear examples of these classical uses in Biblical 
Greek. Instead, he asserted, the New Testament uses the 
term to refer to intelligent speaking or talking, applying 
the word to apostles, prophets, the Savior, and God. 
Implied is the unlikelihood that these would engage in 
"chatter." This approach conforms to Whately's notion 
that one may refute an objection by proving its opposite. 
Whately also said, as noted elsewhere, that refuta-
tion involves the specialized use of ordinary argument 
forms. In this refutation Broadus used an argument from 
testimony, which is one of the three forms included in the 
paradigm. The testimony he cited was that of the well-
known and widely-accepted Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon 
47Ibid., p. 5. 
158 
of the New Testament.48 Whately asserted that in matters 
of opinion, the strength of the testimony of a witness 
depends upon expertise or the ability of the witness to 
form a judgment. In this case, Broadus selected a highly 
credible witness to support his definition and thus to 
refute the objection. Thayer was the Bussey Professor of 
New Testament Criticism and Interpretation at the Harvard 
Divinity Schooi.49 
The second objection Broadus addressed was that the 
word "church" in I Corinthians 14:34 referred to a formal 
public meeting rather than informal gatherings.SO The 
implication of the objection is that women could speak in 
smaller, informal gatherings. To refute this argument 
Broadus challenged the objector's premise, arguing that 
the distinction between formal and informal gatherings is 
a modern one which cannot be imposed upon the historical 
situation here involved. He argued that, in fact, the 
48Joseph H. Thayer, A Greek-English Lexicon of the 
New Testament, corrected ed. (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, Franklin Square, 1889), s.v. laleo. Thayer 
included five nuances of the term, including 1) to utter a 
voice, emit a sound, 2) to speak, i.e., to use the tong.ue 
or the faculty of speech, to utter articulate sounds, 3) to 
talk, 4) to utter, tell, and 5) to use words in order to 
declare one's mind and disclose orie's thoughts. Thayer 
noted that the term is used of animal noises and of human 
chatting and prattling. I Cor. 14:34, however, is listed 
as an example of the fifth use, signifying that in 
Thayer's opinion, the reference is to intelligent speech. 
49rbid., title page. 
50 Ibid. 
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kind of abuse addressed by the text was one which could 
arise only in an informal meeting, because early church 
gatherings were held in private houses and lacked the 
formality of contemporary worship services. Therefore, he 
said, the distinction required by this objection failed. 
The third objection Broadus addressed was that in 
I Corinthians 11:5ff the apostle had spoken approvingly of 
women "praying and prophesying" in the public assemblies.51 
From this fact it could be inferred that women are not 
forbidden to speak in the assembly, at least not abso-
lutely. In this case, Broadus conceded the accuracy of 
the premise, but challenged the conclusiveness of the 
opponent's reasoning with a mildly complicated counter 
argument. 
Broadus argued that the Apostle had made two 
apparently contradictory statements which must be recon-
ciled, since actually contradictory statements in such 
immediate proximity to one another would be unlikely. 
Assuming that the Apostle did not contradict himself, the 
two passages may be reconciled by understanding the act of 
prophesying as an exception to the general directive 
stated in chapter fourteen. Prophesying, then, by women 
was allowed, but because prophesying was "inspired 
speaking" and because there is no inspired speaking in the 
51 Ibid. , p. 6 • 
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present day, the permission granted by I Corinthians 11 is 
moot. 
Both of the assertions by which he determined 
I Corinthians 11 to be moot could be challenged. He 
anticipated one which argued from I Corinthians 14:3 that 
prophecy edifies; therefore, if a woman speaks to edify, 
whether speaking with "inspired speech" or not, she is 
exempt from the apostle's prohibition. This challenge he 
refuted by attacking the conclusiveness of the reasoning 
on grounds of a logical fallacy committed. He described 
the fallacy and illustrated it with an analogy as follows: 
The author of this argument had forgotten the 
first elements of his logic, which certainly 
taught him that he must beware of assuming a 
proposition to be convertible. All prophesying 
was edifying speech; but how in the world can it 
be inferred that all edifying speech is prophecy? 
Yellow fever is a malarial disease; shall we 
infer t~at all malarial diseases are yellow 
f ever? 5 
In matters of form, Broadus followed Whately's para-
digm closely in refuting the third objection to his propo-
sition. In so doing, perhaps he adequately refuted the 
contemporary claim to prophesying and other forms of edi-
fying speech. Several of the propositions of his refuta-
tion were not supported, however, which weakened their 
52 Ibid • p. 7 • 
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force.S3 One obvious weakness of substance is that he 
failed to address the other primary provision of I Corin-
thians ll:S, namely, that women could pray in the 
assembly. 
The fourth objection to the proposition was that the 
prohibition applied only in its historical and cultural 
setting at Corinth, where the generally loose behavior of 
the women in society required a particular strictness of 
Christian women in public places.S4 If the prohibition was 
thus culturally bound, then it would have no binding 
effect upon Broadus's contemporary audience. 
This objection Broadus stated with full force, con-
ceding that it was more plausible than those which had 
preceded it.SS Again, his method of refutation was to deny 
the premise with two contrary assertions. First, he 
observed that the same prohibition was made through 
Timothy to the churches in the region of Ephesus. Thus 
the command was not restricted to the women of Corinth. 
Second, he argued that the basis for the prohibition as 
stated in I Timothy 2 was the facts connected with the 
S3several of Broadus's interpretive assertions are 
not heavily supported. This is not to say that they are 
without basis, however, for evidence in their favor 
exists. His failure to present the evidence makes the 
arguments less satisfying. 
S4sroadus, "Should Women Speak ••• ," pp. 7, 8. 
ssrbid., p. 7. 
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creation and the fall of Adam and Eve. Based upon the 
second of these statements, he asked rhetorically, "Does 
not this absolutely forbid restricting his prohibition to 
Corinth and Ephesus, or to that particular age?"56 
His refutation of the cultural argument was based 
upon the accepted principles of reformed hermeneutics,57 
namely, the consideration of the cultural and grammatical 
contexts of a proposition. Broadus would not deny that 
certain Biblical propositions are culturally conditioned 
and therefore are limited in their scope of application. 
His argument in this case was that the grammatical con-
text, and its logic, established the proposition on trans-
cultural grounds, and therefore made it universal in its 
scope. 
The fifth and sixth objections, that the prohibition 
did not apply to women who have no husbands and that the 
documents of these two passages are corrupt, Broadus 
barely mentioned before dismissing them as desperate 
attempts to dislodge his proposition.SB Both objections he 
56 rbid. I P• 8. 
5 7Reformed hermeneutics refers to the governing prin-
ciples of Biblical interpretation followed by the Chris-
tian Reformers of the sixteenth century. Among these 
individuals were John Calvin and Martin Luther. Essen-
tially, reformed hermeneutics rejects the fanciful inter-
pretations of allegory in favor of a literal understanding 
of the Bible. 
58Broadus, "Should Women Speak ••• ," p. 9. 
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considered to be absurd, the former because it posed a 
ridiculous policy and the latter because no documentary 
evidence could be offered to substantiate the claim. In 
his dismissal of these objections, he applied Whately's 
dictum that in refutation one should not pay great heed to 
inconsequential arguments, because to do so elevates their 
importance. 
The seventh objection, found in the addendum, was 
that the Apostle Paul contradicted Jesus, who held women 
in high regard. Paul's statements, then, must have been 
biased and non-authoritative and therefore, non-binding 
for the contemporary audience.59 As Whately had urged, 
Broadus stated this objection full force, quoting exten-
sively from a letter in which the objection was raised and 
acknowledging that the conclusion follows logically from 
the premise.GO 
Broadus chose to refute this argument by showing the 
origin of the error, as Whately had urged. He pointed out 
that the practice of women speaking in mixed assemblies 
had originated among the Methodists, and had been prac-
ticed by Quakers. Also Universalists and Unitarians, who 
did not acknowledge the authority of the New Testament, 
encouraged women to speak. The force of the argument was 
59rbid., pp. 11, 12. 
60rbid., p. 12. 
that the practice had not originated with Baptists, and 
was embraced by those who did not share in the Baptist 
loyalty to the authority of the Bible. 
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Although he employed a principle of form drawn from 
Whately, this refutation was weak. Correctly he framed 
the objection as being that the Apostle Paul's opinion was 
biased and non-authoritative. However, he failed to deal 
with that objection directly, which he could have done. 
For example, he could have challenged the line of rea-
soning which inferred that because women were important in 
the 1 if e of Jesus they should be permitted to speak in the 
mixed assembly. The conclusion does not follow the pre-
mises and is, therefore, fallacious. Had he established 
this point, he would have eliminated the objection that 
Paul contradicted Jesus. He also could have challenged 
the premise that Paul was not "inspired" when he wrote the 
texts involved from the well-developed theological doc-
trine of the inspiration of Scripture. Why he did not 
present these arguments is not clear, but their absence 
clearly weakened his refutation of this objection. 
The eighth and ninth objections were both based upon 
expedience. Respectively, they assert that the questioned 
practice should be allowed because it does much good, and 
that to reject the growing movement favoring the practice 
would be to concede its benefits to others.61 The fol-
lowing statement expresses the former objection well: 
A justly honored Baptist pastor was not long ago 
reported as saying (in substance) that he did not 
want to hear so much about texts on this subject; 
the thing does good, and that was enough for him.62 
Broadus replied to this objection using indirect 
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means, which Whately had described as using the opponent's 
own premises to prove an absurdity. His argument, quoted 
below, assumed the premise that a good outcome justifies 
the means by which it is obtained, and then ex tended the 
premise to an objectionable conclusion. 
The Paedobaptists do much good. Many devout 
Romanists gain good and do good by holding up a 
crucifix to dying eyes; does that make the prac-
tice scriptural and justifiable for Baptists? Why 
will not Baptist people see the gross inconsis-
tency of vehemently asserting the necessity of 
conforming to the New Testament in regard to 
church membership and the ordinances, while they 
coolly disregard ex~ress prohibitions in respect 
to another matter?6 
To the objection that other groups would benefit 
from the growing movement if Baptists did not accommodate 
the practice in question, Broadus employed an argument 
similar to that used to refute the previous objection. 
Again, he assumed the premise and extended it to an 
undesirable conclusion. 
6lrbid., pp. 14, 15. 
62Ibid. p. 14. 
63rbid., pp. 14, 15. 
"Ah, but," some will say, "this is a great move-
ment; and it is going to grow. Shall we let the 
Methodists get all the benefit of it?" Grant for 
the sake of argument that it seems expedient, and 
will give denominational power. We let the Metho-
dists get all the benefit of infant baptism, of 
Arminian theology, of centralized organization, 
because we think these things are contrary to the 
New Testament. If Baptists are going to abandon 
New Testament teachings for the sake of falling in 
with what they regard as a popular movementt the 
very reason for their existence has ceased. 4 
In both cases he conformed to the Whately paradigm. He 
also developed materially convincing arguments by 




In this discourse, Broadus conformed consistently to 
the paradigm of Whately. He was aware that presumption 
favored his proposition, and he confessed that he appre-
ciated that advantage in addressing a controversial sub-
ject. Although it was contrary to his own view regarding 
burden of proof, he apparently did not feel obligated to 
prove his proposition, confining his argumentation to 
refuting objections. 
In every one of his refutations, specific dicta from 
Whately's notions of refutation are followed. Thus, in 
matters of form, his arguments conformed to the paradigm. 
The third and the seventh objections were not refuted as 
64 Ibid., p. 15. 
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well as they could have been. The absence of certain 
available arguments weakened his case at those two points. 
Often in this discourse Broadus made assertions 
concerning interpretive matters with little support. For 
example, concerning the definition of the word "speak" in 
the first objection he developed an argument from testi-
mony, citing an authoritative opinion on the interpretive 
matter. However, only in that instance did he quote such 
an authority. In his refutation of the third objection, 
his assertion that "to prophesy" referred to inspired 
speech seemed arbitrary, because no support was presented. 
It must be acknowledged that some and perhaps many of his 
statements were not proven as they might have been. It 
must also be acknowledged that Broadus himself was a 
scholar both of the New Testament and the Greek language, 
in which it was originally written. At the age of 63, he 
had earned the respect of both scholars and laymen for his 
opinions. Thus, the entire address bore the imprint of 
his expert testimony. 
In substance, then, the arguments in this discourse 
are somewhat uneven in quality. Some of the objections 
were handled reasonably well, but others were not convin-
cingly refuted. 
It is significant that Btoadus apparently followed 
Whately's approach to presumption and burden of proof 
rather than his own in this discourse. Rather than 
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proving his proposition, as his own view of burden of 
proof would require, he asserted it as the teaching of the 
New Testament on the subject, and then proceeded to refute 
objections. In this he followed Whately's notion that if 
presumption favors one's proposition, he need only refute 
objections for the statement to stand. He also implicitly 
claimed presumption in his favor, both from the authority 
of the Bible and from the bias of his intended audience. 
In the refutation of arguments, he consistently 
followed several of Whately's ideas, as demonstrated 
above. The major weakness of his refutations was that 
they were not thoroughly supported. 
"Immersion Essential to Christian Baptism" 
Background of the Discourse 
In the first address examined in this chapter, 
Broadus urged that Baptists should teach their distinctive 
views, because they owed as much to Christians of other 
denominations. Dr. Broadus followed his own admonition in 
this discourse, in which he argued that the correct mode 
of baptism is immersion. 
Like the second discourse studied, this one was 
written rather than oral. It was published in pamphlet 
form in 1892.65 As in the present day, most Christian 
65starr, 3: 151. 
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denominations in 1892 practiced baptism either by sprin-
kling or by pouring. Broadus chose ~o speak to this issue 
from the Baptist perspective, urging the practice of 
immersion. 
Unlike the other two, this discourse was written for 
a non-Baptist audience. Internal evidence clearly indi-
cates as much. This evidence will be presented and dis-
cussed below, with regard to presumption and burden of 
proof. Although the audience was not Baptist, it was 
assumed to be Christian, as the overview below indicates. 
An Overview of the Discourse 
This discourse is almost entirely argumentation 
centered on the proposition that immersion in water is 
essential to Christian baptism. Of the three addresses 
examined in this study, this one is the most thoroughly 
developed from the standpoint of argument. It is also the 
longest of the three. 
The proposition is stated in the first sentence of 
the document and is followed by some qualifying develop-
ment. Particularly important in this regard was Broadus's 
immediate appeal to the authority of the Bible. He also 
asserted that the discussion was not simply an inconse-
quential matter of form, but rather an issue of the nature 
of the practice. 
Having established the preceding suppositions, 
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Broadus proceeded to prove his proposition. His argument 
was threefold: 1) the obvious sense of the Bible, as 
conveyed in its descriptive accounts of the practice, 
favors immersion; 2) the lexical definition of the term 
baptizo favors immersion; and 3) the practice of the 
Greek church favors immersion. Two objections are 
addressed in this section of the discourse. 
Satisfied that he had adequately established his 
proposition, Broadus next undertook the refutation of five 
primary objections. These were the following: 1) the 
church has authorized a change from the New Testament mode 
of baptism; 2) Christian liberty permits one to choose 
the outward mode as long as the significance is unchanged; 
3) practical constraints often make immersion undesirable 
if not impossible; 4) the Biblical use of baptizo permits 
other understandings than immersion; and 5) the term 
bapto involves immersion, but baptizo means "to put 
within." 
Broadus ended his discourse with a plea for cross-
denominational Christian unity, both in spirit and in 
organization. He insisted, however, that such unity 
required that Christians take the Bible as their sole 
authority and understand it in its plain sense. And, if 
this understanding of the Bible were adopted, differences 
regarding the subject of baptism would be eliminated. 
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An Analysis and Assessment of the Discourse 
Once again, the Whately paradigm will be used as the 
standard of analysis and assessment of this discourse. 
Presumption and burden of proof will be discussed first. 
Then the arguments identified in the overview will be 
individually examined. The writer will discuss forms of 
argument and refutation together so that the order of 
Broadus's discourse may be preserved. 
Presumption and Burden of Proof 
Unlike the other two discourses, which were 
addressed to Baptist audiences, this discourse was 
addressed to a broad Christian audience. Internal evi-
dence makes this fact obvious. In the introductory com-
ments affirming the sole authority of the Bible, Broadus 
probably had in mind Christians from other denominational 
traditions in his audience when he said: 
We cannot acknowledge any other authority. The 
opinions and practices of eminent Christians in 
past ages, yea of our own best friends, our pas-
tors, our parents must not be regarded, except so 
far as they may help us to determine what is 
taught on the subject in the Scriptures.66 
More clearly, in his concluding remarks it is evident that 
he was thinking of many non-Baptists. He said: 
I have spoken long and earnestly of a controverted 
question, one of those which divide Christians. 
66John A. Broadus, 
Baptism" (Philadelphia: 
Society, n. d.}, p. 4. 
"Immersion Essential to Christian 
The Bible and Publication 
But I am a rejoicing believer in Christian Union • 
• • • All who are truly his are one in him. Not 
only those belonging to what we call evangelical 
denominations, but many Romanists, for there are 
doubtless lovers of Christ among them, as there 
have been in past ages; and many of the Greek 
Church; and perhaps some Universalists, and Uni-
tarians, possibly even Mormons; and Quakers who 
reject all water baptism •••• 67 
Although members of other denominational groups are not 
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directly addressed, the conciliatory tone clearly implies 
that his aim was to persuade those of other denominations 
to adopt his viewpoint. His final appeal, which followed 
the statement above, clearly indicated his intent. He 
said: 
All Christians, except the Quakers, make baptism a 
condition of church membership. And for the sake 
of a more complete and efficient Christian union, 
we urge upon our fellow Christians, as the plain 
teaching of God's word, that there is no baptism 
where there is not an immersion.68 
Concerning presumption, Whately had said that the 
biases of an audience may determine the side of a question 
upon which presumption falls, and conversely, that pre-
sumption is against that which is paradoxical or contrary 
to prevailing opinion. It was determined above that 
Broadus's audience included Christians of all denomina-
tions. It follows, therefore, that presumption was not in 
his favor, for the groups other than his own practiced 
either sprinkling or pouring as the mode of baptism. In 
67Ibid., pp. 64, 65. 
68Ibid o I P• 66. 
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terms of the paradigm, Broadus's proposition was contrary 
to the prevailing opinion of his intended audience. 
One aspect of presumption, as Whately defined it, 
Broadus did apply. In his introductory comments, he 
applied the notion of the habitual presumption in favor of 
the judgments of the Bible.69 As the following statement 
indicates, he believed that his claim to presumption for 
the authority of the Bible would be upheld by his 
audience. 
To insist on the scriptural act of baptism is a 
necessary consequence of a great fundamental prin-
ciple, which was once held by Baptists almost 
alone, but which many of our brethren of other 
connections are now coming to share--the exclusive 
authority of Scripture. We do not say simply the 
authority, nor the paramount authority, but the 
exclusive authority of Scripture. Baptism is 
performed at all, simply because the Scriptures 
direct us to perform it; therefore we feel bound 
to in~8ire what it is that they direct, and to do 
that. 
It is also clear from the final sentence of the statement 
above that this presumption was foundational to the argu-
ment to follow. 
On one hand, then, regarding the authority of the 
Bible, presumption may have favored Broadus. On the other 
hand, prevailing opinion concerning the specific issue in 
69This element of presumption has been explained 
previously. 
70Broadus, "Immersion Essential. 
Emphasis mine. 
" • •I pp. 3, 4. 
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question opposed the Professor's proposition. Because the 
habitual presumption in this case is less directly and 
specifically related to the issue than the presumption of 
prevailing opinion, the latter is probably the stronger. 
Therefore, the writer concludes that presumption was not 
in Broadus's favor in this case. 
According to Whately, the burden of proof rests with 
the one who disputes presumption. If the conclusion 
stated above concerning presumption is correct, the burden 
of proof in this discourse rested with Broadus. Broadus 
did, in fact, assume this burden, developing three lines 
of argument in support of his proposition and refuting 
objections to it. It cannot be determined, however, that 
Broadus assumed the burden in keeping with Whately's 
views. It must be remembered that.Broadus's own belief 
was that he who alleges must prove. Because he alleged 
that immersion is essential to Christian baptism, he 
placed upon himself the burden of proof apart from any 
consideration of presumption. 
Analysis of Arguments 
As indicated in the overview above, Broadus offered 
three lines of argument to establish his proposition, and 
then addressed five objections to his proposition. First 
the affirmative arguments will be examined, followed by 
consideration of the refutation of objections. 
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Affirmative Arguments. Broadus's first affirmative 
argument was that the obvious sense of the New Testament 
references to the practice is that of immersion. Given as 
examples are the baptisms of Jesus and the Ethiopian 
eunuch, both of whom are said to have come up out of the 
water after being baptized. Also cited is Romans 6, in 
which baptism is likened to burial. The Professor's point 
was that the descriptive narrative accounts and the 
imagery of burial all indicate that the New Testament 
practice was to immerse. 
Broadus anticipated an objection to his interpreta-
tion of the baptism of Jesus, for the literal translation 
of Matthew's account of the event states that Jesus came 
up from the water. From this premise, one could infer 
that he had not been in or under the water. Conforming to 
Whately's standard, Broadus challenged the validity of the 
premise, noting that Mark's account of the event said that 
Jesus came up out of the water. He also appealed to the 
expert testimony of the translators of the Tyndale, 
Cranmer, Geneva, and King James versions of the Bible, all 
of whom translated Matthew's term "out of." In addition, 
he demonstrated from other uses of the term "from" the 
similarity of the two ideas. For example, he observed 
that to take a mote fro_!!! the eye of another is to take it 
out of that one's eye. 
To summarize and reinforce his first argument, 
Broadus related two personal incidents which illustrated 
his point that the obvious meaning of the New Testament 
narratives supports the notion of baptism by immersion. 
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This first line of argument clearly conforms to the 
elements of Whately's theory included in the paradigm. 
First, insofar as he perceived a presumption of the autho-
rity of the Bible to be in his favor, he pressed it to his 
advantage. Only upon such presumption would the narrative 
accounts cited be considered as normative for contemporary 
practice. Second, the objection that Jesus came "from" 
the water was raised immediately after it was asserted 
that he came "out of" the water. The objection was 
refuted, in fact, before the other two affirmative exam-
ples were presented. Thus, in his placement of the objec-
tion, Broadus was consistent with Whately's dictum that 
refutation should be done near the beginning rather than 
at the end of an argument. 
In substance, the refutation conformed to three of 
Whately's ideas regarding argument from testimony. The 
reference to several translations may be considered a form 
of argument from testimony in that these expert linguists 
and interpreters expressed an interpretive judgment in 
their translation of Matthew's account of Jesus' baptism. 
Whately would agree that their witness in a matter of 
opinion is credible because they have the recognized 
ability to form an intelligent judgment concerning the 
question. Such an argument is further strengthened, 
according to Whately, if it counters the witness's pre-
judice. Broadus explicitly pointed out the bias of his 
witnesses, writing: 
Does some one think our friend's translation has 
misled him on this subject? That would be 
strange, for the translation certainly was not 
made by Baptists •••• The translation he reads, 
our cherished Bible, was made by Episcopalians, 
members of the Church of England.7 
Third, Whately asserted that the argument from testimony 
is made stronger by increasing the number of witnesses. 
This Broadus accomplished by quoting four translations 
rather than one. 
The second affirmative argument was that the New 
Testament term baptize, which is translated "baptize," 
requires immersion. In establishing this assertion, 
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Broadus again employed heavily the argument from testimony 
in a manner quite consistent with Whately's theory. 
Before introducing the testimony he would use, Broadus 
articulated the principles by which testimony must be 
judged. His statements are remarkably like those of 
Whately: 
It is a question of scholarship. Therefore we 
ought to ask those who are unquestionably able and 
leading scholars. And they ought to be as nearly 
as possible disinterested as to the matter in 
71Ibid., p. 11. Episcopalians and Anglicans practice 
sprinkling as their mode of baptism. 
hand. Such are the conditions required when we 
refer an~ matter whatever to the decision of 
others.7 
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Before he presented the evidence, Broadus carefully stated 
the credentials of each of the scholars whose writings 
would testify to his viewpoint.73 After he presented his 
arguments, he again emphasized that the sources he had 
employed met the criteria of acceptable testimony. He 
said: 
Such is the rendering of this word by the three 
most recent lexicons of acknowledged scientific 
value; the three which any competent scholar, if 
asked to recommend lexicons to a student of New 
Testament Greek, would be sure to name. I might 
add that the two German commentators on the New 
Testament, who are the foremost of the century as 
to full and accurate scholarship, Fritzsche and 
Meyer, furfish like testimony as to the meaning of 
the word. 7 
Broadus anticipated an objection to this argument, 
namely, that some lexicons also define the term to mean 
"pour" or "drench." From such definitions one could infer 
that modes other than immersion are permitted by the word 
72Ibid., p. 12. 
73It is particularly significant that in stating the 
credentials of Liddell and Scott, whose lexicon he would 
quote, he noted that they were scholars of the Church of 
England. 
74Broadus, "Immersion Essential ••• ," p. 14. In the 
argument itself, Broadus quoted three lexicons: 
1) Liddell and Scott's Lexicon of the Greek Language; 
2) Grimm's edition of Wilke's Lexicon of New Testament 
Greek; and 3) Cremer's Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New 
Testament Greek. All of these concurred that the sense of 
baptizo is "to immerse." 
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baptize. Broadus conceded the premise that such def ini-
tions are included in some lexicons. Conforming to 
Whately's dictum that one may deny the conclusiveness of 
another's reasoning in refutation, he argued that in the 
cases in which the term is used of pouring or drenching it 
is used in a figurative sense. He also asserted a prin-
ciple of interpretation, which requires that the primary 
sense of a term75 be used unless the context requires a 
remote or secondary sense. These two counter-assertions 
decrease the probable validity of the opponents' conten-
tion that baptizo means "pour." 
Whately suggested concerning refutation that some-
times one will prefer to establish his own position before 
refuting objections. Should this be the case, one should 
make clear his intention to return to objections raised. 
Broadus, in concluding his treatment of the second aff ir-
mati ve argument, acknowledged that further objections to 
his conclusions drawn from lexical studies existed. These 
he promised to answer later in his discourse. This pro-
mise he fulfilled in treating the fourth objection, which 
will be discussed at an appropriate point below. 
The third affirmative line of argument was that the 
Greek Church practices immersion, because they understand 
75rn this case, immersion is the primary sense of the 
term. 
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the Greek term baptizo in that sense. As before, Broadus 
cited the testimony of individuals versed in the Greek 
language, who testified that the term in question involves 
immersion. He quoted one Greek scholar, who said: 
The Church of the West commits an abuse of words 
and of ideas in practicing baptism by aspersion, 
the mere statement of which is in itself a ridicu-
lous contradiction.76 
Having presented the three lines of argument des-
cribed above, Broadus was satisfied that he had adequately 
proven his proposition. He expressed this belief through 
the words of the imaginary inquirer whom he had led 
through his arguments: 
Such, then, is the evidence which may be given our 
unlearned friend from scholars, the lexicons, and 
the living Greeks, concerning their own word. 
Much more might be added in the way of conf irma-
t ion; but he would probably say, "Well, it is 
plain that I can trust my English Bible. What 
these great scholars say--none of them Baptists--
and what the living Greeks say and do, accord 
exactly with the impression I got from my own 
Bible; and so the evidence is enough; I care for 
no more.11 7 7 
Refutation of Objections. Believing that he had met 
his obligation to bear the burden of proof, Broadus next 
raised and refuted five objections to his proposition. He 
did not call them objections, but instead referred to them 
as grounds upon which Christian people defend the practice 
76Broadus, "Immersion Essential •• 
771bid., p. 19. 
" . , p. 18. 
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of sprinkling for baptism.78 Regardless of what they are 
called, the propositions he refuted ~ere functionally 
objections. These will be treated briefly. 
The first objection Broadus addressed was that 
although the New Testament required immersion, the church 
authorized a change. This notion he refuted by tracing 
the origin of the error, according to the dictum of 
Whately. The practice was begun in the third century to 
be applied in cases of sick and dying individuals. It was 
not until the thirteenth century that sprinkling was used 
in all cases. Broadus argued that the earliest use of 
this "clinic" baptism arose from an exaggerated sense of 
the importance of the practice, for people were afraid to 
die without having been baptized. 
He further refuted the notion using argument from 
testimony. He cited the Reformers, Luther and Calvin, who 
had called for a return to the practice of immersion.7 9 
Again, he selected witnesses who, in matters of opinion, 
were considered capable of forming a credible judgment. 
The second objection was that the significance of 
baptism is that which should be maintained, and the mode 
should be left as a matter of liberty, or individual 
preference. In this case, Broadus challenged the premise 
78Ibid., p. 20. 
79Ibid., pp. 22, 23. 
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that the significance of the practice is all that matters. 
Using the indirect approach described by Whately, he 
extended the premise to support the Quaker assertion that 
baptism is unnecessary altogether, because the spiritual 
significance exists quite apart from the act. Such an 
extension is unacceptable to one who practices baptism in 
any form. Broadus had expressed this line of argument in 
conversation with an Episcopalian, which he related in the 
discourse as follows: 
They say Christians may choose for themselves 
about mere outward forms; these make no dif-
ference if you have the essence of the thing. 
Yes, and so says the Quaker, more strongly still. 
What would you say to the Quaker? I asked this 
question of an esteemed friend, who is an Epis-
copal clergyman. The Quaker tells us the mere 
outward form of baptism is unnecessary; the 
essential thing is to have the baptism of the 
Spirit, and water baptism need not be observed at 
all. What would you say to him? "I would tell 
him the Scripture teaches us to baptize in water." 
Very well, I replied, and so it teaches us to 
baptize in water. If you have an outward ceremony 
at all, you have a form, and can you say that the 
form of a ceremony is of no importance? How will 
such an one answer the Quaker, except upon the 
Baptist principle?BO 
The third objection Broadus answered was actually a 
series of five practical difficulties attendant to baptism 
by immersion. Among these were that it can be dangerous 
to the ill or feeble, it can result in indecent exposure, 
it may be impracticable, and that many good people have 
80Ibid., pp. 26, 27. 
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believed in and been blessed by the practice of sprin-
kling. In each of these cases the Professor challenged 
the premise of the argument as insufficient to merit 
justification for an alternate mode of baptism, using 
various forms of argument. For example, to refute the 
notion that immersion can result in indecent exposure, 
Broadus used an argument from analogy. He observed that 
when a lady alights from her carriage, there is danger of 
indecent exposure, unless proper care is exercised. Just 
as indecency in that circumstance can be avoided by taking 
proper precautions, so also can indecency in the act of 
immersion be avoided by careful planning and management. 
To refute the notion that sprinkling has been used and 
defended by good people, he again employed the indirect 
approach of extending the premise to an unacceptable con-
clusion. He did this by selecting various denominational 
groups and asking rhetorically why they rejected certain 
doctrines of other denominations. The doctrines they 
rejected, he reasoned, have been held and defended by some 
of the greatest Christians and intellects of the human 
race. 
Like the third objection, the fourth was actually a 
series of five challenges to Broadus's claim that the New 
Testament meaning of baptizo is "immerse." Earlier in 
the discourse he had promised to address further his 
assertion that the New Testament word cannot be used to 
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justify modes other than immersion. His treatment of this 
objection fulfilled that promise. 
Primarily, the objection concerned various passages 
of Scripture which some understood to describe pouring or 
sprinkling. To refute the interpretations which countered 
his proposition, he used the techniques of argument which 
have been described earlier in this study.Bl Two represen-
tative examples will be suffice to demonstrate Broadus's 
dependence upon Whately in this rather lengthy section of 
the discourse. 
First, there was the notion proposed by Dr. Edward 
Beecher that, according to John 3:22-25, baptism is syno-
nymous with purification. Such an idea is based upon the 
textual statement that a discussion of purification arose, 
based upon several acts of baptism. The text reads: 
After these things Jesus and His disciples came 
into the land of Judea; and there He was spending 
time with them, and baptizing. And John also was 
baptizing in Aenon near Salim, because there was 
much water there; and they were coming and were 
being baptized. For John had not yet been thrown 
into prison. There arose therefore a discussion 
on the part oa John's disciples with a Jew about 
purification. 2 
81All of the arguments offered cannot be treated 
here, due to limits upon the scope of this study and 
length of the discourse. Two examples have been given to 
demonstrate Broadus's use of Whately's elements. The 
reader interested in further analysis may examine pp. 35-
55 of the discourse. 
82John 3:22-25 (NASB). 
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Broadus conceded that baptism was understood to be a rite 
of purification, and that the passage in question clearly 
teaches that a discussion of purification very naturally 
was precipitated by acts of baptism. However, he argued, 
one cannot infer that baptism is therefore synonymous with 
purification. He said: 
The fact that baptism was going on might very 
naturally lead to a discussion between some of 
John's disciples and a Jew about the general sub-
ject of purification, and the relation of this to 
other purifications. Being a peculiar, remark-
able, and novel purification, it was perfectly 
natural that baptism should lead to discussion of 
the general subject. But why in the world are we 
to say that the terms baptism and purification are 
synonymous, that baptism means nothing more def i-
ni te than purification, and that an~ form of puri-
fication might be called a baptism? 3 
Broadus's argument is obviously that the inference is far 
broader than that which is warranted by the particular 
from which it is drawn. To support his contention, he set 
forth an argument from analogy: 
Suppose a murder has occurred, and leads some 
persons into a discussion concerning death; are 
we to conclude that the terms murder and death are 
synonymous, and that any form of death may be 
called a murder? Yet because the occurrence of 
baptism led to a discussion concerning purifica-
tion, we are told that these terms are synonymo~i' 
and that any form of purification is a baptism. 
In the Professor's argument, Whately's contention that an 
analogy rests upon the relationship of ratios is obviously 
83Broadus, "Immersion Essential • • • ," pp. 37, 38. 
84 Ibid., p. 3 8. 
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applied. No comparison is intended between murder and 
baptism or death and purification. Rather, his point was 
that just as an act of murder might lead to a broader 
discussion of death, so also an act of baptism might lead 
to a broader discussion of purification. However, just as 
all deaths are not murders, neither are all purifications 
baptisms. That the analogy emphasized the relationship is 
unmistakable because the entities compared, i. e., murder 
and baptism, are quite unlike each other. 
A second example involves the objections based upon 
testimony regarding the Jordan River. On one hand, 
Broadus cited testimony that the river is too shallow to 
permit immersion. On the other hand, he reported testi-
mony that the bank is so steep and the current so swift 
that immersion would be impracticable. 
Whately had said that regarding matters of fact, the 
witness's honesty, accuracy, and means of obtaining infor-
mation must be considered in evaluating testimony. 
Further, he urged that a witness's prejudice must be 
considered. Broadus employed both of these elements in 
his refutation. The view that the bank was too steep and 
the current too swift had been asserted by one who had 
visited the traditional place of Jesus' baptism. There-
fore, Broadus implied, this individual could testify con-
cerning the matter based upon first-hand observation. 
Such a means of obtaining information should be reasonably 
accurate. Although he disclaimed intent to impugn the 
character of this witness, the Professor pointedly chal-
lenged the accuracy of the testimony. He charged: 
Now this gentleman perfectly knew that every 
Spring, when the river is high as he saw it, in 
the week preceding Easter, there come four or five 
or seven or eight thousand pilgrims from all parts 
of the East to this very place, ••• and there 
••• do actually immerse themselves and one 
another in the river--not as a baptism (for they 
have received that in infancy), but as a sacred 
bath at that holy spot. He knew as well as I do 
that this happens every Spring at that very place, 
and yet it never occurred to him to connect that 
fact in his mind with his own timid notion that 
immersion would there be impracticable. I am 
satisfied he was a good man, and have no idea he 
meant to deceive, but how strangely g~gd men can 
sometimes manipulate their own minds. 
The statement not only alleges inaccuracy in the testi-
mony, but also attributes that inaccuracy to prejudice 
which, in Broadus's opinion, prevented the witness from 
drawing an accurate conclusion. 
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The fifth and final objection to his proposition was 
a novel view proposed by a Presbyterian clergyman. This 
view involved a distinction of terminology, namely, that 
bapto means "dip," but baptizo means "put within." The 
former word would require that an object (or person) be 
put in water and quickly taken out again, whereas the 
latter would leave the object or person there. 
85Ibid., pp. 39, 40. 
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Broadus's first line of refutation was to employ 
Whately's indirect approach, drawing a ridiculous conclu-
sion from the premises. This form of reductio ad absurdum 
rather humorously points out the foolishness of the 
notion: 
Suppose it were granted that this was true; then 
we should have Christ commanding us to put men 
within or under the water, as a religious cere-
mony, and, because he does not expressly add that 
we are to take them out again, we should be bound, 
forsooth, to let them remain there. If any of my 
esteemed brethren of other denominations should 
take this view of the matter, and request me to 
"intuspose" them, to put them within the water, in 
the name of our Redeemer, it may be assumed that 
my common sense and humanity will cause me to take 
them out again, as their own common sense and 
prudence w i 11 then lead them to go off and change 
their garments, without needing an express command 
in either respect.86 
He further refuted the opponent's view by denying the 
accuracy of his premise, namely, that a distinction of 
meaning is to be made between bapto and baptizo. He 
accomplished this denial with the counter-assertion that 
commonly in language a strengthened form of a word 
gradually replaces a weaker form without a substantial 
change of meaning. Although the two words did not become 
identical in meaning, he said, the stronger came to be 
frequently employed in the same sense as the weaker.87 
86rbid., pp. 57, 58. 
87rbid., p. 61. 
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The argument at this point is rather complex and 
seems to be more involved than the novel approach he 
attempted to refute merited. Broadus noted that the view 
was gaining a following, which probably explains why he 
devoted such attention to it. Perhaps, however, he vio-
lated Whately's dictum, which urged that one pay little 
heed to insignificant arguments, lest undue attention 
elevate their importance. 
Summary 
Of the three discourses studied, this one was not 
only the longest, it was also the finest specimen of 
argumentation, according to Whately's paradigm. Con-
cerning presumption and burden of proof, Broadus did not 
enjoy the former and, therefore, bore the latter. A 
significant portion of the discourse involved proof of his 
proposition. He probably assumed the burden of proof upon 
his own premise that he who alleges must prove rather than 
following Whately's dictum that the burden rests upon the 
one who challenges presumption. However, his arguments to 
establish his proposition are far more carefully framed in 
this discourse than in the other two. If, by his prin-
ciple, he believed that he had assumed the burden of proof 
in the other two discourses, one might ask why in this one 
his arguments were so much more extensive. 
His refutations regularly followed Whately's prin-
ciples. All of those included were too numerous to dis-
cuss above. Those presented, however, are a fair repre-
sentation of Broadus's approach. 
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It is significant to note a similarity and a dif-
ference between this discourse and the first one studied. 
In both discourses, the proper mode of Christian baptism 
is an issue. In the first, it was a subordinate proposi-
tion whereas, in this one, it is the central issue. In 
the first, very little argument was offered to establish 
the proposition. This may be because baptism was not the 
central issue, but the more likely reason is that the 
first audience agreed with Broadus concerning the subject 
at the outset. In this third discourse, the arguments are 
far more thorough, probably because Dr. Broadus did not 
expect the third audience to concur with his view. 
Clearly this pamphlet was intended to persuade a broader 
Christian audience of another point of view. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to investigate 
how and to what extent John Broadus applied Richard 
Whately's theories in three of his own addresses. 
Employing a model for critical discourse proposed by 
Lawrence Rosenfield, the author constructed a paradigm 
which includes elements of Whately's theory. Criteria 
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developed required that elements of the paradigm, first, 
must be found both in Whately's Elements of Rhetoric and 
in Broadus's Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery of 
Sermons and, second, must be in the opinion of contem-
porary experts, Whately's most significant contributions. 
The paradigm included the following elements: presumption 
and burden of proof, arguments from testimony and from 
analogy, and refutation of objections. 
Three of Broadus's discourses were analyzed accor-
ding to the provisions of the paradigm. They were studied 
in chronological order, which happened to coincide with a 
progressive order, namely, that both the quantity and 
quality of argument presented increased with each subse-
quent discourse. This dual increase may be explained in 
terms of Whately's ideas. 
The first address was presented to a Baptist audi-
ence and concerned a subject to which there could be 
little objection. The speech emphasized Baptist tradi-
tions, both in belief and practice. In terms of Whately's 
conceptions, presumption was clearly in Broadus's favor 
and there were few objections to be raised and refuted 
with that audience. The greater need of the audience was 
motivation rather than persuasion, and so there is greater 
emphasis upon appeal than upon· argument. Because the 
paradigm is limited to only a few aspects of argument, 
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much of the development of this speech cannot be judged by 
it. 
The second discourse was also intended for a Baptist 
audience, but involved a more controversial subject. Pre-
sumption favored Broadus, in that the majority of his 
audience shared his opinion. However, he admitted several 
objections to his proposition, so that the greater part of 
the discourse was given to refutation of them. The number 
of objections, properly admitted and refuted, account for 
the increase in quantity and quality of argument, as 
compared to the first address studied. 
Concerning burden of proof, it seems to this writer 
that Broadus did not follow his own notion that he who 
alleges must prove. To establish the proposition, he 
merely asserted that the obvious sense of the two New 
Testament passages which he quoted clearly prohibited 
women from speaking in mixed assemblies. The only argu-
ment following the proposition was the refutation of 
objections. Thus, his practice conformed to the dictum of 
Whately, namely, that if presumption favors one's proposi-
tion, he need only to refute objections to it in order to 
maintain it. It could be argued that he assumed the 
burden of proof and offered, in his opinion, sufficient 
support for the proposition to satisfy his audience. If 
he did assume the burden, then he may be faulted for 
failing to build a convincing case to establish his 
assertion. 
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The third address was longest and contained the most 
involved argumentation. This almost certainly was due to 
the fact that Broadus's audience was not primarily Bap-
tist, and therefore would not grant presumption in favor 
of his proposition. Although he claimed habitual pre-
sumption for the authority of the Bible, it is apparent 
that he conceded presumption concerning the specific issue 
addressed. He therefore offered relatively extensive 
arguments to establish his assertion. Rather than simply 
asserting his interpretive views as he had tended to do in 
the other discourses studied, he carefully argued support 
for them. He also went to great lengths to refute objec-
t ions, particularly those involving interpretation of the 
Biblical data. 
In the previous chapter, the writer discussed the 
unmistakable influence of Whately upon the theory of 
John Broadus. In this chapter he has examined that 
influence upon Dr. Broadus's practice. This examination 
has disclosed clear evidence that Broadus applied elements 
of Whately's theory in his speeches and discourses. 
Generalizations must be drawn cautiously from such a 
limited number of specific examples, but at least in these 




An understanding of argument is essential to an 
understanding of rhetoric. It is through argument, among 
other forms of proof, that one convinces an audience that 
a given proposition is valid. At least since the time of 
Aristotle, who wrote extensively concerning proof by means 
of argument in his Rhetoric, theorists have discussed the 
subject. 
Argument is important not only to rhetoric in 
general, but to preaching in particular. Therefore, 
various homileticians have discussed the application of 
argument theory to preaching. Two of these theorists, 
both from the nineteenth century, have been the subjects 
of this study: Richard Whately, the Anglican Archbishop 
whose Elements of Rhetoric was published in 1828 and John 
Broadus, the Southern Baptist educator and preacher whose 
Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery of Sermons was 
published in 1870. 
The purpose of the study has been to trace the 
influence of Whately's theory of argument upon the theory 
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and practice of Broadus. This purpose was accomplished as 
described below. 
The study began with a brief background study of 
Richard Whately and a selective description of his theory 
of argument. Elements were chosen for discussion, either 
because they were original with Whately or because they 
represented, in the opinion of experts, a significant 
development of ideas previously created. 
Included in the discussion were the elements of 
presumption and burden of proof. These notions, known in 
Roman and English law, were introduced into the field of 
rhetoric by Whately. He defined presumption as a preoccu-
pation of ground rather than as a preponderance of proba-
bility in favor of a given proposition. He believed it to 
be essential at the outset of an address to determine 
where the presumption lies, for the burden of proof, he 
said, rests with the side disputing the view favored by 
presumption. Presumption, in his view, favors existing 
institutions, the innocence of those accused of wrong-
doing, tradition, and individuals, bodies, or books which 
command deference. Presumption is also determined, he 
noted, by audience prejudice concerning a proposition. 
A second major contribution discussed was the 
Archbishop's theory of refutation. Following the classic 
theorists, Whately noted that there is not a distinct 
class of refutatory argument. Rather, he said that regu-
lar argument forms may be employed in refutation. He 
explained several ways one can refute propositions and 
objections. 
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Also discussed in the second chapter were Whately's 
notions of argument from analogy and argument from testi-
mony. An argument from analogy is based not upon simi-
larity of the essence of the analogues, but rather upon 
their relationships to some other thing or things. An 
argument from testimony is based upon a witness's state-
ment of a fact or an opinion. Such an argument, according 
to Whately, does not conclusively prove anything since it 
can be falsified. However, its relative weight may be 
determined by considering several conditions related to 
the testimony. Among these conditions are the witness's 
ability to know the facts or form an opinion concerning a 
matter, his own bias concerning that to which he testi-
fies, and the number of witnesses who concur in their 
testimonies. 
The third chapter included a background study of 
John Broadus and a selective presentation of his theory of 
argument. The ideas treated are among those influenced by 
Whately. 
Comparison of the two theories disclosed that Dr. 
Broadus closely followed Archbishop Whately's notions 
regarding refutation of arguments and argument from 
analogy. Broadus approached argument from testimony in a 
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slightly different fashion, however, distinguishing 
between testimony and authority. The former, he said, 
applies to matters of fact, whereas the latter applies to 
matters of opinion. Concerning the use of argument from 
testimony in matters of fact, the Professor followed 
Whately quite closely. In his discussion of authority and 
matters of opinion, he employed the notions of other 
theorists. It was in his development of the concept of 
authority that Broadus discussed his view of the authority 
of the Bible. Although Whately had not made the distinc-
tion Broadus followed, his ideas concerning the authority 
of the Bible were similar to those of Broadus and have 
been cited as the reason for his emphasis on testimony in 
the Elements of Rhetoric. 
In the matters of presumption and burden of proof, 
Broadus disagreed pointedly with Whately. Broadus pre-
ferred to distinguish between legal and rhetorical def ini-
tions of presumption. Believing that only the latter 
sense was relevant for his purposes, Broadus defined pre-
sumption as predisposition concerning a given proposition. 
A related difference of opinion between the two men 
involved the relationship of presumption to burden of 
proof. Broadus argued that it is useful for a speaker to 
know the predisposition of his ·audience, but that in 
rhetoric, presumption has no bearing on placing of the 
burden of proof. Whately had stated that presumption 
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determines the placement of the burden of proof. Unlike 
the Archbishop, Broadus believed that he who alleges bears 
the burden of proof, regardless of presumption. 
In Chapter Four, a paradigm for rhetorical analysis 
was developed. The paradigm included the elements of 
Whately's theory for which he is best known and with which 
Broadus interacted. Included in the paradigm were pre-
sumption and burden of proof, arguments from analogy and 
testimony, and refutation. 
The paradigm was applied to three of Broadus's dis-
courses, namely, "Duty of Baptists to Teach Their Distinc-
tive Views," "Should Women Speak in Mixed Public Assem-
blies?" and "Immersion Essential to Christian Baptism." 
The addresses were studied in chronological sequence, 
which happened to coincide with a progressive sequence. 
One progression was from a strong presumption in favor of 
Broadus's proposition in the first address to a presump-
tion against his proposition in the third. A correspon-
dent progression was from limited argumentation in the 
first address to extensive argumentation in the third. 
As one might expect, uses of Whately's elements were 
discovered in all three discourses. Broadus closely 
followed the Archbishop in matters of refutation, argument 
from analogy, and argument from testimony. Concerning 
presumption and burden of proof, only in the third dis-
course did Broadus offer substantial argument to establish 
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his proposition. In so doing, he conformed to Whately's 
dictum that if presumption favors one's proposition, the 
burden of proof rests upon the other side. Satisfactory 
refutation of objections is all that is required to allow 
the proposition to stand. Particularly in the second 
discourse there is little evidence that Broadus followed 
his own notion that he who alleges bears the burden of 
proof. 
Conclusions 
One aim of this study was to determine the contem-
porary usefulness of Whately's and Broadus's theories of 
argument for public speaking in general and preaching in 
particular. Conclusions pertaining to this aim will be 
discussed below. 
Before conclusions are suggested, some limitations 
which condition the conclusions of the study must be 
stated. First, the paradigm used for analysis is limited 
in its scope, for it included only selected elements of 
Richard Whately's theory of argument. Therefore, it can-
not account for all argumentative materials in a discourse 
compared to it. 
Second, only the variables of the message the source 
of the message were considered in the paradigm and the 
analysis based upon it. Rosenfield noted that the 
environment and the critic are two other variables opera-
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tive in any rhetorical event. The practical validity of 
the theory could have been better judged if the effects of 
the discourses, when they were delivered, had been 
studied. 
Third, the nature of the study is, in part, descrip-
tive. It is difficult to draw prescriptive conclusions 
from descriptive studies with any degree of certainty. 
The fact that a particular rhetorical theory has been 
created and practiced in the past does not prove that it 
is either valid or effective in the present. 
Fourth, only three discourses were studied. Upon 
such a limited sample, it is unwise to draw conclusive 
generalizations concerning either the general usefulness 
of the theory of argument involved or Broadus's applica-
tion of it. 
The limitations noted restrict one from drawing 
independent conclusions. Conclusions may, however, con-
firm or modify the opinions of others who have examined 
the theories and drawn conclusions concerning them. 
Conclusions have been suggested previously con-
cerning the extent to which Broadus was influenced both in 
theory and in practice by Whately's theory of argument. 
The findings reported in chapters three and four suggest 
that Broadus considered Whately's notions to be useful for 
preaching, particularly when controversial subjects are 
involved. 
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Expert opinion, cited elsewhere, noted the lasting 
contributions of Whately. He recognized the need to 
establish the truth of a proposition by the governing 
rules of logic, which he knew well. He also realized that 
a good argument must convince an audience. Combining 
these two notions, Whately produced a practical, psycho-
logical, audience-oriented rhetoric. His extensive dis-
cussion of refutation and arrangement of arguments 
reflect his audience awareness. 
Whately's work has also been applauded for its 
ecclesiastical usefulness. He assumed that principles of 
argument may be used to establish and support doctrines of 
the Christian faith. In his Elements he demonstrated this 
use. Certainly this study has confirmed this usefulness, 
for the three discourses studied here were directed toward 
religious audiences. Broadus's use of argument from tes-
timony and deference to Biblical authority particularly 
tends to confirm this opinion. 
Concerning the matters of presumption and burden of 
proof, Broadus pointedly disputed Whately's ideas. For 
rhetorical purposes, Broadus adopted the better view, in 
the opinion of this writer. In each situation the deter-
minant of presumption must be the audience. To claim 
presumption based upon tradition, for example, while 
addressing a group which holds no respect for tradition is 
folly. It is axiomatic in speech theory that a speaker 
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must analyze the audience and prepare and present a speech 
accordingly. 
As for burden of proof, Broadus also held the 
better view, rhetorically speaking. Following Whately, 
one might fail to assume the burden based upon an an 
inaccurate estimate of presumption. Consequently, the 
speaker would fail to prove a proposition to the satisfac-
tion of an audience. This difficulty was illustrated 
previously by a hypothetical sermon on the subject of 
infant baptism. Because tradition favors the practice of 
infant baptism, one whose propositions favors the custom 
might assume that he enjoyed presumption and fail to prove 
his propositions in his speech. If he were addressing a 
group of Baptists, he would fail to satisfy his audience 
because he had mistakenly placed the burden of proof, as 
far as that audience was concerned. 
Following Broadus's notion that he who alleges must 
prove, one will always argue to support his viewpoint. An 
audience's predisposition in favor of one's viewpoint may 
remove the necessity of extensive proof. But following 
Broadus's dictum, a proposition would not fail for lack of 
any proof. In the hypothetical example cited above, the 
speaker would assume that all of his statements should be 
proven. His arguments might not prove these propositions 
conclusively, but they would be more likely to convince a 
skeptical audience than mere assertions would be. 
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Suggestions for Further Study 
The limitations identified above suggest several 
types of studies which could be done to expand the present 
work. Following are a few suggestions. 
First, Rosenfield's model for critical discourse 
includes four variables: the message, the source of the 
message, the environment, and the critic. The message, 
according to Rosenfield must be included in all analyses, 
but other combinations of variables are also possible. 
For example, a study of the same discourses could be 
undertaken examining a combination of message and 
environment. Such a study would cover the information 
necessary to examine outcomes of the discourses, providing 
an additional basis for evaluating the usefulness of the 
theory. 
Another study could use the same critical model, but 
would employ different elements of argument in the paradigm. 
The same discourses could be compared to any number of 
elements of argument, drawn from Whately's theories or 
from the theories of others. 
A third type of further study could apply the para-
digm developed for this analysis to other sermons and 
addresses delivered by Broadus. Those chosen for this 
study were chosen for their controversial subject matter, 
among other things. It would be informative to analyze 
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some of the Professor's typical Sunday sermons to discover 
how and to what extent he applied Whately's ideas in them. 
A fourth type of study would be more empirical in 
nature. The contemporary usefulness of the theory could 
be tested by developing a series of sermons and addresses 
applying Whately's notions, and evaluating the persuasive 
effects upon a contemporary audience. 
It is this writer's hope that his work will help 
public speakers in general and preachers in particular to 
understand and apply elements of argument. Concerning the 
importance of argument, especially in preaching, the final 
word belongs to Broadus: 
Every preacher, then, ought to develop and discip-
line his powers in respect to argument. If averse 
to reasoning, he should constrain himself to prac-
tise it; if by nature strongly inclined that way, 
he must remember the serious danger of deceiving 
himself and others by false arguments. One who 
has not carefully studied some good treatise on 
Logic should take the earliest opportunity to do 
so. It will render his mind sharper to detect 
fallacy, in others or in himself, and will help to 
establish him in the habit of reasoning soundly. 
The fact that, as so often sneeringly remarked, 
"preachers are never replied to," should make it a 
point of honor with preachers not to mislead their 
hearers by bad logic, and should render them 
exceedingly solicitous to avoid those self-decep-
tions, which they have no keen opponent to reveal • 
• • • The delicate perception of truth, and the 
enthusiastic love for it, will inevitably be 
impaired by a contrary course.l 
lJohn A. Broadus, Treatise On the Preparation and 
Delivery of Sermons, ed. E. C. Dargan (New York: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1898), p. 170. 
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